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I. INTRODUCTION 
Disposal of hazardous waste is both a serious environmental prob-
lem and a costly one. In the United States, industry alone produces 
more than one quarter of a billion metric tons (MT)l of Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)2 regulated hazardous 
1 In 1985, United States industries generated about 275 million metric tons of hazardous 
wastes that were managed under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901-699li (1982 & Supp. V 1987). U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE 
HAZARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM, at ES-2 (1987) [hereinafter EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM]. 
Reported statistics concerning hazardous waste generation, however, vary considerably. For 
example, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) estimated that United 
States production of hazardous wastes was 569 million metric tons in 1985. OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FROM POLLUTION To PREVENTION: A PROGRESS REPORT ON WASTE 
REDUCTION 19 (1987) [hereinafter OTA, PROGRESS REPORT]. The Chemical Manufacturers 
Association estimated that its members generated about 212 million tons in 1985. Chemical 
Industry Waste Down 20 Percent, CMA Says, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 361 (July 8, 1987) 
(questionnaire results from 72% of major chemical producers). Higher numbers suggest that 
hazardous wastes not regulated by RCRA may also be included in the estimates. 
There is evidence to suggest, however, that the aforementioned estimates were inaccurate. 
Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,42 U.S.C. 
§ 11023 (Supp. V 1987), required industry to submit more complete data to the Environmental 
Protection Agency starting in 1988. United States manufacturers reported releasing over 22 
billion pounds of toxic chemicals into the environment or to off-site treatment and storage 
facilities in 1987. Section 313 Reports of Toxic Emissions Said to Reveal Need for Pollution 
Prevention; 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 154 (May 19, 1989). Estimates of total releases, including 
those not covered by section 313, may be close to 400 billion pounds or even higher if automobile 
emissions are included. Id. (1989 OTA estimates). 
242 U.S.C. §§ 6901-699li (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
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wastes per year that must be safely managed through treatment, 
storage, or disposal. Another 300 million metric tons of hazardous 
wastes are generated3 and are regulated under the Clean Water Act 
(CWA).4 Three of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) ten 
regions have companies that, combined, generate 219 million MT of 
the RCRA hazardous wastes. 5 The fifty largest hazardous waste 
generators produce eighty percent of these wastes, and fewer than 
five percent of the 21,728 generators together account for nearly all 
of the wastes produced. 6 
Industry should continue to move toward waste minimization 
strategies, but for the foreseeable future such efforts are unlikely 
to significantly reduce waste production. 7 As both our population 
and consumption per capita rise, our "throw-away" society can be 
expected to continue to generate massive amounts of hazardous 
wastes that threaten our already deteriorating environment. 8 There-
fore, while source reduction is important and should be pursued, we 
must focus on what to do with the extant and ever-increasing quan-
tities of hazardous wastes. All options for handling and disposing of 
hazardous wastes must be considered. These options must be ana-
lyzed from a health and safety perspective along with the usual 
concern for costs. For more than a decade, however, legal develop-
ments continuously have reduced the options for management and 
disposal of hazardous wastes by restricting land and water disposal. 
One effect of this trend in environmental laws is to make incin-
eration increasingly more attractive, particularly because it can offer 
better environmental protection at lower costs than legally accept-
able land disposal. 9 Incineration can take place on land or at sea. 
Land-based incineration has been the traditional method of thermal 
destruction of wastes in the United States. During the 1970s, ocean 
incineration began to emerge as a viable disposal technology. More 
3 These are figures covering RCRA-exempt wastes managed in 1985. Study Shows States 
in Three EPA Regions Generate, Handle 80 Percent of RCRA Waste, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
149 (May 19, 1989) [hereinafter EPA Study]. 
433 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
6 EPA Study, supra note 3, at 149 (data from EPA 1985 biennial report released May 12, 
1989). The three regions are Regions III (mid-Atlantic states), IV (Southeastern states), and 
VI (Gulf states). Id. 
BId. 
7 See Gordon, Legal Incentives for Reduction, Reuse, and Recycling: A New Approach to 
Hazardous Waste Management, 95 YALE L.J. 810, 812-14 (1986); LaCroix, Waste Minimi-
zation: The Goal Is Laudable, But the Meaning Debatable, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1641, 1641-
43 (Oct. 30, 1987). 
8 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR 
ACTION 12 (1988) (draft report of Municipal Solid Waste Task Force, Office of Solid Waste). 
9 OTA, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. 
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than a dozen western European nations used this technology, with 
most incineration taking place in the North Sea. 
Most experts felt that ocean incineration was a viable method for 
elimination of liquid hazardous wastes. Ocean incineration looked 
especially attractive within the context of the available alternative 
disposal strategies and the need to protect the environment and 
human health. The United States allowed incineration at sea during 
the years 1974 through 1982. EPA delayed issuance of a proposed 
regulation covering ocean incineration until 1985, however, and has 
never issued a final regulation. A potentially useful technology was 
intentionally vetoed through agency inaction. The nascent United 
States ocean incineration industry, unable to get permission to op-
erate, basically died. 
The ocean incineration program exemplifies deficient government 
leadership. Originally, EPA pushed for ocean incineration with in-
adequate information concerning its potential impact on human 
health and the environment. The agency issued research permits 
that seemed to be designed more to produce profits for a single 
company than to produce usable data. EPA's delay in issuing a 
regulation also effectively discouraged other companies from enter-
ing the field. 
In the 1980s, public opinion regarding ocean incineration changed 
from apathy to opposition. Though the public wanted the benefits of 
a high-technology lifestyle, it also sought a risk-free life. This av-
ersion of the affected public and of environmentalists to environ-
mental risks associated with ocean incineration was natural. The 
movement against ocean incineration was encouraged, and some-
times financially supported, by a land-based incineration industry 
that feared losing business to a low-cost rival. In addition, the prin-
cipal corporation desiring to incinerate at sea had a major credibility 
problem. EPA, rather than exercising a leadership role or acting to 
provide useful information on the relative risks of ocean incineration, 
took the politically expedient position of doing nothing. 
This Article first describes the current status of hazardous waste 
management and disposal in the United States, including the use of 
incineration as a disposal option. It next addresses the history, tech-
nology, legal regulation, and risks of ocean incineration of hazardous 
wastes. Finally, the Article assesses the use of ocean incineration 
for disposal of hazardous wastes. The assessment includes the factors 
that influenced the decision making process that led to the present 
ban on ocean incineration. This Article concludes that the United 
States must continue, with some urgency, to develop and utilize 
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methods that reduce, recycle, treat, and destroy our growing inven-
tory of hazardous wastes, and that all hazardous waste management 
options, including ocean incineration, should be considered and ob-
jectively evaluated. 
II. THE HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 
Prior to addressing the options for hazardous waste management 
and disposal, one must first ask whether it is realistic to expect that 
we could have a society free from hazardous wastes. Clearly, the 
answer is no-at least projecting into the next few decades. 10 As a 
goal, however, we should attempt to prevent the creation of hazard-
ous wastes. It is better to avoid the creation of environmental prob-
lems than to deal with pollution after it has been created. 
A general consensus has developed that a hierarchy of waste 
management options exists, with each option rated according to its 
ability to protect the environment. 11 The hierarchy includes: 
1. Waste reduction to produce fewer harmful residuals, including 
process changes and raw materials substitutions; 
2. Waste recycling, including resource recovery; 
3. Physical, chemical, and biological treatment that results in 
reduced volume and/or less toxicity; 
4. Incineration at high temperature; and 
5. Solidification and/or stabilization before land disposal. 
This hierarchy is generally accepted by both industry and envi-
ronmentalists. 12 Disputes typically arise over the criteria used to 
decide when an option is no longer viable, and a waste generator 
can move down the hierarchy to select another option. Industry often 
uses cost as the criterion, seeking an option that is cost-effective in 
three years or less. Environmentalists often use elimination of all 
toxic waste as the criterion, demanding waste reduction or recycling 
in all, or nearly all, situations. 13 
10 One study claims that the hazardous wastes generated in 1983 totaling about 266 million 
metric tons might rise to about 280 million metric tons by 1990, but would be at least 229 
million metric tons even with the maximal national effort for waste reduction. CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT: RECENT CHANGES AND POLICY AL-
TERNATIVES 43 (1985) [hereinafter CBO STUDY]. 
11 See Wolf, Source Reduction and the Waste Management Hierarchy, 38 JAPCA 681 (1988). 
12Id. at 682; see also Reitze, Environmental Policy-It Is Time for a New Beginning, 14 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111, 134-35 (1989). 
13 Wolf, supra note 11, at 682. 
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Techniques to prevent pollution, rather than end-of-the-pipe con-
trols, are finally getting governmental attention. 14 The U. S. 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the major environmental litigation 
organizations have issued strong statements in support of waste 
minimization programs. 15 In June, 1989, Senator John Chafee intro-
duced the Municipal Solid Waste Source Reduction and Recycling 
Act, which proposed the establishment of source reduction and re-
cycling as the preferred methods for managing solid wastes. 16 This 
is one of several such legislative proposals. 17 
A further push for waste minimization stems from the "Super-
fund," the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA).18 The Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act (SARA) requires that states assure EPA that 
their hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities are adequate 
to handle the wastes that they expect to generate over the next 
twenty years. 19 After October 17,1989, EPA cannot obligate Super-
fund money to states for remedial actions unless they have an EPA-
approved "Assurance of Hazardous Waste Capacity Plan."20 For 
waste-exporting states, there must be a reasonable match between 
their export and import quantities. 21 Such a requirement puts addi-
tional pressure on the states to find new ways to dispose of hazardous 
wastes.22 
14 SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FUTURE RISK: RE-
SEARCH STRATEGIES FOR THE 1990s, at 5 (1988). 
15 See Freeman, Hazardous Waste Minimization, 38 JAPCA 59 (1988); White, EPA Pro-
gram for Treatment Alternatives for Hazardous Waste, 35 JAPCA 369, 371 (1985) (studies to 
be conducted by EPA Treatment, Recycling, and Reduction Program). 
16 S. 1112, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 135 CONGo REC. S6014-16 (daily ed. June 1, 1989). 
17 See RCRA Reauthorization Action: Luken Offers Plan Emphasizing Waste Minimiza-
tion, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Aug. 23, 1989, at 12; First-Ever Market-Based Used Oil Recycling 
Bill Seen as Test for Other Wastes, INSIDE EPA, June 23, 1989, at 13 (waste oil recycling 
quota bills). 
'"42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
19 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499 tit. I 
§ 104(k)(9)(A), 100 Stat. 1613, 1621 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(A) (Supp. v 1987». 
20 Taimi, EPA Issues Guidance to State Officials for Hazardous Waste Capacity Assurance 
Project, 39 JAPCA 130 (1989). 
21 EPA Issues Draft Guidance to States on Showing Adequate Treatment Capacity, 19 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 964,965 (Sept. 9, 1988); cf State Officials Blast EPA Capacity Guidance, 
Predict Suits, Civil War on Hazardous Waste, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1899 (Jan. 27, 1989); 
States Negotiate Regional Agreements to Meet Future Treatment Capacity Needs, 20 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 742 (Sept. 1, 1989). 
22 See Brown, Developing Model State Legislationfor Hazardous Waste Reduction, ENVTL. 
L. (ABA), Fall 1989, at 1. 
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Until the mid-1970s, hazardous waste disposal was not viewed as 
a significant problem. Traditionally, wastes were either stored at 
the site where they were generated, shipped off-site and dumped in 
landfills, deposited underground using injection wells, or dumped 
into the ocean. 23 Today, land disposal of hazardous wastes has become 
increasingly difficult and expensive. Existing sites are running out 
of space, and new facilities are rarely permitted because of intense 
political opposition by people living near a proposed facility.24 Known 
as the NIMBY ("not in my back yard") or L UL U ("locally unwanted 
land use") syndromes, this opposition has imposed a national gridlock 
on the siting of new facilities. 25 Such opposition is not entirely irra-
tional given the record of disposal sites that have created environ-
mental problems.26 As a result, however, the United States is unable 
to deal with a hazardous waste problem that will not disappear. The 
necessary but increasingly restrictive legal constraints being placed 
on all forms of hazardous waste disposal exacerbate the disposal 
problem. 
III. DISPOSAL OPTIONS 
A. N onthermal Disposal Options 
1. Land Disposal 
Over time, EPA's regulatory, permitting, and enforcement pro-
grams have restricted the use of hazardous waste management prac-
tices that do not sufficiently protect the environment and human 
health.27 As a consequence, the short-term ability of EPA to handle 
23 u.s. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES: 
EPA's UPDATE 78 (1988) [hereinafter EPA, PROGRESS UPDATE]. 
24 See Steinhart, Down in the Dumps, 102 AUDUBON 290, 290-91 (1986); Detroit Audubon 
Soc'y v. City of Detroit, 696 F. Supp. 249, 251-52, 255 (E.D. Mich. 1988), rev'd sub nom. 
Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 344 (6th Cir. 1989) (remanding to Michigan state 
courts) (discussed in Detroit Incinerator Case Remandedfor State Court Review of Challenges, 
20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 114 (May 12, 1989)). 
25 See Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 437, 437-38 (1988); Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction 
to State Control of Hazardous-Waste Facility Location, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 1 
(1981); Tarlock, Siting New or Expanded Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facilities: The Pigs 
in the Parlors of the 1980s, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 429,433-34 (1984). 
26 See EPA, PROGRESS UPDATE, supra note 23, at 78. 
27 OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
ASSESSMENT OF INCINERATION AS A TREATMENT METHOD FOR LIQUID ORGANIC HAZARDOUS 
WASTES: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 6 (Mar. 1985) [hereinafter EPA, INCINERATION As-
SESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS]. 
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and manage hazardous wastes has been reduced severely. Environ-
mental laws that restrict disposal to air and water increase the 
amount of hazardous wastes that must be disposed of on land; all 
wastes must go somewhere.28 Most hazardous wastes have been 
placed on land, where they often create environmental problems, 
especially groundwater contamination.29 The Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that industry spent approximately $5 billion in 1983 
for hazardous waste disposal; yet, these expenditures were insuffi-
cient to provide adequate protection of the environment. 3o Current 
land disposal methods are clearly ineffective considering the increas-
ing amount of wastes and already have caused widespread environ-
mental degradation. 31 The shrinking availability of land for such 
disposal has hastened the trend away from the use of these disposal 
methods. 32 
The federal environmental laws applicable to land disposal, par-
ticularly the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),33 
its 1984 amendments-also known as the Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), 34 and CERCLA,35 are changing haz-
ardous waste disposal practices. In the 1984 RCRA amendments, 
Congress created a phased program by which EPA would reduce 
the use of land for hazardous waste disposal. 36 The goal of these 
amendments was that "reliance on land disposal should be minimized 
or eliminated, and land disposal, particularly landfill and surface 
impoundment, should be the least favored method for managing 
hazardous wastes."37 Under RCRA, EPA is required to set pretreat-
ment requirements that reduce the toxicity of wastes.38 RCRA has 
several other components as well: it prohibits storage of wastes in 
28 See id. at 56; CBO STUDY, supra note 10, at 47. 
29 National Groundwater Pol'y Forum, Groundwater: Saving the Unseen Resource, in THE 
CONSERVATION FOUND., GROUNDWATER PROTECTION 105 (1987). 
30 CBO STUDY, supra note 10, at xii. The Budget Office estimated 1983 expenditures 
between $4.2 and $5.8 billion. Id. 
31 EPA previously estimated that the United States generates more than 264 million tons 
of hazardous wastes per year. Incineration of Hazardous Wastes at Sea: Hearings Before the 
Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (July 12,1984) (statement of Representative Barbara 
Boxer) [hereinafter House Hearing 198.4.]. 
32 EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 3-3. 
33 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
34 Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
36 See Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(7) (Supp. v 1987). 
38 Id. § 6924(m). 
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excess of specified time and quantity limits;39 it restricts and subjects 
to permit requirements the disposal of hazardous wastes in salt 
formations or caves;40 and it prohibits landfill disposal of bulk or non-
containerized liquid wastes. 41 The overall aim of these environmental 
laws is to eliminate the land disposal of hazardous wastes. 
The program established in the 1984 RCRA amendments has three 
phases. The first phase of the land disposal ban began November 7, 
1986, when EPA introduced the regulatory program for land disposal 
prohibitions and treatment standards for specified solvent and dioxin 
wastes.42 The second phase banned land disposal of wastes on the 
"California list" after July 8, 1987.43 The California list consists of 
categories of wastes previously banned by California that subse-
quently have been incorporated into RCRA.44 These include free 
liquids associated with sludge, heavy metals, acids with pH less than 
two, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and halogenated organic 
compounds. California wastes, with the exception of halogenated 
organic wastes, must be rendered into a solid to be disposed of legally 
in a landfill. 45 
The third phase of the land disposal ban is a schedule for disposal 
restrictions of wastes not dealt with in phase one or phase two. 46 
The schedule ranks each hazardous waste according to its volume 
and toxicity, with the most harmful regulated first. EPA promul-
gated a plan in 1986 that would regulate "one-third" of the ranked 
and listed hazardous wastes by August 8, 1988, "two-thirds" by June 
8, 1989, and the remaining wastes by May 8, 1990.47 In May, 1988, 
EPA promulgated proposed regulations for restrictions on the first 
"one-third" of the list,48 and finalized them on August 17, 1988.49 The 
land ban on the "second-third" of the wastes was finalized on June 
8, 1989.50 The final "one-third" had regulations proposed in Novem-
ber, 1989, and final regulations are expected by May, 1990. 51 
39 [d. § 6924(j). 
40 [d. § 6924(b). 
41 [d. § 6924(c). 
42 40 C.F.R. § 261.31 (1989). 
43 [d. § 268. 
44 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d) (Supp. v 1987). 
45 51 Fed. Reg. 19,300 (1986). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g)(4) (Supp. v 1987). 
47 [d.; see also 51 Fed. Reg. 44,713,44,740 (1986). 
48 53 Fed. Reg. 17,578 (1988). 
49 [d. at 31,138. 
50 54 Fed. Reg. 26,594 (1989). 
51 EPA May Propose Most Stringent Treatment in Upcoming RCRA Land Ban, INSIDE 
EPA, Oct. 20, 1989, at 3; EPA Land Ban Rule Proposes Most Stringent Standards for Large 
Waste Group, INSIDE EPA, Nov. 17, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter EPA Land Ban Rule]. 
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The term "thirds" here is a misnomer. In the "first-third" rule, 
EPA issued treatment standards for only thirty-nine hazardous 
wastes. In the "second-third" rule, EPA issued treatment standards 
for sixty-seven hazardous wastes. In the "third-third" rule are some 
350 hazardous wastes. 52 
At the same time that restrictions on the generators of hazardous 
wastes targeted for land disposal have become more stringent, EPA 
has promulgated more restrictive technical and permit standards for 
landfills and other disposal units that receive hazardous wastes. 53 
These amendments set standards to prevent migration of toxic 
material into groundwater by requiring landfills or surface im-
poundments to have double liners and leachate collection systems 
between the liners. 54 In 1986, the rules to control and detect 
leachate were tightened again. 55 Land disposal facilities must meet 
even more stringent permit requirements by November, 1986.56 
Of approximately 1600 land disposal facilities with interim 
status permits, only 492 applied for a final permit. 57 Thus, over 
two-thirds of the land disposal sites chose to close or operate 
illegally rather than meet the new permit requirements. As with 
the regulations governing generators, these rules discourage land 
disposal. 
Other common ways to dispose of hazardous wastes also are being 
limited. For example, the export of hazardous wastes has come 
under increased scrutiny. 58 The 1984 RCRA amendments prohibit 
52 EPA Land Ban Rule, supra note 51, at 1; Procedural Difficulties Predicted for Third-
Third Rule-The 'Really Big One', 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1261 (Nov. 10, 1989). 
63 The basic regulations were issued in 1982. In 1985, the rules were amended to reflect the 
statutory changes made to RCRA in 1984. 50 Fed. Reg. 28,702 (1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 264 (1989». 
54 42 U.S.C. § 6924(0) (Supp. V 1987). 
66 52 Fed. Reg. 20,218 (1986). 
66 40 C.F.R. § 270.73(c) (1989). 
57 Hahn, An Evaluation of Options for Reducing Hazardous Waste, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 201, 223 (1988); see also Noll, Haas & Patterson, Recovery, Recycle and Reuse, 36 
JAPCA 1163 (1986). 
66 With disposal costs ever increasing, and land-based dump sites scarce, exporting toxic 
wastes has become an increasingly attractive alternative as the United States and the Euro-
pean nations become overwhelmed by refuse. EPA estimates that roughly 2.2 million tons of 
garbage cross borders annually. At this time, no international agency monitors where the 
wastes go or what occurs after they are dumped. However, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) gathered in Geneva in 1988 to try to agree on international safeguards 
to cover this toxic trade. Boroughs, Dirty Job, Sweet Profits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Nov. 21, 1988, at 54. In March, 1989, representatives of 116 countries approved a global 
convention aimed at limiting the dumping of hazardous wastes across national boundaries. 
But only 34 countries, mostly the developed nations, appear ready to sign the convention. 
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the export of hazardous wastes until EPA is notified and the receiv-
ing country consents to accept the wastes. 59 New bills that propose 
further restrictions on export of hazardous wastes are introduced 
regularly.60 Some of the proposed legislation seeks to limit waste 
exports to Canada, currently the largest recipient of hazardous 
wastes from the United States. 61 
Increased controls over land disposal will not end, in the foresee-
able future, the need for hazardous waste disposal in the United 
States. 62 This country will continue to create hazardous wastes in 
large quantities despite waste minimization efforts, especially since 
such efforts receive more publicity than money. For example, in its 
fiscal year (FY) 1988 budget request, EPA requested $398,000 for 
waste minimization efforts. This figure is about 0.03% of EPA's 
operating budget of $1.5 billion, and is less than EPA spent in FY 
1986 for waste minimization. 63 
If waste reduction and/or recycling is not going to play a mean-
ingful role in hazardous waste management in the near future, then 
the estimated quarter billion metric tons of hazardous wastes that 
are produced each year must be managed through treatment, stor-
age, or disposal. 64 For industry, land disposal involves dealing with 
the impact of the federal laws previously discussed. It also requires 
Third World nations appear reluctant because they feel the convention does not go far enough. 
116 Nations Approve Global Pact on Transborder Shipments of Waste, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
2516 (Mar. 24, 1989). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 6938(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Corresponding regulations are found at 40 
C.F.R. § 262 (1987). 
60 EPA Waste Export Plan Would Allow Shipments to Countries with Weaker Laws, INSIDE 
EPA, May 19, 1989, at 7 [hereinafter EPA Plan]; see also UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT 
PROGRAMME, BASEL CONVENTION ON THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENT OF 
HAZAROOUS WASTES AND THEIR DISPOSAL (1989). 
61 EPA Plan, supra note 60, at 7; House Bill Would Require Foreign Countries to Manage 
U.S. Waste Exports by U.S. Standards, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 195 (June 2, 1989). For an 
analysis of the status of this subject, see Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports: A Leak in the 
System of International Legal Controls, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,171 (Apr. 
1989). 
62 EPA and the states also face increased quantities of hazardous wastes as they bring 
heretofore unregulated sources into the regulatory sphere. For example, some 30,000 edu-
cational institutions in the United States generate 2000 to 4000 metric tons of hazardous 
wastes a year. Yet, only 62 schools were fully permitted under RCRA. Up to 4,000 Tons of 
Hazardous Waste Generated by U.S. Schools Annually, EPA Says, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
177 (May 26, 1989). 
63 OTA, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. There are 17 organizations within the 
federal government, however, that are engaged in waste minimization research and devel-
opment. Cranford, Federally Sponsored Waste Minimization Research and Development for 
Hazardous and Non-Hazardous Wastes, 39 JAPCA 34 (1989). 
64 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 6. 
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dealing with state laws concerning hazardous wastes,65 such as Cal-
ifornia's well-publicized Proposition 65,66 other California laws en-
acted recently,67 and toxics use reduction acts recently enacted in 
Massachusetts and Oregon. 68 Land disposal also exposes responsible 
parties to tort liability, including joint and several liability for the 
effects of other generators' wastes when hazardous wastes are co-
mingled. 69 If wastes are disposed on a generator's site, the wastes 
may affect the land's future marketability70 as well as the present 
insurability of the business. 71 
What, then, are the options that do not require traditional land 
disposal? There are three major choices: deep-well injection, dis-
charge to surface water or the oceans, and incineration. 72 
2. Deep-well Injection 
EPA estimates about twenty-five million metric tons (MT) of the 
303.6 million MT of hazardous wastes generated in the United States 
each year are disposed of in deep wells. 73 This accounts for less than 
ten percent of all RCRA hazardous wastes. Deep-well disposal oc-
curs primarily in Texas, Louisiana, Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana. Most 
65 Lennett & Greer, State Regulation of Hazardous Waste, 12 ECOLOGY L. Q. 183 (1985). 
66 Proposition 65 was approved on November 4, 1986 as a voter initiative and is codified at 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (West Supp. 1990). 
67 L. STEWART, CALIFORNIA HAZARDOUS WASTE ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
(1988). 
68 State Toxic Waste Proposal Mandating Reduction Plans Seen as National Model, INSIDE 
EPA, July 7, 1989, at 6. Oregon, with the passage of a landmark Toxics Use Reduction Act, 
joined Massachusetts as the only two states to mandate pollution prevention planning. Hansen, 
Pollution Prevention Planning: A New Mandate for Oregon's Environment, 6 ENVTL. F. 30 
(Sept.lOct. 1989). 
69 See Bayer, Joint and Several Liability, 21 TRIAL 56 (1985); Note, Joint and Several 
Liability for Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1982). 
70 See Evans, Environmental Audits of Real Property Before Purchase, 3 NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV'T 20 (1988). 
71 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: THE COST AND AVAILABILITY 
OF POLLUTION INSURANCE (Oct. 1988) (GAOIPEMD-89-6); Pendygraft, Plews, Clark & 
Wright, Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments in CERCLA Liability 
and Insurance Coverage Litigation, 21 IND. L. REV. 117 (1987). 
72 Wastes that are handled under any of the tested options can be treated first biologically 
or chemically to reduce volume and/or toxicity and/or to make them more stable. OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OCEAN INCINERATION: ITS ROLE IN MANAGING HAZARDOUS 
WASTE 85 (1986) [hereinafter OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION]. 
73 EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at E::>-4. An injection well means a 
"well" into which "fluids" are being injected. 40 C.F.R. § 146.3 (1989). A "well" refers to a 
bored, drilled, or driven shaft, or a dug hole, whose depth is greater than the largest surface 
dimension. Id. Injection wells are further classified on the basis of the wastes injected into 
them. Id. § 146.5. 
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deep wells are located at the sites where the wastes are generated. 74 
There are currently only thirteen commercial deep-well systems in 
operation, eleven of which are located along the Gulf Coast of Texas 
and Louisiana. 75 Both RCRA76 and the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA)77 regulate deep-well injection, which also has been re-
stricted as a disposal option. 
The HSWA 78 included a ban on deep-well injection of hazardous 
wastes, effective August 8, 1988, unless well operators or owners 
can demonstrate that the wastes will not affect adversely human 
health or the environment. 79 Regulations prohibit injection if wastes 
will migrate from an injection zone during the time wastes remain 
hazardous.80 Solvents, dioxins, and the "California list" were to be 
controlled at injection wells by August 8, 1988.81 As previously 
noted, the first "one-third" of all other RCRA ranked and listed 
wastes were to be controlled by August 8, 1988.82 The "second-third" 
of the ranked and listed wastes were to be regulated by June 8, 
1989, and all other ranked and listed wastes are subject to a May 8, 
1990 control date. 83 
Similarly, EPA imposed new technical requirements on deep-well 
injection of hazardous wastes under the SDWA Amendments of 
1986.84 These amendments toughened the Underground Injection 
Control Program of the SDWA 85 that had been implemented with 
the promulgation of regulations in 1980.86 Under the SDWA and 
associated regulations, wells that inject wastes into, or above, un-
derground sources of drinking water were to be plugged by May, 
74 EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
75Id. at app. C. 
76 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (Supp. v 1987). 
77Id. § 300h-7. 
78 Pub. L. No. 98-616,98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S. C.). 
79 42 U.S.C. § 6924(0 (Supp. v 1987). 
80 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: CONTROLS OVER INJECTION WELL 
DISPOSAL OPERATIONS 37 (1987) (GAO/RCED-87-170) [hereinafter GAO, INJECTION WELL 
CONTROLS]. The "no migration" provision has become controversial as EPA has produced a 
draft proposal that would allow some migration. Land Barlr-EPA Draft Proposal Expands 
Industry Exemption, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Apr. 19, 1989, at 17. 
81 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g)(4) (Supp. v 1987). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. § 6924(g)(4)(B)-(C) (Supp. v 1987». 
84 Pub. L. No. 99-339 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h to 300h-7 (Supp. v 1987». 
85 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h to 300h-4 (1982). 
86 OFFICE OF GROUND-WATER PROTECTION, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FACT 
SHEET: GROUND-WATER PROVISIONS OF THE SDWA AMENDMENTS OF 1986 (1986); Gray, The 
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986: Now a Tougher Act to Follow, 16 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,338 (Nov. 1986). 
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1985. Class I wells, which inject hazardous wastes below the deepest 
underground sources of drinking water, are subject to a comprehen-
sive permit program. 87 
These new requirements, however, may not have much effect on 
hazardous waste disposal because there are only 181 active wells and 
only seventeen of these are commercial wells. 88 Most wells handle 
only on-site generated waste. The General Accounting Office (GAO) 
estimates that about fifty-nine percent of the 290 million tons of 
hazardous wastes generated in the United States each year are 
injected as a liquid into deep wells.89 The GAO figure is highly 
suspect and differs from EPA's estimate that less than ten percent 
of the hazardous wastes is deep-well injected. 90 
Underground injection of waste is attractive to industry because 
it costs less than land filling. At noncommercial facilities, under-
ground injection costs range from $10-18 per ton, while landfill 
disposal costs range from $50-500 per ton.91 Moreover, the new 
environmental regulations are not expected to have much impact on 
costs of operating existing wells. 92 Because there are few commercial 
deep wells, and the siting of new deep wells will be subject to 
increasingly stringent environmental requirements, however, a ma-
jor move by hazardous waste generators to use commercial deep-
well injection is unlikely. 
3. Discharge to Surface Water 
The discharge of hazardous wastes to surface waters is the legal 
system's least-favored option. Discharges to the ocean are severely 
restricted by existing law and are becoming even more SO.93 In the 
past, hazardous wastes were often discharged to the ocean. 94 Since 
87 40 C.F.R. §§ 144-148 (1989). 
88 GAO, INJECTION WELL CONTROLS, supra note 80, at 3, 13. GAO says there are 17 
commercial injection wells and EPA says there are 13. See supra text accompanying note 75. 
The reason for the discrepancy may be that EPA does not count wells found in states where 
the state has taken over the primary responsibility of administration. 
89 GAO, INJECTION WELL CONTROLS, supra note 80, at 8. Of the remaining hazardous 
wastes, 35% is placed in ponds or other surface impoundments, and six percent is placed in 
landfills or buried. Id. Note that estimates of U.S. hazardous waste generation vary among 
the governmental agencies, and the quantity has been increasing each year. 
90 EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at E~. 
91 GAO, INJECTION WELL CONTROLS, supra note 80, at 8. 
92 Id. at 47. 
93 See generally COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 16TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 262-64 (1987) (discussing U.S. and international legal mecha-
nisms for controlling marine pollution). 
94 Id. at 262. 
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1972, a discharge from a point source or a floating craft into the 
navigable waters95 of the United States has required a permit under 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, now known as the Clean 
Water Act (CWA).96 No permit can be issued unless the permit-
issuing authority, which can be EPA or an authorized state agency, 
determines that the discharge will not cause unreasonable degra-
dation of the environment. 97 
Under the CWA, few hazardous substances are regulated di-
rectly,98 because most controls are imposed as limitations on effluent 
discharges by industry.99 The CW A focuses on 129 toxic priority 
pollutants. This list of pollutants developed from a 1976 consent 
decree between the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
and EPA 100 requiring the regulation of sixty-five compounds or 
classes of compounds. 101 The consent decree also required regulation 
of effluents from twenty-one industrial categories102 which have been 
reorganized subsequently into thirty-four primary industries. 103 
These priority pollutants also are incorporated into the RCRA and 
CERCLA regulatory programs. Among the point sources that the 
CWA regulates are publicly-owned treatment works (POTWs),104 
which, in turn, must impose pretreatment requirements on the dis-
charges of hazardous industrial wastes they receive. 105 The Toxic 
95 The "navigable waters" are defined as the waters of the United States including the 
territorial seas, generally out to three miles from shore. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982). 
96 See id. §§ 1342-1343 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). As rules governing water discharges tighten, 
the quantity of wastes disposed of on land or in the air increases. EPA regulations issued in 
1987 directed over 1000 facilities to reduce their surface water discharges by over 130 million 
pounds. These regulations were upheld in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 539 
F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1989). See EPA Directed to Explore Total Recycling to Eliminate Toxic 
Wastes, NRDC NEWSLINE, May-June 1989, at 2. 
97 40 C.F.R. § 125, subpart M (1989). 
98 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
99 Id. §§ 1311, 1316. 
100 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 
1976). 
101 I d. at 2129-36. 
102 Gaba, Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act: NPDES Toxics 
Control Strategies, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 761, 772 (1985). 
103 40 C.F.R. § 122, app. A (1989). 
104 POTWs that have a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, 
persons holding an ocean dumping permit under the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanc-
tuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), and permitted Underground Injection Control Program facilities 
under the SDWA are all considered to be in compliance with RCRA. T. WAGNER, THE 
COMPLETE HANDBOOK OF HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION 156 (1988). 
105 See Arbuckle, Vanderver & Randle, Water Pollution Control, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 244 (9th ed. 1987); Garrett, EPA's Amendments To General Pre-Treatment Reg-
ulations, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2530 (Mar. 24, 1989); Gold, EPA's Pretreatment Program, 16 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 459, 468 (1989). 
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Substances Control Act (TSCA)106 also regulates certain specified 
pollutants, including PCBS,107 chlorofluorocarbons (CFCS),108 and as-
bestos. 109 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 
(MPRSA, or the Ocean Dumping Act)l1O prohibits ocean dumping, 
except by permit, in any United States ocean waters by any vessel 
registered by the United States, or by any vessel sailing from United 
States ports. 111 The statute completely prohibits the dumping of any 
radiological, chemical, or biological warfare agent, or any high-level 
radioactive wastes. 112 The MPRSA also requires the Administrator 
of EPA to enforce the "Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter," commonly 
known as the London Dumping Convention (LDC).113 The LDC an-
nexes prohibit the ocean dumping of mercury and cadmium and their 
substances, organohalogen substances including DDT and PCBs, 
persistent plastics, oil, high-level radioactive wastes, and chemical 
and biological warfare agents. Additionally, the LDC requires special 
permits for other heavy metals, cyanides and fluorides, and medium 
and low-level radioactive wastes. 114 Congress has amended the Ocean 
Dumping Act to regulate oil taken on board vessels for the purpose 
of dumping at sea. 115 
Overall, the effect of these laws-the CWA, TSCA, and MPRSA-
is that ocean dumping of industrial wastes declined from five million 
tons in 1973 to 0.3 million tons in 1986. 116 Ocean dumping may be 
restricted further after the passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act 
of 1988,117 which makes it illegal to dump sludge or industrial wastes 
into the ocean after December 31, 1991. 118 This law could increase 
106 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2671 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). 
107 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1982). 
108 40 C.F.R. § 762 (1989). 
109 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2641-2655 (West Supp. 1989). 
110 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1445 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). 
111 [d. §§ 1412-1414b. 
112 [d. § 1412(a) (West Supp. 1989). 
113 [d. § 1412(a)(I); see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION: AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND PROGRAMS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY 56 (1983) (Report No. 83-34-ENR) [hereinafter CRS, HISTORICAL 
REVIEW]. 
114 CRS, HISTORICAL REVIEW, supra note 113, at 56. 
115 33 U.S.C. § 140l(c) (1982). 
116 EPA, PROGRESS UPDATE, supra note 23, at 69. 
117 33 U.S.C.A. § 1414(b) (West Supp. 1989). 
118 Currently only one company, Allied Signal Inc., continues to dump in the ocean. Allied 
dumps about 59,000 wet tons of acidic wastes in the ocean every year according to a permit 
application the firm filed with EPA. Allied has been dumping wastes into the ocean for about 
20 years. Wastes are dumped at a site about 15 miles off-shore of New Jersey. EPA officials 
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the attractiveness of incineration as a disposal option. But, as is 
discussed more fully below, because EPA considers ocean incinera-
tion to be ocean dumping, this law has been construed by the United 
States as a ban on ocean incineration as well. 119 
Without belaboring the point, the use of surface waters as a dis-
posal medium is no longer a viable option for generators of hazardous 
wastes. Legal restrictions on releases to land and water result in 
pressure for discharges to the atmosphere. This situation emphasizes 
the attractiveness of incineration as an option for hazardous waste 
disposal. 
B. Incineration 
Incineration is a destruction technology that reduces quantities of 
wastes and generally appears to be preferable to storage in landfills, 
injection into wells, or dumping. EPA defines incineration as "a 
said Allied has assured them that dumping will cease by the end of 1992. Reagan Signs Law 
Restricting Ocean Disposal of Sewage Sludge, Industrial, Medical Wastes, 19 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 1485 (Nov. 25, 1988). 
The DuPont Co. has dumped acidic wastes resulting from the manufacture of titanium 
dioxide at a site 106 miles off the New Jersey coast since 1968. Although the company filed a 
permit application with regional EPA officials to continue that practice, it withdrew the 
application in July, 1988, when it announced that it would cease dumping wastes in the ocean. 
Id. 
The Ocean Dumping Ban Act also increases the civil penalties for illegal dumping of medical 
wastes in the ocean. 33 V.S.C.A. § 1415(a) (West Supp. 1989). In 1988, Congress also passed 
the United States Public Vessel Medical Waste Anti-Dumping Act of 1988, which prohibits 
dumping of medical wastes into the ocean by public vessels six months from the date of 
enactment. Id. §§ 2501-2504. 
There are also nine local governments, three in New York State, including New York City, 
and six in New Jersey, that dump sludge into the ocean. A few other local governments, such 
as Boston and San Diego, pipe sewage into the ocean that has undergone only primary 
treatment. These local governments now are required, under court orders, to stop these 
practices. The Ocean Dumping Ban Act will end the dumping of eight million wet tons of 
sludge a year into the disposal site 106 miles from the New Jersey shore. Id. § 1414a(b). One 
problem with New York City sludge is that it contains high concentrations of cadmium, copper, 
lead, mercury, nickel, silver, and PCBs. Mayor Koch of New York estimated that it would 
cost about $500 million to build incinerators to burn this sludge if land sites could be found. 
Marshall, The Sludge Factor, 242 SCIENCE 507, 508 (1988). 
On April 19, 1989, the six New Jersey ocean dumpers sued EPA to prevent the imposition 
of penalties under the Ocean Dumping Ban Act. Passaic Valley Sewage Comm'rs v. Reilly, 
No. C 89-1670 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 19, 1989); see also Ocean Dumping: First Agreement Reached 
in Federal Effort to End Illegal Dumping, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, June 14, 1989, at 37. In 
response, EPA simply negotiated lower standards. 
Sewage sludge dumping in the ocean by Westchester County, New York will end December 
31, 1991. At the same time, New York City will reduce its dumping by 20% and halt all 
dumping by June 30, 1992. Ocean-Dumping Days Ending for New York, Wash. Post, June 
24, 1989, at A14, col. 1. 
119 See infra notes 411-13, 826-28 and accompanying text. 
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controlled oxidation process that uses flame combustion to combine 
hazardous wastes with oxygen, thus converting the wastes to less 
hazardous materials."120 Ideally, incineration converts organics to 
carbon dioxide and water vapor. However, if air is insufficient, car-
bon monoxide is produced. If chlorinated organic compounds, such 
as PCBs, are combusted, hydrogen chloride and chlorine are also 
produced. Incineration of other liquid hazardous wastes may produce 
metals, sulfur, organically bound nitrogen, and other substances. 121 
In addition, highly toxic products of incomplete combustion (PICs), 
such as dioxin and dibenzofuran, may form and be emitted as gases 
or particulates. 122 Waste incineration has three major benefits: (1) 
the process actually destroys most of the wastes rather than just 
disposing of, or storing, them; (2) it can be used to dispose of a 
variety of wastes; and (3) it is reasonably competitive in cost when 
compared with other disposal methods. 123 
Hazardous wastes typically occur as organic liquids or sludges. 
Incineration can only be used to destroy a small portion of these 
hazardous wastes. The most frequently cited estimate of RCRA 
regulated hazardous waste generation per year in the United States 
is EPA's 1981 figure of 264 million MT.124 This figure increased in 
1986 to 303.6 million MT, partly because it included twenty-five 
million MT that were deep-well injected under the SDWA regulatory 
program. 125 Approximately six million MT of these wastes are inci-
nerable liquid wastes. The amount of wastes potentially incinerable 
increases by adding materials such as waste oils regulated by RCRA 
since 1984, PCBs controlled under TSCA, industrial scrubber 
sludges, and air pollution control dusts. A 1986 study by Arthur D. 
Little, Inc. estimated incinerable liquid wastes to be at least ten 
million MT per year. 126 The Office of Technology Assessment esti-
120 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 36. 
121 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ASSESSMENT OF INCINERATION As A TREATMENT 
METHOD FOR LIQUID ORGANIC HAZARDOUS WASTES, BACKGROUND REPORT I: DESCRIPTION 
OF INCINERATION TECHNOLOGY 1, 2 (1985) [hereinafter EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: 
BACKGROUND REPORT Il. 
122 [d. 
123 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at II. 
124 [d. at 13; see also OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 63 (citing WESTAT, 
INC., NATIONAL SURVEY OF HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS AND TREATMENT, STORAGE 
AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES REGULATED UNDER RCRA IN 1981 (1984) (report prepared for 
the EPA Office of Solid Waste». 
126 EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at E~. 
126 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 65-66 (citing ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., 
OVERVIEW OF OCEAN INCINERATION (1986) (prepared for the Office of Technology Assess-
ment». 
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mated that as much as ten to twenty percent of the hazardous wastes 
generated in the United States each year could, in theory, be incin-
erated. 127 According to EPA's 1986 estimate, however, only 2.1 mil-
lion MT, less than one percent of all RCRA hazardous wastes, were 
incinerated. 128 
Most of the existing RCRA hazardous waste incinerators are lo-
cated on-site where the wastes are generated. There are over 175 
such incinerators that burn 1. 7 million MT of hazardous wastes each 
year.129 In addition, fourteen commercial incinerators burn 0.4 mil-
lion MT of the hazardous wastes generated each year.130 Currently, 
there are only two permitted incinerators for burning wastes con-
taining dioxin. 131 
EPA's assessment of incineration technology noted that the effi-
ciency of incineration, whether on land or at sea, is determined by 
performance, not design. 132 Currently, testing has shown that incin-
erators can destroy at least 99.99% of the indicator compounds used 
to assess performance. 133 EPA acknowledges a lack of complete 
knowledge regarding this technology, and notes the need for con-
tinuing research. 134 Nevertheless, EPA believes that incineration is 
a valid option and the best available approach to handle liquid haz-
ardous wastes. EPA also believes that incineration provides for 
effective protection of the environment and human health. 135 
Further, EPA projects that the demand for both commercial and 
on-site incineration will increase because of restrictions imposed by 
the 1984 RCRA amendments and because of other factors such as 
generators' increasing concerns with long-term tort-based liability 
stemming from environmental contamination associated with land 
disposal, costly Superfund clean-up activities, and declining landfill 
127Id. at 9. 
128 EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at ES--4. 
129Id. at 2-5. The number of incinerators, however, varies in EPA reports. For example, 
the head of EPA's Office of Water Regulations and Standards said there were 273 hazardous 
waste incinerators. EPA Plan Would Require BAT Standards for Hazardous Waste Treat-
ment Facilities, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 741 (Sept. 1, 1989). 
130 EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 2-5. 
131 These are mobile incinerators run by EPA. One was scheduled to cease operation in 
May, 1989, and EPA planned to use the other one only for experiments. Incinerator Used to 
Burn Dioxin Waste Will Be Shut Down in Spring By Agency, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1906 
(Jan. 27, 1989). 




706 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:687 
capacity.136 However, there is now a major push by environmental-
ists to prohibit incineration where possible and to get EPA to agree 
that source separation137 is the "best available control technology" 
(BACT) for incinerators. 138 Source separation would keep materials, 
such as automobile batteries, that produce dangerous lead emissions, 
from being incinerated. The overall effect of acceptance of such a 
position is difficult to predict. Environmentalists have demanded 
source separation as a way to defeat incinerator construction. 139 But, 
if source separation reduces the amount of metals present in waste 
streams, it should make the residues from the incineration of organ-
ics much less toxic140 and increase the acceptability of incineration 
as a disposal option. Currently, EPA is considering requiring ma-
terial separation for incinerators subject to New Source Performance 
Standards (NSPS)141 under section 111 of the Clean Air Act. 142 
Incineration can be used on any substance that can be burned, 143 
including hazardous wastes, municipal wastes, sludge from POTWs, 
hospital wastes, and various miscellaneous wastes generated by 
small businesses or apartment houses, for example, which can be 
burned on-site. This last category largely has been outlawed by state 
air pollution controls implementing the Clean Air Act. 144 
136 Id. at 14. 
137 Source separation is more likely to be considered within the scope of the Clean Air Act 
than recycling. See EPA May Call for Source Separation of Waste in Future Municipal 
Incinerator Air Permits, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 432 (June 16, 1989). 
138 See Environmentalists Launch Push to Get Mandated Recyclingfor Incinerators, INSIDE 
EPA, May 26, 1989, at 9-10. 
139 See EPA Region X Calls for Recycling as Possible Incinerator Permit Condition, 19 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2565 (Apr. 7, 1989); Cities Scrap Plans for Incinerators, Paving Way for 
Recycling, INSIDE EPA, Sept. 9, 1988, at 15. 
140 Sommer, Kenney, Kearley & Roos, Mass Burn Incineration with a Presorted MSW 
Fuel, 39 JAPCA 511 (1989). 
141 Reilly Rejects National Requirement of Recycling for Incinerators, INSIDE EPA, June 
16, 1989, at 3. 
142 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
143 As an extreme example, in India many of the dead are cremated and their ashes dumped 
in the Ganges River. About 10,000 bodies sent to the river are only partially burned, creating 
a serious pollution problem. The government plans to build more crematoria, but the low-
caste "doms" who have supervised cremations in India for centuries oppose this plan. Yerkey, 
Living and Dying with Ganga Ma, SIERRA, May/June, 1988, at 16. 
144 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. v 1987); see also NRDC Petitions EPA to Shut 
Down Incinerators in New York Apartment Houses, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1988 (Jan. 8, 
1988). Municipal ordinances also have been used to control the use of apartment incinerators. 
See Oriental Blvd. Co. v. Heller, 27 N.Y.2d 212, 265 N.E.2d 72, 316 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1970). 
Hospital wastes are incinerated primarily to prevent transmission of disease. While these 
wastes may be hazardous because of their potential for disease transmission, this subject is 
outside the scope of this Article. See Brunner & Brown, Hospital Waste Disposal by Incin-
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About twenty-one percent of all sludge from POTWs is inciner-
ated. 145 As of 1984, there were 268 sludge incineration facilities of 
which 156 are fully operational. 146 The others are either no longer in 
service, under construction or startup, being retrofitted, or used 
only seasonally. 147 EPA's policy for funding POTW projects requires 
that recycling and reuse of sludge be the options of choice, if eco-
nomically feasible. l48 This policy tends to make land application of 
the sludge seem more environmentally desirable. Sludge high in 
chemical contamination, however, is less desirable for land applica-
tion because of possible contamination of plants used for human 
consumption or for livestock feed. Likewise, highly toxic sludge is 
not appropriate for incineration because toxic air pollutants may be 
released. 149 
Municipal solid waste is heterogeneous, with a composition that 
varies with time of year and geographic location. 150 On average, 
about one-third of these wastes are paper and paperboard. 151 Yard-
wastes comprise nearly twenty percent by weight of municipal 
wastes. 152 Although incineration of some municipal solid wastes may 
emit hazardous substances, most of the wastes are not hazardous. 
Incineration of municipal wastes requires a design to deal with dif-
ferent conditions than those found in incinerating hazardous wastes. 
The scope of this Article, however, is limited to incineration of liquid 
hazardous wastes. 
eration, 38 JAPCA 1297 (1988); Allen, Brenniman, Logue & Strand, Emission of Airborne 
Bacteriafrom a Hospital Incinerator, 39 JAPCA 164 (1989). 
145 Ocean Dumping Ban, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, May 31, 1989, at 27. 
146 GANNETT FLEMING ENVTL. ENG'RS, INC., SLUDGE MANAGEMENT STUDY: BLUE PLAINS 
WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT 2-7 (1989) (Draft Environmental Impact Statement). 
147 More restrictive sludge incineration rules were expected to be proposed in 1989. Sludge 
Incineration Rules, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Nov. 2, 1988, at 13. 
148 Under section 405(d) of the Water Quality Act of 1987, EPA must establish regulations 
for the disposal of sludge. EPA issued its sludge proposal on January 19, 1989. The proposal 
was seriously criticized by a scientific review panel. The incineration proposal is currently 
being reviewed separately by EPA's Science Advisory Board. EPA Sludge Reviewers Find 
Risk Assessment Flawed, Too Stringent, INSIDE EPA, May 26, 1989, at 5. 
149 EPA's proposed sludge incineration rules have become controversial. See EPA's Science 
Advisors: Sludge Incineration Risk Assessment Too Conservative, INSIDE EPA, Sept. 1, 
1989, at 12; Sludge Incineration, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Sept. 6, 1989, at 23; Environmen-
talists Hit EPA Sludge Rule As Contrary to Agency Composting Goal, INSIDE EPA, Sept. 
8, 1989, at 7. 
150 See SCIENCE ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EVALUATION OF SCI-
ENTIFIC ISSUES RELATED TO MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION 20 (1988) (Report of the 
Environmental Effects, Transport and Fate Committee). 
151 Steinhart, supra note 24, at 104. 
152Id. 
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Hazardous wastes are not only burned in incinerators, they also 
are burned in boilers and industrial furnaces. Most of these wastes 
are generated on-site. 153 In 1981, twice the quantity of wastes burned 
in incinerators was disposed of in furnaces including industrial boil-
ers, cement kilns, iron-making furnaces, and light-weight aggregate 
and asphalt plants. l54 A wet-process cement kiln is considered best 
for hazardous waste incineration because the process uses high tem-
peratures for relatively long time periods to drive off moisture from 
the cement slurry.155 In 1983, there were over 1300 facilities using 
hazardous waste-derived fuels totaling 230 million gallons per year. 156 
The waste treatment industry has been litigating for more stringent 
regulation of boilers and industrial furnaces. 157 In October, 1989, 
EPA proposed new regulations under RCRA for these incineration 
methods. 158 
Recycling operations are exempt from the stringent regulations 
of RCRA. Determining what constitutes recycling, however, is con-
troversial. For example, Marine Shale Processors, Inc. (Marine 
Shale) has been burning soils contaminated with creosote and dioxin 
and other hazardous wastes for about one-half the price charged by 
their competitors. 159 Marine Shale maintains that it is recycling haz-
ardous wastes into an aggregate ash, alleged to be nontoxic, which 
it sells to the construction industry.16o Marine Shale's detractors, 
153 Oppelt, Incineration of Hazardous Waste: A Critical Review, 37 JAPCA 558, 566-67 
(1987). 
154 Id. at 566. 
155 Detroit Cement Maker Gets State Approval to Burn Liquid Hazardous Waste in Cement 
Kiln, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 176 (May 26,1989). "[H]azardous wastes can be burned in cement 
kilns as an integral part of the production process ... [whereby] [c]hlorinated combustion 
products get tied up in the cement itself, thereby minimizing toxic emissions." Zurer, Incin-
eration of Hazardous Wastes at Sea: Going Nowhere Fast, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, 
Dec. 9, 1985, at 30. 
156 Oppelt, supra note 153, at 567. 
157 Petro-Chern Processing, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Hazardous Waste 
Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also EPA Rule on Banning 
Waste in Cement Kilns Survives Challenge by Industry Group, Firm, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
1903 (Jan. 27, 1989). 
158 54 Fed. Reg. 43,718, 43,719 (1989). The EPA does not regulate land-based hazardous 
wastes consistently. Hazardous waste incinerators are regulated under Subpart 0 of 40 C.F.R. 
§ 264, while industrial furnaces burning hazardous substances are regulated under 40 C.F.R. 
§ 260. EPA is proposing to make the standards for burning hazardous wastes as uniform as 
possible. 54 Fed. Reg. 43,718, 43,719 (1989). 
159 Incineration Company, Sham or Not, Points Out Major Loophole in EPA Policy, 
ENVTL. MANAGER'S COMPLIANCE ADVISOR, May 9, 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Incineration 
Company]; Waste Processing-Action: Hearing on Marine Shale, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Apr. 
20, 1988, at 10. 
160 Incineration Company, supra note 159, at 1. 
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environmentalists as well as regulated incinerator operators, claim 
that the sales are not relevant because they constitute such a small 
portion of the revenue derived from burning the hazardous wastes. 
Rather, they suggest that Marine Shale is taking advantage of a 
loophole in RCRA that exempts from RCRA's provisions facilities 
that recycle hazardous wastes into a nontoxic product. 161 Marine 
Shale paid $1 million in fines as settlement of a suit brought by the 
United States. This deal resulted in criticism of the Department of 
Justice by members of Congress, EPA, and environmentalists. 162 
EPA's proposed rules governing the burning of hazardous wastes 
in boilers and industrial furnaces may make such disposal less at-
tractive. l63 Also, burning hazardous wastes for energy recovery, 
which is presently unregulated, soon may be treated legally the same 
way as burning wastes for destruction. l64 RCRA standards for par-
ticulate matter also will be imposed on boilers and industrial fur-
naces. 165 Thus, the movement is toward greater inclusion in the 
RCRA permitting process. 166 
Organic compounds can be destroyed through incineration, but 
producing a well-designed incinerator and operating it properly is a 
challenge for both the design engineer and the operator. The "Three 
161 Christrup, Nasty Business: The Marine Shale Masquerade, GREENPEACE, May/June, 
1989, at 14, 15. Marine Shale was subject to permit revocation by the State of Louisiana. 
State Revokes Permit from Major Waste Handling Facility, Threatening Shutdown, INSIDE 
EPA, June 2, 1989, at 12. Challenges were required to be made at the administrative level. 
Louisiana Court Rules on Challenges by Marine Shale Processors to DEQ Actions, 20 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 824 (Sept. 15, 1989). The Department of Justice settled a federal case for minor 
penalties, which settlement has become controversial. EPA Sources Reportedly Upset by Lack 
of Indictment in Recent DOJ Settlement, INSIDE EPA, Aug. 18, 1989, at 1; Marine Shale 
Reaches Agreement with U.S. Department of Justice, 39 JAPCA 1165 (1989); DOJ, EPA 
Blasted for Lax Civil Enforcement During Marine Shale Criminal Investigation, 20 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 959 (Sept. 29, 1989). 
162 EPA Officials Blast Justice Over Failure to Gain Marine Shale Indictment, ENVTL. 
POL'y ALERT, Aug. 23, 1989, at 19. 
163 See 54 Fed. Reg. 43,718 (1989). 
164 Incineration Company, supra note 159, at 1. Refuse-derived fuel plants and pyrolysis 
plants have not yet proved to be financially feasible or environmentally attractive. See Sus-
skind, Standard Setting By Consent: A Case History, ENVTL. L., Summer 1986, at 1 (ABA 
Newsletter). 
165 Burning Hazardous Waste, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Jan. 25, 1989, at 7. 
166 In June, 1989, EPA announced that it would separate proposed regulations governing 
the burning of hazardous wastes in boilers and industrial furnaces from the revised regulation 
on incinerators. EPA to Issue Boiler, Furnace Proposal Independent of Incinerator Regs, 
INSIDE EPA, June 9,1989, at 2. EPA divided the regulation to avoid further delay after OMB 
rejected the incinerator package and the Environmental Defense Fund filed a lawsuit for 
failure to promulgate regulations for boilers and industrial furnaces. Id.; see also Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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Ts" of incineration are temperature, time, and turbulence. 167 If an 
organic substance is made hot enough, for long enough, with ade-
quate air, it will oxidize to carbon dioxide, water, and a haloacid, 
usually hydrochloric acid. The variables, unfortunately, are not in-
dependent. Increasing air supply decreases temperature and/or res-
idence time. 
The design characteristics of an effective incinerator include: (1) 
efficient atomization of the wastes; (2) a thorough mixing of wastes 
and air through high turbulence; (3) a method to ensure that all 
molecules have the minimum residence time necessary for oxidation; 
and (4) a scrubber to remove acid gases and uncombusted particu-
lates from the gas stream. 168 Analysis of the scrubber water provides 
an effective way of monitoring destruction efficiency. It also provides 
a way of capturing unburned material if a malfunction occurs that 
does not trigger an automatic shutdown. 169 
The major components of a hazardous waste incineration system 
are: waste preparation and feeding, combustion chamber(s), air pol-
lution control, and residue/ash handling. 170 Preparation of wastes 
prior to burning is necessary to put wastes into a form that will 
allow them to be burned effectively.171 For example, mixing wastes 
with varying BTU values creates wastes that burn readily and min-
imizes the need for external sources of heat energy for complete 
combustion. 
Economic constraints further limit the wastes that can be burned, 
even if theoretically incinerable. For example, wastes that must be 
supplemented with auxiliary fuel to burn may be uneconomical to 
incinerate. 172 Thus, wastes with a high water content are costly both 
to transport and to incinerate and are more commonly deep-well 
injected or incinerated at the location where generated. 173 It is also 
necessary to limit the concentration of heavy metals and substances 
such as chlorine,174 which produce toxics when burned and therefore 
increase costs of air pollution control. 
167 EWK CONSULTANTS, INC., OCEAN INCINERATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: A CRITIQUE 
ii (1983) (prepared by Dr. Edward W. Kleppinger and Desmond H. Bond) [hereinafter EWK, 
OCEAN INCINERATION]. 
168 [d. at iii. 
169 [d. 
170 Oppelt, supra note 153, at 562. 
171 See id. at 562-63. 
172 See OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 55-57. 
173 [d. at 57. 
174 See id. 
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The physical form of the waste and its ash content determine the 
type of incinerator necessary.175 Incinerators typically are charac-
terized on the basis of their combustion chamber. Among the most 
utilized types are liquid injection, rotary kiln, fixed hearth, and 
fluidized bed. 176 Rotary kiln incinerators, which can destroy solid 
wastes, slurries, containerized wastes, and liquids, are the type used 
at most commercial off-site facilities. 177 Liquid injection incinerators 
are used to destroy pumpable liquid wastes. This is the technology 
utilized in ocean incineration, which is used primarily for disposing 
of liquid hazardous wastes. 178 
The first federal standards for air pollution control for incinerators 
were regulations promulgated under the New Source Performance 
Standards (NSPS) of the Clean Air Act. 179 The NSPS established a 
time-averaged particulate emission limit of 0.08 grains per dry stan-
dard cubic foot (gr/dscf), corrected to twelve percent CO2 for all 
incineration units constructed after August, 1971, that have charging 
rates greater than fifty tons per day.180 Many state and local gov-
ernments have imposed additional opacity standards181 and, in some 
instances, more stringent particulate controls.182 
Hazardous waste incinerators came under the more focused reg-
ulation of RCRA when technical standards were proposed in Decem-
ber, 1978. 183 The initial requirement for a land-based incinerator is 
to obtain a RCRA permit. This requires obtaining a "Part A 
permit"l84 which must be followed by a "Part B permit" by November 
175 Oppelt, supra note 153, at 563. 
176 [d. at 562. There are also emerging alternative technologies for hazardous liquid organic 
waste incineration. They include: (1) the high temperature electric reactor; (2) wet air oxi-
dation; (3) the molten salt reactor; (4) the plasma arc; (5) supercritical water; and (6) molten 
glass incineration. Only the first three have costs that are comparable to existing technologies. 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ASSESSMENT OF INCINERATION As A TREATMENT 
METHOD FOR LIQUID ORGANIC HAZARDOUS WASTES, BACKGROUND REPORT II: ASSESSMENT 
OF EMERGING ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES 3 (1985). 
177 Oppelt, supra note 153, at 563. 
178 [d. 
179 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
180 Oppelt, supra note 153, at 559. 
181 Opacity is the state of a substance which renders it partially or wholly impervious to the 
rays of light. Opacity as used in air pollution regulations refers to the obscuration of an 
observer's view. A. REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3-110 (2d ed. 1972). 
182 See, e.g., City of Miami v. City of Coral Gables, 233 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); 
Oriental Blvd. Co. v. Heller, 27 N.Y.2d 212, 265 N.E.2d 72, 316 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1970); State 
v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 9 Or. App. 189, 495 P.2d 751 (1972). 
183 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946 (1978). In 1980, proposed regulations were promulgated and in 1981 
performance standards were proposed. 46 Fed. Reg. 7678 (1981). On June 24, 1982, interim 
final standards were published. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,516 (1982). 
184 40 C.F.R. § 270.13 (1989); see also R. HALL, T. WATSON, R. SCHWARTZ, N. BRYSON & 
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8, 1989. 185 Part A permits require compliance with a number of 
federal statutes. 186 Part B permits have both general requirements187 
and specific requirements for incinerators. 188 
As part of the permitting process, the RCRA regulations impose 
performance requirements on land-based incinerators. Permit appli-
cants must perform a waste analysis as part of their trial burn and 
submit the results to EPA. 189 Applicants also must verify that wastes 
fed to the incinerator are within the permit limits. l90 A hazardous 
waste incinerator must achieve a destruction and removal efficiency 
(DRE) of 99.99% for each principal organic hazardous constituent 
(PORC).191 PORCs are selected from a waste's constituents to rep-
resent those that are present in large quantities and/or pose the 
greatest difficulty to incinerate. 192 For specified "very hazardous 
substances," a DRE of 99.9999% must be achieved. 193 This require-
ment also applies to PCBs burned under TSCA authority.l94 An 
R. DAVIS, RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE HANDBOOK 9-13 (8th ed. 1989) [hereinafter RCRA 
HANDBOOK]. 
185 40 C.F.R. §§ 270.14-.29 (1989); see also RCRA HANDBOOK, supra note 184, at 9-15. 
186 See 40 C.F.R. § 270.13 (1989). Permits must comply with the hazardous waste program 
under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), the Underground Injection 
Control Program under the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h to 300h-4 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program under the FWPCA, 33 
U.S.C. § 1342 (1982 & Supp. v 1987), the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) of 
Air Quality Program under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1982), the Nonattain-
ment Program under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), the 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), 42 U.S.C. § 7412 
(1982 & Supp. v 1987), pre-construction approval under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 
(1982 & Supp. V 1987), the ocean dumping permit program under the MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1412 (1982 & Supp. v 1987), the dredge and fill program under the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344 (1982 & Supp. v 1987), and other relevant environmental permits, including state 
permits. 40 C.F.R. § 270.13(k) (1989). Many federal environmental statutes include provisions 
that delegate permit procedures to the states, such as section 110 of the Clean Air Act. 42 
U.S.C. § 7410 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Other federal laws that may also apply and should be 
evaluated in the permitting process include: the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1271-1287 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,16 U.S.C. 
§§ 470 to 47Ow-6 (1982 & Supp. v 1987); the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1544 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982 
& Supp. V 1987); and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-668ee (1982 
& Supp. V 1987). 
187 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.1, 270.14 (1989). 
188 Id. §§ 264.340-.351, 270.19. 
189Id. §§ 264.341, 270.14, 270.62. 
190 Id. §§ 264.341, 264.345. 
191Id. § 264.343; see also Lee, Huffman & Oberacker, An Overview of Hazardous/Toxic 
Waste Incineration, 36 JAPCA 922 (1986). 
192 40 C.F.R. § 264.342 (1989). 
193 44 Fed. Reg. 31,551 (1979). 
194 40 C.F.R. § 761. 70 (1989). 
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incinerator producing more than 1.8 kilograms per hour of hydrogen 
chloride (HCl) must not emit more than the larger of 1.8 kilograms 
per hour or one percent of the HCI in the stack gas. 195 Particulate 
emissions are limited to 180 milligrams per dry standard cubic meter 
(0.08 grains/dscf).196 
A permit for a new hazardous waste incinerator must establish 
conditions necessary to meet the applicable standards. 197 Operating 
requirements must specify conditions in six categories: (1) the carbon 
monoxide concentration in the exhaust gas; (2) the waste feed rate; 
(3) the combustion temperature; (4) the appropriate indicator of 
combustion gas velocity; (5) the allowable variations in incinerator 
system design; and (6) other necessary operating requirements. 198 
The first four of these operating requirements must be monitored 
by the incinerator operator. 199 
Obtaining a permit for a hazardous waste management facility 
requires compliance with a considerable body of regulatory law2°O in 
addition to the specific requirements for incinerators. 201 Further-
more, the 1984 RCRA amendments mandate that all hazardous 
waste permits include all necessary controls to protect human health 
and the environment. This open-ended legal authority is known as 
the "omnibus authority. "202 To date, regulations to implement this 
provision have been delayed by the Office of Management and Bud-
get (OMB).203 
Critics consider permitting incinerators under RCRA to be slow, 
subjective, uncertain, expensive, and complex.204 Even when a fa-
196 Id. § 264.343(b). 
196 Id. § 264.343(c). 
197 Id. § 264.344. 
198 Id. § 264.345. 
199 Id. § 264.347. 
2m Id. §§ 124, 270. 
m1Id. § 270.19. 
3)2 42 U.S.C. § 6925(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
203 EDF Warns States on Incinerator Permits, 39 JAPCA 485 (1989). Draft hazardous waste 
regulations under RCRA subpart 0 would establish carbon monoxide limits, control toxic 
metals, and create tighter requirements on risks. Key Ccmgressmen Urge EPA to Rethink 
Superfund Policy Review, INSIDE EPA, Sept. 23, 1988, at 1, 10. EPA's proposed rules for 
hazardous waste incinerators were rejected by OMB. Incinerator Rules: OMB Rejects EPA 
Proposal, Saying Benefits Do Not Justify Costs, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Mar. 22, 1989, at 20; 
see also OMB Rejects Proposed Incinerator Regs, Citing High Costs, Low Return, INSIDE 
EPA, Mar. 10, 1989, at 2. 
204 See, e.g., Boomer & Trenholm, Common Deficiencies in RCRA Part B Incinerator 
Applications, 37 JAPCA 275 (1987) (common deficiencies exist in engineering descriptions, 
process monitoring, gaseous emission monitoring, automatic waste feed cutoff systems, waste 
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cility is given a permit, the permit is generally so restrictive that 
the incinerator often cannot operate without violating the permit. 205 
The average time spent obtaining a permit for a new incinerator is 
three years. 206 Since 1981, almost 100 incinerators have terminated 
operations. 207 Of the fifty-seven companies in the hazardous waste 
incineration business in 1981, twenty-three have gone out of busi-
ness, ended incineration activities, or put considerably less emphasis 
on incineration. 208 Under RCRA, interim status (Part A) incinerators 
must have obtained Part B permits by November 8, 1989,209 although 
the regulations governing the Part B permits had not been issued 
as of May, 1989. EPA does not have the personnel or the budget to 
handle the RCRA permit work. 210 Thus, indirect pressure to leave 
the incineration field continues to be exerted on operators. 
Environmental problems associated with incinerator operations 
derive from air emissions from the stack, contaminants collected by 
the air pollution controls, and bottom ash from the combustion cham-
ber. Stack emissions are considered the most severe problem. 211 The 
expert consensus is that incinerators can be designed and operated 
to meet applicable environmental laws. 212 When properly operated, 
incinerators pose little risk to human health. The greatest risk is 
associated with emissions of metals that are difficult to detect. But 
metals do not pose much risk for they barely exceed the one-in-a-
million action level for cancer risk used by EPA to trigger regulatory 
actions.213 POHCs and PICs pose an even smaller risk of two to six 
characterization, sampling and analysis, and quality assurance/quality control); Lee, Potential 
P'f{)blems with the Current RCRA Incinemtion Permit Process, 35 JAPCA 1076 (1985). 
2IJ5 Lee, supra note 204, at 1076. 
W5 Oppelt, supra note 153, at 561. 
MId. at 562. Of the 220 existing hazardous waste incinerators in the United States, about 
125 facilities in 34 states have yet to receive final operating pennits. EDF Warns States on 
Incinemtar Permits, 39 JAPCA 485 (1989). 
WI! Oppelt, supra note 153, at 562. 
109 42 U.S.C.A. § 6925(cX2)(A) (West Supp. 1989); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 270.14-.23 (1989). 
210 See Doucet, Incinemtion of Hazardous Waste: Critical Review Discussion Papers, 37 
JAPCA 1017-18 (1987). 
2lI Air emissions also come from hazardous waste land disposal. EPA has estimated that 
there are 1.6 million tons of atmospheric emissions annually from such sources. This is about 
equal to the tonnage of volatile organic compounds emitted by industrial processes. Zegel, An 
Overview of Hazardous Waste Issues, 35 JAPCA 50, 51 (1985). 
212 See EPA, INCINERATION AssESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 
3; Oppelt, supra note 153, at 576. 
2111 A 10-6 cancer risk is comparable to the risk from having one x-ray in a hospital. Lee, 
Incineration of Hazardous Waste: Critical Review Discussion Papers, 37 JAPCA 1011, 1013 
(1987). 
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orders of magnitude less than the cancer risk associated with met-
als. 214 
Some experts see basically no differences between the combustion 
of hazardous wastes and the combustion of fossil fuel in the emission~ 
of PICs,215 although the variability from source to source may be 
high. A recent study found dioxin emissions, which seem to be a 
major concern of those opposed to incinerators, to be an emission 
risk that comes primarily from automobile exhaust pipes. 216 While 
environmental problems from incinerators are relatively minor, 
there is enough uncertainty concerning the actual operation and 
monitoring of incinerators to encourage opposition to their use.217 
Limits on the technology used for monitoring incinerator emissions 
complicate the problem of assuring the public that incinerators are 
being properly operated. To obtain a RCRA permit for operating a 
hazardous waste incinerator, a carefully monitored trial burn is re-
quired. 218 If legally adequate performance is demonstrated, EPA 
issues a permit specifying the operating requirements to assure 
burning under conditions similar to those found during the test 
burn.219 These permit parameters establish CO levels in the stack 
gas, waste feed rates, combustion zone temperatures, gas flow rate 
(residence time in the combustion zone), and air pollution control 
operating conditions.220 These operating parameters are required to 
ensure that wastes will be effectively destroyed, even under "upset" 
conditions. 221 There have been more than 100 trial burns that indicate 
that a large variety of hazardous wastes can be incinerated and that 
the incinerating facility can still conform to regulatory requirements 
even under upset conditions. 222 Furthermore, RCRA permits require 
that all hazardous waste feeds be shut off automatically during an 
upset.223 
The present regulatory approach has several major weaknesses: 
it demands a rather accurate knowledge of the POHCs in the wastes 
being burned; compliance after the trial burn is obtained through 
214 [d. 
215 See id. at 1012. 
216 [d. 
217 See, e.g., Christrup, supro note 161, at 14. 
218 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.34(}-.351 (1989). 
219 [d. §§ 264.344-.345. 
220 [d. § 264.345. 
221 See Doucet, supro note 210, at 1017. 
222 [d. 
223 Lee, 8Upro note 213, at 1014. 
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controls imposed on operating conditions that may not reflect emis-
sions accurately; and it does not fully address the formation of prod-
ucts of incomplete combustion (PICs).224 Determining the extent of 
harmful emissions from an incinerator is an expensive, time-consum-
ing process. Successful incineration requires that proper conditions 
be maintained during the burn. But failures can occur. The challenge 
is to meet the "Three Ts" of incineration-time, temperature, and 
turbulence-that are appropriate for the substances being burned. 225 
A successful burn is achieved by ranking POHCs based on how 
difficult they are to burn and then selecting an appropriate burning 
regime that will destroy the most difficult to burn POHC present in 
the wastes. 226 The biggest problem is that the composition of the 
wastes may not be fully known or the POHC ranking system may 
not be accurate. 
After selecting an appropriate burn regime, various incineration 
surrogates are used to keep operations within legally acceptable 
limits.227 There are three common approaches. First, CO and total 
hydrocarbon can be continuously monitored. 228 Despite its common 
usage, however, little or no correlation exists between these surro-
gate emissions and the organic emissions sought to be controlled. 229 
Second, indicator additives that do not appear in the waste, such as 
Freon or sulfur hexafluoride, can be used. By comparing the amount 
of the indicator before and after combustion, combustion efficiency 
can be determined. Unfortunately, the indicator chemical effectively 
may be destroyed while PICs are produced in improper concentra-
tions due to differences in their combustion characteristics. 230 The 
third approach, which is less common, involves using POHC/PIC 
soups. Stable POHCs that produce stable PICs are used as standard 
test mixtures (soups) for incineration performance certification. The 
224 Dellinger, Incineration of Hazardous Waste: Critical Review Discussion Papers, 37 
JAPCA 1019 (1987). The formula for Destruction Efficiency (DE) is as follows: DE = input-
output/input x 100%. If all of a quantity of hazardous chemicals were incinerated and turned 
into dioxin, the incineration would be perfect and the DE would be 100% even though all of 
the burned chemicals were turned into a different, more harmful chemical. This result could 
not happen, but it illustrates a significant weakness of the DE concept. 
225 See Williams, Becker & Girovich, 3-D Flow Modeling of a Hazardous Waste Incinerator, 
38 JAPCA 1050 (1988). 
226 See Dellinger, supra note 224, at 1020-21. 
227 Id. at 1022. 
228 See, e.g., Staley, Richards, Huffman, Olexsey & Dellinger, On the Relationship Between 
CO, POHC, and PIC Emissions from a Simulated Hazardous Waste Incinerator, 39 JAPCA 
321 (1989). 
229 I d. at 323. 
230 See Dellinger, supra note 224, at 1022. 
1990] OCEAN INCINERATION 717 
difficulty with this approach lies in the lack of understanding con-
cerning the relative incinerability of POHC mixtures and the fact 
that stable POHCs may pass a test that less stable components of 
the waste might fail. 2~1 
The final subsystem of hazardous waste incineration is residue and 
ash handling. 232 The type and quantity of ash produced by incinera-
tion depends on the composition of the wastes being burned. Solid 
wastes create more ash than liquid wastes. Incinerators that use air 
pollution controls generate sludges and effluents from wet scrubbers 
and dusts from dry scrubbers or other collection devices.233 The land-
based incinerator regulation234 and the proposed regulation for ocean 
incineration define ash and other residues as hazardous wastes and 
impose the requisite control requirements. 235 Under RCRA, how-
ever, a variance can be granted if the residue is shown to be non-
hazardous.236 Residues also can be delisted on a case-by-case basis 
under the 1984 RCRA amendments. 237 
The major controversy concerning incinerator ash is whether ash 
from municipal incinerators should be regulated as RCRA hazardous 
waste.238 Currently, many facilities claim that they are exempt under 
RCRA section 3001(i)(G), which would allow them to be regulated 
under the less stringent subtitle D if the wastes are household wastes 
or commercial solid wastes even if the wastes fail an EPA toxicity 
test. This issue is presently an unresolved question as neither the 
courts nor EPA have ruled. 239 
Incineration technology has improved considerably in the past 
decade. Stringent regulatory requirements can now be met. N one-
theless, political opposition to the siting of incinerators is intense.24o 
231 See id. 
232 Oppelt, supra note 153, at 566. 
233 See id. 
234 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.270-.283 (1989). 
235 50 Fed. Reg. 8222 (1985). 
235 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(d), 264.351, 265.351 (1989) (defining nonhazardous waste). 
237Id. § 260.22. 
238 See Florio Introduces Bill to Regulate Air, Ash Generated by Municipal Garbage Incin-
eration, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 294,295 (July 1, 1988). The extent to which the use of municipal 
incineration expands may depend on how the disposal of waste ash is treated. If it is considered 
hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA, as many environmentalists desire, the additional 
costs may slow growth in the use of incinerators. See Municipal Ash Bill Stalls in Markup; 
Florio Says He Will Offer 22 Amendments, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 467 (Aug. 5, 1988); Enm-
ronmentalists, EPA Differ in Interpreting Results of Study on Municipal Incinerator Ash, 
18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1963, 1965 (Jan. 1, 1988); Municipal Incinerator Ash Disposal, ENVTL. 
POL'y ALERT, Apr. 20, 1988, at 9. 
239 See INSIDE EPA, May 12, 1989, at 16. 
240 See Russell, Enmronmental Racism, 11 AMICUS J., Spring 1989, at 22. 
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Such opposition is fueled by the uncertainties and technological lim-
itations concerning monitoring despite the fact that the relative risk 
from incineration is low compared to disposal alternatives. Ocean 
incineration offers a significantly lower risk than the already low 
human health risk associated with land-based incineration because 
of its greater distance from human populations.241 This particular 
approach to incineration, the incineration at sea of liquid organic 
hazardous wastes, has been the subject of intense debate and is the 
focus of the next section. 
IV. OCEAN INCINERATION 
A. Introduction 
Ocean incineration usually is considered appropriate only for liquid 
organic hazardous wastes. 242 Although up to twenty percent of all 
hazardous wastes are theoretically incinerable, only about eight per-
cent are suitable for ocean incineration. 243 The liquid injection tech-
nology used in ocean incineration makes this alternative less versa-
tile than land-based incineration, which, by using rotary kilns, also 
can burn solids and sludges. 244 Liquid injection incinerators can han-
dle a large volume of wastes, but the wastes must be in a form in 
which they can be pumped and introduced into the incinerator as 
small droplets. 245 In addition, incinerable wastes must have the phys-
ical form, energy content, and hazardous properties appropriate for 
the particular incineration technology being used.246 Ocean inciner-
ation is especially useful for destruction of highly chlorinated liquid 
wastes that are difficult to destroy in land-based incinerators.247 
Polychlorinated wastes, while comprising less than ten percent of 
incinerable hazardous wastes, are some of the most toxic.248 Wastes 
with a high metal content, however, may be inappropriate for dis-
posal through incineration.249 
241 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 1. 
242 See OTA, OcEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 3. 
243 Id. The wastes most appropriate for ocean incineration include waste oils, nonhalogenated 
solvents, halogenated solvents, other organic liquids (often referred to as RCRA "K" wastes), 
and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Id. at 71. 
244 See EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: BACKGROUND REPORT I, supra note 121. 
245 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 55.' 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 3. 
246 Id. at 4. 
249 See supra note 140, infra notes 454-60, 521, 541-43, 776 and accompanying text. 
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The chemical, petroleum, and coal industries produce the great 
majority of the incinerable liquid organic wastes,250 at least half of 
which is generated by industries situated along the Gulf and Middle 
Atlantic Coasts. Coastal proximity is one factor making these wastes 
suitable for ocean incineration. 251 Moreover, the amount of wastes 
generated at these sites is expected to increase in the future, even 
after accounting for waste reduction and recycling efforts.252 In-
creases will occur in part because nonincinerable wastes are more 
suitable for waste reduction, recycling, and recovery. 253 
An additional factor affecting the quantity of wastes available for 
ocean incineration is the amount disposed on-site where generated. 
Because ocean incineration is off-site, the extent of its use is at best 
inversely proportional to on-site disposal. An EPA analysis found 
that at least ninety percent of present liquid waste incineration was 
at on-site facilities. 254 This practice, therefore, introduces consider-
able uncertainty concerning the potential market for ocean inciner-
ation.255 
Nevertheless, using a midpoint estimate for liquid hazardous 
waste incineration, EPA projected a need for thirty-three incinerator 
ships with a capacity of 50,000 MT per ship per year or eighty-two 
land-based incinerators with a capacity of 20,000 MT per year.256 
Although these projections are not easily verifiable, a shortfall in 
present and future capabilities for incinerable waste management 
had been asserted until only recently.257 The land-based incineration 
industry claimed otherwise, 258 despite the fact that it then expanded 
250 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 66. 
251Id. 
252 Id. at 69-71 (citing MINNESOTA WASTE MANAGEMENT BD., REVISED DRAFT HAZARDOUS 
WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN (1984». 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 73 (citing U.S .. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ASSESSMENT OF INCINERATION AS 
A TREATMENT METHOD FOR LIQUID ORGANIC HAZARDOUS WASTES, BACKGROUND REPORT 
III: ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE INCINERATION MARKET (1985». 
255 Id. 
256 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 60. 
257 EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 4-1; see also Wybenga, A "Burning" 
Issue: Ocean Incineration, 39 PROC. OF THE MARINE SAFETY COUNCIL 143 (1982). 
258 Incineration of Hazardous Waste at Sea, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries 
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment and the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the 
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 234 (Dec. 7, 1983) 
(statement of Robert C. Gregory, Vice President and Technical Director, Rollins Environ-
mental Services, Inc.) [hereinafter House Hearing 1983]. In opposition to ocean incineration, 
the Cousteau Society testified that the London Dumping Convention (LDC) requires a showing 
of need. It claimed there was no need, because both Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. and 
ENSCO, Inc. had excess capacity. The Cousteau Society appended letters from executives of 
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its capacity between 1985 and 1987. 259 Future demand for incinera-
tion ultimately may decline, however, as some harmful chemicals, 
such as PCBs, no longer are manufactured and because of an increase 
in the use of industrial boilers and furnaces for hazardous waste 
disposal. 260 But, demand could increase quickly if the rules described 
previously261 concerning boilers and industrial furnaces become more 
stringent and thereby direct hazardous wastes to other disposal 
options. 
The capacity of the waste treatment and disposal industry is, of 
course, a function of the stringency of the laws applied to them. If, 
for example, EPA imposed regulations as strict as those proposed 
for ocean incineration to land-based incineration, some land-based 
incinerators could be forced out of business. 
Compared to land-based incineration, ocean incineration technol-
ogy is in its infancy. At present, the combined capacity of all ocean 
incineration ships in the world could burn only a small portion of the 
United States' incinerable hazardous wastes. Ocean incineration 
presents most of the problems associated with land-based incinera-
tion, although it poses fewer public health problems because it dis-
tances incineration from population concentrations. However, ocean 
incineration presents at least four types of problems not as exten-
sively associated with land-based systems: (1) the use of ports to 
transfer hazardous wastes to ships creating additional potential for 
accidents;262 (2) the potential impact of the emissions on the ocean 
ecosystems;263 (3) incineration of wastes by using ships at sea com-
plicates monitoring and enforcement; and (4) additional legal con-
straints from international laws concerning at-sea operations. As is 
discussed below, most of these concerns are not associated only with 
the ocean incineration option. 
both land-based incineration companies that attested to the ability of those companies to 
handle the incineration of wastes proposed for ocean incineration. Ocean Incineration, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment 
and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 565-88 (1985) (statement of the Cousteau Society) 
[hereinafter Senate Hearing 1985]. 
259 From Shortage to Surplus, The Changing State of Incinerator Capacity, ENVTL, MAN-
AGERS COMPLIANCE ADVISOR, May 23, 1988, at 6 [hereinafter From Shortage to Surplus]. In 
1989, Rollins Environmental Services had the capacity in place to increase incineration volumes 
by 30-40%. V AWE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY 353 (2d ed. June 30, 1989). 
260 From Shortage to Surplus, supra note 259, at 7. 
261 See supra notes 158, 163-66 and accompanying text. 
262 See MARITIME ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PLANNING A PORT INTERFACE FOR AN 
OCEAN INCINERATION SYSTEM (1986) (Report No. MA RD 760-85046) (prepared by Henry 
Marcus and Maurice Glucksman). 
263 Land-based incineration, however, can also affect the oceans with the fallout of emissions 
transported as air pollution from these facilities. 
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B. History 
Ocean incineration-the concept of using floating furnaces to burn 
liquid hazardous wastes at sea-began in 1969 as an alternative to 
dumping wastes directly into the ocean. Ocean incineration was 
developed by some European countries because of a shortage of land 
for disposal and because ocean incineration was considered environ-
mentally preferable to most land disposal options for hazardous 
wastes. 264 A modified chemical tanker, the Matthias I, first burned 
organochlorine waste in the North Sea.265 The wastes incinerated at 
sea increased from 4000 tons per year (t/y) in 1969 and stabilized at 
about 100,000 t/y in the 1980s.266 
During the 1970s and the early 1980s, two additional incinerator 
ships, the Matthias II and the Vulcanus 1,267 successfully operated 
off the coast of Europe in the North Sea. 268 About 320. voyages were 
made, and about 650,000 metric tons of hazardous wastes were 
incinerated. 269 No collisions, groundings, rammings, fires, or other 
accidents occurred, nor were there any spills at port while loading 
wastes onto these ships.270 In 1983, the Matthias II lost its right to 
operate when West German authorities detected high levels of dioxin 
in its incineration exhaust gases. 271 Another vessel, the Matthias 
III, operated briefly between 1975 and 1977, but was sold in 1979 
for scrap in Spain because test burns showed that it was unsuitable 
for the incineration of organohalogen wastes at sea. 272 In 1979, a new 
vessel, the Vesta, owned by Lehnkering Montan Transport A.G. of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, began operation in the North 
264 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 23. 
265 Asmus & Johnson, A Sea of Troubles: Where Will Ocean Incineration Turn Up Next?, 
GREENPEACE, March/April 1988, at 7. The West German chemical companies, Bayer and 
Solvey et Cie, employed the ship. The Matthias I was decommissioned in 1975. Helsing, 
Offshore Disposal of Hazardous Waste, ENVTL. REG. ANALYST, July 1980, at 2,3. 
266 EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF CHEM. MFRS.' FED'NS, INCINERATION AT SEA: HISTORY, STATE 
OF THE ART AND OUTLOOK 3 (1985) [hereinafter CEFIC, INCINERATION AT SEA]. 
2670TA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 193. The Vulcanus was renamed the 
Vulcanus I when Vulcanus II was built. 
266 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 78. 
The Oslo Dumping Convention regulates, in part, incineration activities in the North Sea. See 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Feb. 
15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S. 5 [hereinafter Oslo Dumping Convention]. 
269 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 78. 
27°Id. 
271 The ship was reportedly emitting 40-50 grams of dioxin per incineration journey. Bunin, 
Ocean Incineration-The Case for a Global Ban, STICHTING GREENPEACE COUNCIL 1, 4 
(1988). 
272 International Maritime Organization, Incineration At Sea, SCIENTIFIC GROUP ON DUMP-
ING, 7TH MEETING, Agenda Item 10 (LDC/SG.7/1O/5) (Sept. 12, 1983); see also Bunin, supra 
note 271, at 4. 
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Sea. 273 In 1982, the Vulcanus II was constructed for Ocean Com-
bustion Services of the Netherlands. 274 Ocean Combustion Services 
became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Chemical Waste Management, 
Inc. (Chern Waste) in 1980. Thus, the two Vulcanus ships effectively 
became the property of Waste Management, Inc. (Waste Manage-
ment), the parent company of Chern Waste. The two Vulcanus ships 
and the Vesta are the only ocean incineration vessels remaining in 
operation today. 275 
Before any corporation could begin incinerating hazardous wastes 
in waters of the United States, Congress passed the Marine Protec-
tion, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), also known 
as the Ocean Dumping Act.276 The MPRSA regulates the transpor-
tation of material from the United States for the purpose of dumping 
into ocean waters, and prohibits ocean dumping of wastes without a 
federal permit from vessels registered in the United States.277 The 
purpose of the MPRSA is to place a strict limit on the dumping into 
ocean waters of any material that will "adversely affect human 
health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological 
systems, or economic potentialities. "278 
Under the MPRSA, EPA issued two types of permits-short-term 
"research" permits and "special" (commercial operating) permits. 279 
In evaluating applications for ocean dumping permits, EPA must 
consider a number of environmental factors as well as the alterna-
tives to ocean dumping. 280 Although EPA began promulgating ocean 
dumping regulations in 1973, and issued its first permit in 1974,281 it 
did not publish complete regulations governing the issuance of both 
types of permits until 1977.282 Under these regulations, EPA may 
issue a permit only if the agency determines that there are no 
practicable improvements that will reduce adverse impacts and there 
are no practicable alternatives available that have less adverse en-
vironmental impact or potential risk. 283 
273 Bunin, supra note 271, at 4. 
274 CEFIC, INCINERATION AT SEA, supra note 266, at 4, 11. 
275 Nassos, The Problem of Ocean Incineration: A Case of Modern Mythology, 18 MARINE 
POLLUTION BULL. 211 (1987). 
276 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
277 See id. §§ 1411-1412. 
278Id. § 1401(b). 
279Id. § 1412(b); 50 Fed. Reg. 8231 (1985). 
280 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a). 
281 38 Fed. Reg. 8726 (1973) (proposed Apr. 5, 1973); see also Note, The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency's Proposal for At-Sea Incineration of Hazardous Waste-
A Transnational Perspective, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157, 172 (1988). 
282 40 C.F.R. §§ 220-223 (1988). 
283 Id. § 227. 16(a). 
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In 1985, EPA proposed rules modifying its ocean dumping regu-
lations concerning ocean incineration and provided for three types 
of permits:284 research permits with a duration up to six months;285 
emergency permits where urgent action is required to protect human 
health;286 and operating permits that would take the place of "special" 
permits and would be issued after a needs assessment that required 
a comparative evaluation with land-based incineration.287 In response 
to EPA's request for comments on the proposed regulation, the 
Oceanic Society submitted lengthy comments generally opposing 
ocean incineration on behalf of a national coalition of thirty-five 
environmental organizations. 286 
After the first ocean dumping regulations under the MPRSA were 
issued in 1973,289 Shell Chemical Company (Shell) was prohibited 
from dumping its untreated organochlorine wastes into the ocean.290 
Therefore, Shell began storing its wastes in above-ground storage 
tanks in Texas, and in 1974 hired Ocean Combustion Services to 
incinerate the wastes at sea using the Vulcanus I incinerator ves-
sel. 291 
On January 23, 1974, EPA released a legal memorandum stating 
that it lacked regulatory authority over ocean incineration because 
the MPRSA provided no specific language giving EPA such author-
ity, and the legislative history did not indicate that Congress in-
tended airborne pollutants to be within the purview of the 
MPRSA.292 Nonetheless,Congressman John D. Dingell, a principal 
author of the MPRSA, and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) 
convinced EPA that it had jurisdiction over incinerator ships as 
"indirect" ocean dumpers.293 On October 3, 1974, EPA issued a re-
284 50 Fed. Reg. 8222 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 220, 227, 228, 234) (proposed 
Fe~. 28, 1985). 
285 Id. at 8231, 8259 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 234). 
286 Id. at 8232, 8259. 
287Id. at 8231, 8259. 
288 OCEANIC SOCIETY, JOINT COMMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND OTHER CITIZEN ORGA-
NIZATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S DRAFT REG-
ULATIONS ON OCEAN INCINERATION (1985) [hereinafter OCEANIC SOCIETY, JOINT COMMENTS]. 
289 38 Fed. Reg. 8726 (1973). 
290 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 24. 
291 Id. at 24. 
292 Kamlet, Ocean Disposal of Organochlorine Wastes by At-Sea Incineration, in OCEAN 
DUMPING OF INDUSTRIAL WASTES 298-99 (B. Ketchum, D. Kester & P. Park ed. 1981). 
293Id. at 299. This interpretation was based on EPA's concern that the failure to regulate 
recently developed waste disposal techniques involving ocean incineration would frustrate the 
purposes of the MPRSA and the London Dumping Convention. Id. at 300. Thus, EPA 
determined that ocean incineration of wastes was under the purview of the MPRSA, as 
amended. Incineration of Hazardous Waste at Sea: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Ocean-
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vised legal memorandum reversing its position, and stating that the 
Ocean Dumping Act applied to ocean incineration. 294 
EPA had issued an Ocean Dumping Regulation in 1973, but be-
cause the MPRSA did not provide specific technical criteria for 
incineration activities, EPA issued ocean incineration permits under 
the MPRSA using administrative and technical guidelines derived 
from the London Dumping Convention (LDC).295 Under the LDC, 
ocean incineration is considered a method of dumping and is, there-
fore, subject to that Convention.296 The Oslo Convention, which deals 
in part with dumping in the North Sea, also considers ocean incin-
eration subject to its dumping provisions. 297 
In October, 1974, regulatory activities began with a joint proposal 
by EPA, the NWF, and Shell to evaluate incineration at sea as a 
viable alternative to ocean dumping, land disposal, or land-based 
incineration of highly toxic substances. 298 EPA issued a number of 
research or interim permits for incineration at sea between 1974 and 
1982. Although EPA made a tentative decision to issue "special" 
permits for at-sea incineration under the existing ocean dumping 
regulations in late 1983, it abandoned the effort to issue permits by 
the spring of 1984. 
Between 1974 and 1982, EPA issued permits for four series of 
ocean burns, three in the Gulf of Mexico and one in the Pacific Ocean, 
conducted on the Vulcanus 1.299 The first series of burns occurred 
during 1974 and 1975 when Shell conducted two research burns3°O 
and two operational burns in the Gulf of Mexico under federal per-
ography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 
table 1 (1987) [hereinafter House Hearing 1987]. 
294 Kamlet, supra note 292, at 300. 
296 [d. The London Dumping Convention is an international agreement containing specific 
regulations governing ocean incineration. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972,26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 
[hereinafter London Dumping Convention]. For a review and analysis of this convention, see 
Note, supra note 281, at 162-169. 
296 London Dumping Convention, supra note 295. 
297 Oslo Dumping Convention, supra note 268; see also Note, supra note 281, at 161. 
29B EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 25. 
On October 10, 1974, EPA added a new site in the western Gulf of Mexico to the list of 
approved ocean dumping sites for controlled high temperature incineration of organic chloride 
wastes. EPA Approves Site of Ocean Burning, 4 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,200 
(1974) [hereinafter EPA Approves Site]. The burn site was designated under authority of 
section 102(C) of the MPRSA. [d. 
299 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 25. 
300 Research permits are issued for burns in cases when the impact and processes of disposal 
are not fully understood. EPA Approves Site, supra note 298, at 10,200. 
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mits. 301 Both EPA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA) monitored these initial burns.302 Based on the 
data and experience derived from these burns, EPA rated the use 
of ocean incineration for the disposal of organochlorine wastes "a 
success and an environmentally acceptable practice when closely 
monitored and regulated. "303 EPA had analyzed seawater samples in 
the incineration area and was unable to detect any change over 
background levels of pollutants analyzed. 304 
EPA's sanguine evaluation, however, was unwarranted. The EPA 
surveillance plane had a piston fail as it was taking off, and the 
NOAA research vessel, Oregon II, that was monitoring the burn, 
had personnel and equipment problems.305 Other technical problems 
involving monitoring on the Vulcanus I were pervasive. 306 Subse-
quent burns in the series provided additional data, but the data were 
not interpreted universally as favorably as EPA interpreted the 
data. 307 Because of acknowledged shortcomings in monitoring the 
first burn, a second "research" permit was granted, and the burn 
occurred between December 2 and December 9, 1974.308 EPA then 
approved two additional burns that occurred between December 19 
and December 26, 1974, and between December 31, 1974 and Janu-
ary 4, 1975.309 
On July 8, 1976, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 310 EPA issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement 
(FE IS) designating the Gulf of Mexico Incineration Site.3ll In 1977, 
the second series of burns of organochlorine wastes on the Vulcanus 
I took place in the Gulf of Mexico. 312 The destruction efficiency (DE) 
for total hydrocarbons ranged from 99.991 to 99.997%.313 The DE 
301 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 25. 
302 EPA monitors were stationed on the Vulcanus itself, on a nearby Coast Guard ship, and 
in the air. EPA Approves Site, supra note 298, at 10,200. 
303 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 25. 
The incineration that took place disposed of 4200 metric tons of waste, and Shell reported no 
change in the acidity of the sea at the burn site and a DE above 99.9%. EPA Approves Site, 
supra note 298, at 10,200. 
304 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 179. 
305 Kamlet, supra note 292, at 302-303. 
306 [d. at 302. 
307 See EWK, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 167. 
308 Kamlet, supra note 292, at 303-04. 
309 [d. at 304; see also OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 179. 
310 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
311 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 58. 
312 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 179. 
313 [d. 
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for the major waste constituent, trichloropropane, ranged from 99.92 
to 99.98%.314 This test burn produced the first evidence of an envi-
ronmental impact caused by ocean incineration. 315 Tests showed ev-
idence of temporary stress on one fish enzyme system,316 but this 
impact was attributed subsequently to shipboard handling of the 
fish. 317 The Office of Technology Assessment interpreted the result 
as a need for caution and further monitoring. 318 
The third series of burns occurred in 1977 when the United States 
Air Force had its stock of the herbicide Agent Orange incinerated 
approximately 332 kilometers west of Johnston Atoll in the Pacific 
Ocean.319 The waste contained abo~t equal amounts of 2,4-D and 
2,4,5-T contaminated with dioxin (TCDD).320 About 10,400 metric 
tons (MT) were destroyed in three burns. 321 According to EPA, the 
DE was 99.999% and could have been higher because the detection 
limits of the sampling instruments did not allow a more precise 
measurement. 322 Dioxin in the emissions was below detection limits 
in the first and third burns and was only detected in samples for the 
second burn in this series. 323 Dioxin levels that were detected were 
so low, however, they may have been caused by sampling errors. 324 
The limited environmental monitoring showed no impact on plank-
ton. 325 
An interesting aspect of this burn concerned the legal gymnastics 
utilized to allow it. Because EPA interpreted the Ocean Dumping 
Act to include incineration, Agent Orange would appear to have 
been banned by the absolute prohibition applied to the dumping of 
chemical warfare agents by the LDC.326 Nevertheless, EPA ration-
alized the issuance of the permit by saying it was not the warfare 
agent that was being dumped but only its combustion products. 327 
314Id. 
315Id. 
316Id. at 181. 
317 See Connor, At-Sea Incineration: Up In Srrwke?, 27 OcEANUS 70,71 (1984). 
3180TA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 181. 
319 50 Fed. Reg. 8223 (1985). The site was designated by EPA solely for this purpose and 
only for the length of time necessary to complete the operation. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, INCINERATION OF CHEMICAL WASTES AT SEA (1983). 






326 Kamlet, supra note 292, at 307. 
327 Id. 
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The last series of burns occurred in 1981-1982 under a research 
permit issued jointly to Chern Waste and Ocean Combustion Ser-
vices,328 which owns the Vulcanus I. These burns were conducted 
on the Vulcanus 1 off the coasts of Texas and Louisiana and were 
the first attempt by a United States corporation to incinerate PCBs 
at sea. 329 The first burn of the series produced inconclusive data due 
to major problems with sampling and analysis. 330 According to EPA, 
the second burn was successful with a DE for PCBs of 99.99989% 
and no detectable increases in PCB levels in water samples or or-
ganisms. 331 
In December, 1980, Chern Waste and Ocean Combustion Services 
applied for another joint permit to burn liquid PCBs,332 and in July, 
1981, they applied for a permit to destroy "organohalogen liquid 
chemical compounds referred to as 'SOUp."'333 In November, 1981, 
Chern Waste and Ocean Combustion Services applied for a permit 
to incinerate liquid DDT at sea.334 In May, 1982, public meetings 
were held by EPA in Mobile, Alabama and Brownsville, Texas on 
the applications for the various permits to burn PCBs, "soup," and 
DDT. About fifty citizens expressed strong opposition to the ocean 
incineration concept at the Brownsville meeting, and ten to fifteen 
citizens at the Mobile meeting also opposed ocean incineration. 335 On 
August 5, 1982, EPA announced that another public hearing would 
be held in Brownsville, Texas to cover the same subjects as the 
previous public meetings. 336 During August 17-19, 1982, EPA al-
lowed a second research burn of PCBs on the Vulcanus 1.337 On 
August 31, 1982, the second Brownsville hearing took place, but 
EPA decided to defer action on the permit applications until all of 
the PCB research burn data could be analyzed. 338 
Because of the delays, the Vulcanus 1 sailed to Australia and 
burned 1.6 million gallons of mixed chemical wastes and 250,000 
328 See Note, supra note 281, at 173. 
329 Id.; U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AT-SEA INCINERATION OF PCB-CoNTAINING 
WASTES ONBOARD THE M!r VULCANUS (1983) (EPA-600/57-83-024). 
330 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 181. 
331 Id. at 181-82. 
332 Id. 
333 Id. 
334 WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC., CHRONOLOGY OF EPA PROCESSING OF U.S. OcEAN INCIN-
ERATION PERMITS PRIOR TO DECEMBER, 1980 at 1, 7 (1984) [hereinafter WASTE MANAGEMENT 
CHRONOLOGY]. 
336 Id. at 7-8. 
336 Id. at 8. 
337Id. 
838 Id. 
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gallons of PCB wastes pursuant to the LDC as well as Australian 
regulations. 339 In December, 1982, the Chern Waste/Ocean Combus-
tion Services permit application was changed to substitute the Vul-
canus II for the older Vulcanus I. While waiting for United States 
approval, the Vulcanus II incinerated wastes in the North Sea in 
February, 1983.340 For nearly a year, EPA evaluated data and made 
requests for supplemental information. In October, 1983, EPA made 
a tentative decision to issue three "special" permits to Chern Waste 
and Ocean Combustion Services. 341 
In 1983, the political tide began to turn against ocean incineration. 
The 1981-1982 Chern Waste/Ocean Combustion Services permits had 
been issued after an expedited permit procedure involving an attor-
ney named James Sanderson, who, at that time, was under inves-
tigation for unrelated conflicts of interest.342 Sanderson was report-
edly a paid part-time advisor to EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch 
Burford and was Gorsuch's choice for EPA's number three job,343 
while simultaneously representing CWM on the Vulcanus issues. 344 
Allegedly, Sanderson wrote the permit conditions for the Vulcanus 
burns in the United States while working under contract with Gor-
such. 345 After the 1981 burn on board the Vulcanus I, EPA scientists 
apparently had serious questions about the reliability of the data 
obtained. The permits did not require appropriate research, so EPA 
339Id. at 9. 
340 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 58. 
341 WASTE MANAGEMENT CHRONOLOGY, supra note 334, at 10-11; see also 50 Fed. Reg. 
8223 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 220, 227, 228, 234) (proposed Feb. 28, 1985); OTA, 
OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 182. EPA published a tentative detennination to 
issue special and research pennits to Chern Waste on October 21, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 48,986 
(1983). The special permits would have authorized incineration of 300,000 metric tons of mixed 
chlorine wastes on the Vulcanus I and II over a three-year period at the Gulf of Mexico 
Incineration Site. Id. A six-month research pennit would have authorized the VulcanusII to 
incinerate DDT. Id.; see also House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 58. 
342 See Vallette, Waste Management, Inc.: The Greenpeace Report, GREENPEACE USA 1, 
11 (1987); Gordon, Firm Represented by Gorsuch Crony Gets Quick Action, United Press 
Int'l, Feb. 18, 1986; Peterson & Kurtz, EPA Speeds Friend's Permit, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 
1983, at 1, cols. 5-6; Schneider, The Leper Ships: Incinerator Sent to Sea, OcEANS, May 1984. 
349 A. BURFORD & J. GREENYA, ARE You TOUGH ENOUGH? 1, 82, 87-88 (1986); Peterson 
& Kurtz, EPA Speeds Friend's Permit, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1983, at 1, cols. 5-6. The number 
three job did not then exist; it was a new position conceived by Burford, which she likened 
to "a mini-OMB within EPA, sort of my own Office of Management and Budget." A. BURFORD 
& J. GREENYA, supra, at 87. 
344 Ocean Incineration, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the 
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 113 (1985) 
(testimony of Sue Ann Fruge on behalf of the Gulf Coalition for Public Health, Harlingen, 
Texas). 
345 GREENPEACE U.S.A., OcEAN INCINERATION OF TOXIC WASTE CHRONOLOGY (n.d.). 
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had to pay an additional $300,000 for a second analysis.346 EPA paid 
an additional $300,000 for a second analysis because the expedited 
pennit did not require that Chern Waste cover such costs. 
In 1982, Greenpeace revealed that the Vulcanus I pennit to incin-
erate "only PCBs in fuel oil" was changed at the last minute to 
include "other organic components."347 Because of this change, the 
pennit allowed wastes contaminated with dioxin to be burned. 348 
Ocean incineration thus became part of the so-called "Sewergate" 
controversy that led to the replacement of Anne Gorsuch by William 
Ruckelshaus as EPA's Administrator. 349 
The National Wildlife Federation endorsed ocean incineration of 
wastes in the Gulf of Mexico in 1983,350 although most other envi-
ronmental organizations actively concerned with ocean incineration 
346 Anderson, Firms Compete for Incineration of Waste at Sea, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1982, 
at C15. 
347 From December, 1981 through January, 1982, Chern Waste burned nearly 70,000 gallons 
of PCB waste in the Gulf of Mexico under the EPA research permit. Vallette, supra note 342, 
at 12. The Vulcanus also burned 40,000 gallons of dioxin-contaminated leachate from Hyde 
Park, New York. Id. Under the original research permit, this incineration of dioxin would 
have been illegal. Id. "However, someone added the phrase 'and other organic components' 
to the list of [chemicals] permitted in the research burn. Despite a full internal investigation, 
the EPA's Inspector General was unable to determine why the change was made, and who 
made it." Id. 
348 Vallette, supra note 342, at 12. 
349 See A. BURFORD & J. GREENYA, supra note 343, at 257. Additionally, in March, 1984, 
EPA investigated two high-level but unnamed EPA officials who owned substantial Waste 
Management stock. One, who worked with the EPA toxic substances division, owned $29,000 
in Waste Management stock. The other Waste Management investor worked for EjPA's water 
quality division. Vallette, supra note 342, at 40 (citing Gibson, EPA Probes Stock Held By 
Employees, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 2, 1984). 
36() Waste Incineration in Gulf of Mexico Endorsed by National Wildlife Federation, 14 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1390 (Dec. 2, 1983). The National Wildlife Federation's position on ocean 
incineration at sea was stated as: 
-The destruction and/or treatment of persistent toxic wastes, such as organohalo-
gens, should be favored over disposal- or dispersal-oriented solutions. 
-Incineration at sea, like incineration on land, can be an acceptable, even exem-
plary, means of managing certain waste types when properly conducted and 
monitored. 
-From an environmental standpoint, it cannot be said that land-based incineration 
(of chlorinated organics, for example) is categorically preferable to incineration 
at sea, or vice versa; they each have their advantages and their drawbacks. 
-Incineration at sea, with appropriate safeguards, should be promoted as one of 
an array of environmentally acceptable waste management alternatives; its 
suitability in a given instance must, however, be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Letter from Jay D. Hair, Executive Vice President, National Wildlife Federation, to Ms. 
Elizabeth Otto, Greenpeace U.S.A. (July 12, 1983) (on file with the Boston College Environ-
mental Affairs Law Review). 
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opposed it. The leading environmental opponents were the Oceanic 
Society and Greenpeace.351 Regional environmental organizations 
also opposed ocean incineration,352 as did the land-based incineration 
industry,353 fishermen and shrimpers,354 and the tourism industry. 355 
In 1979, EPA banned PCB production and in 1980 prohibited its 
disposal in landfills. At the time of the PCB research burns on the 
Vulcanus I, only two companies were licensed to incinerate PCBs-
Energy Systems Company (ENSCO) in Arkansas, and Rollins En-
vironmental Services, Inc. (Rollins) in Deer Park, Texas-each on a 
scale of about 200,000 gallons per month. 356 These land-based firms 
were angry at the size of the Vulcanus's permit because they had 
to satisfy EPA's permitting requirements with more time-consuming 
and expensive procedures. 357 
Rollins, a large waste-disposal company that incinerates on land, 
could lose clients should EPA allow ocean incineration. 358 Rollins, 
incorporated in Wilmington, Delaware, retained former Delaware 
Representative Thomas Evans, who in turn hired National Strate-
gies Marketing Group, Inc., run by Robert Beckel, to organize op-
position to incineration at sea.359 Beckel then formed two organiza-
tions, one called the Alliance to Save the Ocean, to fight Waste 
Management on the Gulf Coast,360 and the other called the Ocean 
351 Lentz, Environmental Effects of Ocean Incineration: An Uncertain Science, in OCEANIC 
SOCIETY, SOURCES OF POLLUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 117 (1986). 
352 See, e.g., House Hearing 1983, supra note 258, at 67 (statement by Sue Ann Fruge, Gulf 
Coast Coalition for Public Health). 
353 Opposition to at-sea incineration comes from land-based incinerator companies including 
Rollins Environmental Services, Energy Systems Co. of Dorado, Arkansas (ENSCO), SEA 
Chemical Services, IT Corp., Abco Industries, and Waste Technology, Inc., which have most 
of the land-based incinerator capacity in the United States. Ocean-Based Incineration of 
Hazardous Wastes, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tour-
ism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1981) (statement 
of Melvyn Bell, President of ENSCO); see also Connor, supra note 317, at 74. 
354 See, e.g., House Hearing 1983, supra note 258, at 71 (statement of Deyaun Boudreaux). 
355 See, e.g., House Hearing 1983, supra note 258, at 73 (statement of Jane Rosamond, 
Mayor Pro Tern, South Padre Island, Texas). 
356 Omang, Ship to Begin Burning PCBs in Gulf of Mexico, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1981, at 
4. 
357 Omang, Floating Chemical Destroyer Ready to Sail for EPA, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1981, 
at A33. 
358 Shabecoff, The Guerilla Fighter and the Lobbyist, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1985, at L5. 
359 Id.; see also MacKay, All's Fair in Politics and Wastes, WORLD WASTES, Oct. 1, 1985, 
at 42; Thomas, Peddling Influence: Lobbyists Swarm vver Capitol Hill, TIME, Mar. 3, 1986, 
at 26. 
300 MacKay, supra note 359, at 42. Reportedly, Beckel arranged a telephone bank to make 
calls to local citizens on the Gulf Coast under the name of the "Alliance to Save the Ocean." 
This paper organization was so transparent that the Gulf Coast Coalition, also fighting ocean 
incineration, rejected its help. Id.; see also Zurer, supra note 155, at 32. 
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Tourism Council, located in San Francisco, to fight on the West 
Coast. 361 
Thus, in effect, a land incinerator bankrolled "dummy" local en-
vironmental organizations to stir up public opposition to ocean incin-
eration. While Rollins may have influenced local decisions regarding 
ocean incineration, it appears that the company had minimal impact 
on policy direction at the concerned national environmentalist or-
ganizations such as the Oceanic Society and Greenpeace. It is inter-
esting to note that, in 1981, Waste Management unsuccessfully at-
tempted to take over Rollins Environmental Services, Inc.362 If 
Waste Management had succeeded, it would have controlled nearly 
ninety percent of the off-site hazardous waste incineration industry 
in the United States and would have co-opted the main opponent to 
ocean incineration. 363 
In February, 1983, EPA participated in incineration tests in the 
North Sea.364 The new ship, Vulcanu8 II, burned waste from vi-
nylchloride production. The waste was eighty-four percent chlorine 
and therefore presented a difficult challenge to thermal destruction. 
The Vulcanu8 II successfully destroyed the wastes with a DE of 
99.998% for carbon tetrachloride and a DE of more than 99.999995% 
for trichloroethane. 365 
The opposition to ocean incineration came to a head at the third 
public hearing in Brownsville, Texas on November 21, 1983 and in 
Mobile, Alabama on November 22 and 23, 1983. EPA reported that 
6488 people registered at the two hearings. 366 Most of the attendees 
361 MacKay, supra note 359, at 42. Two members of the Ocean Tourism Council testified at 
the July, 1989 EPA hearing in San Francisco without revealing their connections to Beckel. 
[d. 
862 In 1981, Waste Management, Inc., with 1980 revenues of $560 million, attempted to 
acquire Rollins Environmental Services, a much smaller concern with 1980 revenues of $32 
million. Waste Disposal's Aggressive No. I, CHEMICAL WEEK, Aug. 12, 1981, at 40; CHEMICAL 
MARKETING REP., July 13, 1981, at 9, col. 4. However, the parties failed to reach a definitive 
agreement and the deal fell apart. Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1981, at 8, col. 3. 
363 Vallette, supra note 342, at 43 (citing Atlas, Firm Poised to Clean Up, Chicago Tribune, 
Aug. 2, 1981; Storch, Waste Management Merger Off, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 14, 1981). 
86( OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 182. 
366 [d. 
366 Proposed Ocean Incineration Regulation, 50 Fed. Reg. 8223 (1985). 6278 people regis-
tered at the Brownsville hearing (123 testified), and 214 people registered at the Mobile 
hearing (26 testified). House Heari1l!J 1984, supra note 31, at 34. At that time, the Brownsville 
hearing was the largest public hearing in EPA history. OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra 
note 72, at 3 n.l. More recently, an EPA public hearing in Asheville, North Carolina, con-
cerning the Pigeon River, reportedly drew more than 7000 people, most of them supporting 
the polluter, Champion International Corporation. Satchell, Fight for Pigeon River, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 1989, at 27, 32. 
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opposed the granting of permits. 367 By the close of the comment 
period on January 31, 1984, EPA had received 2039 letters and 
postcards. 368 
On April 23, 1984, the EPA hearing officer for the Brownsville 
and Mobile public hearings recommended that EPA: (1) deny the 
special permits at this time because of the lack of information con-
cerning (a) the need for ocean incineration, (b) the availability and 
capability of alternatives, and (c) the risks of ocean incineration; (2) 
issue a research permit only for DDT and PCB incineration to de-
termine whether a DE of 99.9999% can be achieved; (3) deny the 
research permit until Alabama completes a coastal zone consistency 
determination; and (4) delay all special permits until EPA issues 
ocean incineration regulations.369 In May, 1984, the EPA Assistant 
Administrator for Water issued a final "determination," which ac-
cepted the hearing officer's recommendations and formally denied 
the permits. 370 
In July, 1984, the House Subcommittee on Environment, Energy 
and Natural Resources, of the Committee on Government Opera-
tions, held a hearing in San Francisco on ocean incineration. 371 In 
November, 1984, another company, Environmental Oceanic Services 
Corporation, submitted an application for an ocean incineration per-
mit.372 EPA then promulgated a Proposed Ocean Incineration Reg-
ulation, published in the Federal Register in February, 1985, which 
modified the ocean dumping provisions and provided specific criteria 
and standards regarding the permits for designation and manage-
ment of ocean incineration sites.373 Environmentalist opposition to 
the Proposed Ocean Incineration Regulation was substantial. 374 
In March, 1985, EPA released an Incineration Assessment that 
included a comparison of risks from land-based and ocean-based 
367 Wilczynski, Should We Give Ocean Incineration a Chance?, 3 RENEWABLE RESOURCES 
J., Summer 1985, at 10. 
368 Proposed Ocean Incineration Regulation, 50 Fed. Reg. 8223 (1985). 
369 WASTE MANAGEMENT CHRONOLOGY, supra note 334, at 11; see also Blumm & Noble, 
The Promise of Federal Consistency Under § 307 of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 6 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,047, 50,052 (Aug. 1986). 
370 50 Fed. Reg. 8223 (1985). 
371 WASTE MANAGEMENT CHRONOLOGY, supra note 334, at 13. 
312 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 59. 
373 Proposed Ocean Incineration Regulation, 50 Fed. Reg. 8222 (1985) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. §§ 220, 227, 228, 234). For a broad discussion of the proposed regulatory scheme, see 
INCINERATION-AT-SEA TASK FORCE, CRITERIA AND STANDARDS DIVISION, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, SUMMARY OF PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED OCEAN INCIN-
ERATION REGULATION (50 F.R. 8222, February 28, 1985) (1985) [hereinafter EPA, COMMENTS 
ON PROPOSED REGULATION]; Note, supra note 281, at 173-SO. 
374 WASTE MANAGEMENT CHRONOLOGY, supra note 334, at 13. 
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incineration. 375 One month later, EPA's Science Advisory Board, a 
group of independent scientists, issued a report on the current 
knowledge about ocean incineration.376 Between April and May, 
1985, EPA held five public hearings on the Proposed Ocean Incin-
eration Regulation. 377 
Also in 1985, Chern Waste requested a research permit to conduct 
a "test burn" of PCBs in the Atlantic Ocean, 140 miles east of 
Delaware Bay, as part of a research study on the impact of ocean 
incineration on aquatic ecology.378 Even though EPA used the words 
"research burns," the proposal was for a nineteen-day burn of 1.6 
million gallons of PCB wastes. 379 In December, 1985, EPA published 
a tentative decision to grant a research permit for the incineration 
using Vulcanus II380 to incinerate 700,000 gallons of PCB-laden 
wastes in the North Atlantic using the Port of Philadelphia as a 
base. 381 Once again, the Oceanic Society, in cooperation with a na-
tional coalition of forty-six environmental and other citizen organi-
zations, undertook an analysis and criticized the proposed permit in 
response to EPA's request for public comments. 382 
Because EPA indicated a willingness to allow Chern Waste to 
incinerate, Chern Waste sought approval from the proximal coastal 
states of Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Such approval 
is required under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).383 The 
CZMA gives states with coastal zone management plans that have 
375 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27. 
376 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS, TRANSPORT AND FATE COMM., ScIENCE ADVISORY BD., 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT ON THE INCINERATION OF LIQUID HAZARDOUS 
WASTES (1985) [hereinafter SAB REPORT]. 
377 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 59. 
378 See EPA Denies Permit for Ocean Test Burn by Chemical Waste Management in 
Atlantic, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 107 (May 30, 1986); Polychlorinated Biphenyls: EPA Denies 
Permit for Ocean Test Burn by Chemical Waste Management in Atlantic, 10 Chern. Reg. 
Rep. (BNA) 262 (May 30, 1986). 
379 See Letter from Alfred B. Devereaux, Assistant Secretary, State of Florida, to Dr. Tudor 
Davies, EPA (Oct. 17, 1985) (copy on file with the Boston College Environmental Affairs 
Law Review). 
380 Ocean Dumping Permit Program, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,360 (1985). EPA had released its Final 
EIS for the designation of the North Atlantic Incineration Site (NAIS) on November 25,1981. 
On November 17, 1982, EPA proposed the designation of the NAIS. House Hearing 1987, 
supra note 293, at 58. 
381 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 182. There was also a second proposed 
site centered 190 miles east of Daytona Beach, Florida. Another vessel, Apollo I, also sought 
a permit. DEPARTMENT OF ENVTL. REG., STATE OF FLORIDA, FACT SHEET, PCB INCINER-
ATION PROPOSED FOR ATLANTIC OCEAN (1985). 
382 OCEANIC SOCIETY, JOINT COMMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND OTHER CITIZEN ORGA-
NIZATIONS, IN RESPONSE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S PROPOSED OcEAN 
INCINERATION RESEARCH BURN PERMIT (1986). 
383 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1988). 
-----------------------. 
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been approved by NOAA the right to review federal activities for 
consistency with the state plan. 384 Pennsylvania granted uncondi-
tional approval for a single burn.385 Delaware approved but imposed 
modest conditions. 386 New Jersey approved with considerable re-
strictions, some of which were later withdrawn.387 Maryland also 
sought to make a CZMA consistency review and was granted this 
right by NOAA. Chern Waste then sued EPA and NOAA challenging 
Maryland's right to participate, but Maryland withdrew its CZMA 
request prior to a decision. 388 On May 28, 1986, EPA denied the 
Chern Waste request for the research permit.389 Thus, as a result of 
EPA's decision, the suit brought by Chern Waste was dismissed 
without a ruling on the circumstances under which permit applicants 
are required to demonstrate CZMA consistency or the rights of 
states to place conditions on their findings of CZMA consistency. 390 
EPA's decision to follow the hearing officer's recommendations to 
defer processing of applications for permits to burn hazardous wastes 
at sea pending completion of the regulation addressing ocean incin-
eration under the MPRSA was challenged in court by Waste Man-
agement. 391 An amicus curiae brief supporting the states' opposition 
to ocean incineration was filed by the Oceanic Society in conjunction 
with the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental 
Policy Institute, Greenpeace, and the Coast Alliance. 392 On Septem-
ber 16, 1987, the court upheld EPA's temporary permit freeze. 393 
384 [d.; see also Blumm & Noble, supra note 369, at 50,048--51. 
385 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 182. 
386 [d. at 182-83. 
387 [d. at 183. 
388 [d. 
3B9 Ocean Dumping Program, 51 Fed. Reg. 20,344 (1986) (final determination). 
390 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 183. 
391 Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 669 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1987). On December 5, 1986, 
Waste Management filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
alleging that EPA failed to perform a mandatory duty under the MPRSA to consider appli-
cations for ocean incineration and that EPA's decision not to consider permit applications until 
the new regulation was issued constituted a revocation of existing regulations without notice 
and opportunity for comment. Waste Management requested the court to vacate EPA's 
decision to defer action on permit applications and to direct EPA to consider applications in 
accordance with existing regulations, or, in the alternative, to direct EPA 'to issue a final 
Ocean Incineration Regulation within 30 days of the court's judgment. In response to the 
complaint, EPA moved for summary judgment, arguing that its decision to defer the issuance 
of permits until after final promulgation of the new Ocean Incineration Regulation was rea-
sonable and complied with applicable law. House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 62-63 
(statement of Lawrence J. Jensen, Assistant Administrator for Water, USEPA). 
392 OCEANIC SOCIETY, OCEAN INCINERATION CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (n.d.) (copy on file 
with the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review). 
393 Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 669 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1987). The court held that 
EPA properly decided to defer processing of ocean incineration permits because: (1) the 
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In December, 1987, Waste Management abandoned plans to incin-
erate hazardous wastes at sea off the United States coast. 394 Waste 
Management cited to the prolonged series of delays in federal rule-
making and new competition from land-based facilities as factors 
that convinced it to reach its decision. 395 
EPA had also received an application from At-Sea Incineration, 
Inc. (At-Sea) to burn hazardous wastes on the ship Apollo I in the 
North Atlantic using the Port of Philadelphia as its base.396 However, 
in November, 1985, At-Sea's parent company, Tacoma Boatbuilding 
Company (Tacoma), filed for bankruptcy prior to completion of the 
two incineration ships, Apollo I and II.397 The ship construction 
contracts provided for Tacoma to maintain title to the vessels during 
construction, with construction continuing until the ships met all use 
and certification requirements of all government agencies with ju-
risdiction. 398 EPA never finalized its regulations, which led in part 
to At-Sea's default on almost $68 million in loans guaranteed by the 
United States Maritime Administration (MARAD).399 The federal 
government had to payoff the loans in full. However, under the 
construction contract the ships still belonged to Tacoma; thus, the 
federal government did not have a valid lien and lost both the $68 
million and the security interest in the ships.4°O EPA's failure to 
regulate helped destroy a business that another ann of the federal 
government, MARAD, was subsidizing.401 
Citing budget problems, EPA officials decided to end their ocean 
incineration program in 1988. 402 In so doing, EPA in effect created 
decision to defer was a rule of agency procedure and therefore exempt from the notice and 
comment requirement of the AP A and thus did not affect the substantive rights of applicants 
to obtain permits; and (2) EPA's decision was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discre-
tion. Id. at 538-43. Thus, EPA could not be compelled to process Waste Management's 
application to conduct a test burn in the Atlantic Ocean. 
394 Waste Management Abandons Proposal to Incinerate Hazardous Wastes at Sea, 18 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1969 (Jan. 1, 1988). 
395 Id.; see also EPA Considers Cutting Costs By Dropping Plans to Issue Ocean Inciner-
ation Rules, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2086 (Jan. 29, 1988) [hereinafter EPA Considers Cutting 
Costs]. 
396 See Bailey & Faupel, Out of Sight is Not Out of Mind: Public Opposition to Ocean 
Incineration 9 (1987) (paper presented at the 1987 Meetings of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Chicago). 
397 Id. at 6; Bunin, supra note 271, at 4, Table 2. 
398 In re Tacoma Boatbldg. Co., 81 Bankr. 248, 252-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
899 See Kurtz & Isikoff, Shipbuilder Defaulting on Loans, Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 1985, at 1, 
col. 1. 
400 See id. 
401 50 Fed. Reg. 51,361 (1985). 
402 SeaB,urn, Inc. v. EPA, 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1597, 1599 (D.D.C. 1989); see also 
EPA Considers Cutting Costs, supra note 395, at 2086. 
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for itself a line item veto power for a program they deemed politically 
unacceptable. At present, ocean incineration in the United States is 
at a standstill, although related activities continue. The Department 
of Transportation (DOT) adopted safety rules and construction stan-
dards for ocean-going hazardous waste incineration vessels on May 
4, 1988,403 but because no ocean incineration is allowed in United 
States waters, there are currently no vessels to which the rules 
apply.404 Regulatory authority over ocean incineration was to be 
shared by the Coast Guard and the EPA. 405 The Coast Guard has 
responsibility for navigational safety, and the protection of the ship, 
the crew, and the marine environment, while EPA has authority to 
regulate incinerator emissions, permitting, and the designation and 
management of incineration sites. 406 Unless or until EPA issues final 
permit regulations, however, no vessels will be subject to any of 
these rules. 407 
The most recent serious blow to ocean incineration came in the 
form of a federal district court decision on April 20, 1989.408 SeaBurn, 
Inc., a commercial waste disposal company and a subsidiary of Stolt-
Nielsen Shipping AlS, an international ocean transport corporation, 
filed suit against EPA claiming that its indefinite suspension of ocean 
incineration permit review was tantamount to revocation of existing 
regulations409 and, therefore, required compliance with the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (AP A).41O In its decision, the court focused 
403 DOT Sets Safety, Construction Standards for Ships Incinerating Hazardous Wastes, 12 
Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 223 (May 6, 1988). 
404 See id. These standards regulate the transport of bulk liquid hazardous wastes to be 
incinerated at sea, transfer of the waste from cargo tanks to the incinerator, and the incin-
eration of the wastes aboard ship. Id. 
405Id. 
406 Id. 
407 Id. at 224. For example, one company left with an active interest in ocean incineration 
is Stolt-Nielsen, Inc., which claims to be the world's largest bulk chemical carrier. Stolt-
Nielsen wants to use new technology for ocean incineration, but awaits EPA's issuance of a 
final ocean incineration regulation before beginning construction. Chemical Shipping Firm 
Still Sees Future for Ocean Incineration of Hazardous Wastes, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2015 
(Jan. 15, 1988). 
408 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1597 (D.D.C. 1989). SeaBurn, Inc. had initiated the inciner-
ation at sea permit application process in October, 1983. House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, 
at 58. 
409 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1599. 
410 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988). It is interesting to note that SeaBurn's ocean 
incineration proposal had included total containerization from source to burn, barging, and 
the use of scrubbers. See Future for Ocean Incineration, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2015 (Jan. 
15, 1988). However, EPA continually rebuffed SeaBurn's proposal. See, e.g., Letters from 
Jack E. Ravan, EPA Assistant Administrator for Water, to Vincent G. Grey, SeaBurn Pres-
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on the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988,411 which had been enacted 
after the lawsuit was filed. This Act deleted section 104A of the 
MPRSA of 1972 and added section 104B, which prohibits the issuance 
of new dumping permits and phases out the dumping of all sewage 
and industrial waste by 1991.412 
SeaBurn contended that incinerator residue was not industrial 
waste and, therefore, not subject to the ban. EPA claimed that: (1) 
only the original MPRSA of 1972 defines "dumping," and it does so 
as "the deposition of material" into the ocean;413 (2) ocean incineration 
is dumping because it involves deposition of stack emissions; and (3) 
stack emissions are included in the broad definition of prohibited 
materials. 414 Following current administrative law principles, the 
court supported the reasonableness of EPA's interpretation of the 
legislative language and history.415 In addition, the court felt their 
judicial review should be deferential to an agency's expertise. 416 
c. Ocean Incineration Documents 
Three significant United States documents concerning ocean incin-
eration were released in 1985-1986. Two were produced by EPA 
and the third was the work of the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) of the United States Congress. The three documents sup-
ported the use of ocean incineration as part of a hazardous waste 
management program. 
The first document is a March, 1985, EPA Office of Policy, Plan-
ning and Evaluation needs assessment study of incineration which 
presented a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of incin-
eration as a commercial treatment option for managing liquid organic 
hazardous wastes. 417 The study provided four main conclusions rel-
evant to this Article. First, the study concluded that "[i]ncineration, 
whether at sea or on land, is a valuable and environmentally sound 
treatment option for destroying liquid hazardous wastes, particularly 
ident (May 24, 1984 and July 6, 1984) (copies on file with the Boston College Environmental 
Affairs Law Review); Zurer, supra note 155, at 36--37. 
4ll Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-688, 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS (102 Stat.) 5867 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S. C.) 
412 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1600. 
413 33 U.S.C. § 1402(0 (1982). 
414 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1601. 
415Id. at 1602. 
416 Id.; see also SeaBurn Seeks Federal Court Review of EPA Suspension of Ocean Incin-
eration, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2434 (Apr. 8, 1988). 
417 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27. 
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when compared to land disposal options now available. "418 EPA noted 
that incineration eradicates more than 99.99% of the harmful com-
ponents of the waste and can destroy more than 99.9999% of wastes 
of particular importance, such as PCBs.419 Additionally, the study 
reported that EPA's risk assessments indicated that incinerators 
that satisfy the regulatory requirements for waste destruction effi-
ciency create minimal risks to human health and the environment. 420 
Second, the study concluded that "[t]here is no clear preference 
for ocean or land incineration in terms of risks to human health and 
the environment."421 EPA noted that ocean incineration produces 
human health risks that are significantly lower than the already low 
human health risks produced by land-based incineration.422 But EPA 
recognized the drawback to ocean incineration operations in that a 
ship accident, although a remote probability, could res.ult in a spill 
of hazardous wastes that could cause substantial environmental dam-
age. 423 
Third, the study stated that "[a]lthough current commercial and 
on-site hazardous waste incineration capacities on land are adequate 
to handle existing demand (except for PCBs), future demand will 
significantly exceed this capacity as other disposal alternatives are 
increasingly restricted."424 EPA noted that, as the 1984 RCRA 
amendments425 became more restrictive, available landfills declined, 
and generators' concerns over long-term liability increased, demands 
for incineration as an alternative would intensify. 426 
Fourth, the study stated that "[a]lthough previous research has 
verified the destructive capabilities of incinerators, and risk studies 
have shown minimal impact on health and the environment, a pro. 
gram of continuing research is needed to improve our current knowl-
edge of combustion processes and effects."427 EPA noted that addi-
tional knowledge is needed concerning combustion byproducts, 







C24 Id. at 2. 
425 See supra notes 34, 36 and accompanying text. 
co; EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 2. 
421ld. 
428 Id. 
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formation could be gathered through improved stack and ambient 
monitoring, emissions characterizations, and laboratory toxicity test-
ing.429 
The second important study was released in April, 1985 by the 
Environmental Effects, Transport and Fate Committee of EPA's 
Science Advisory Board (SAB).430 The SAB study, requested by then 
EPA Administrator, William D. Ruckelshaus, also reviewed and 
assessed the public health and environmental impacts associated 
with the incineration of liquid organic hazardous wastes on land and 
at sea.431 The SAB concluded that "[i]ncineration is a valuable and 
potentially safe means for disposing of hazardous chemicals, and 
EPA has made progress in developing an appropriate regulatory 
strategy."432 However, the SAB cautioned that definitive conclusions 
regarding E'nvironmental impacts were lacking, and further research 
was necessary.433 Nevertheless, the SAB did not believe that the 
research questions were significant enough to delay EPA regulation 
and a strong majority of the board supported EPA in licensing 
commercial ocean incineration. 434 
In 1986, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) published the 
third relevant study for two congressional committees-the House 
Committees on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and on Public Works 
and Transportation. 435 The study concluded that "OTA finds that 
ocean incineration could be an attractive, though not essential, in-
terim option for managing liquid incinerable wastes, in particular 
highly chlorinated wastes. "436 The study went on to find that "[f]or 
highly chlorinated wastes, ocean incineration may be preferable to 
available alternatives, with respect to human health risks and cost 
effectiveness. "437 The OTA study advocated the preferred practices 
429 [d. 
430 SAB REPORT, supra note 376. 
431 [d. Liquid organic hazardous wastes were chosen as the basis for comparison because 
they are capable of being treated by both land-based and ocean incineration. EPA, INCIN-
ERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 6. 
432 SAB REPORT, supra note 376, at v. 
433 [d. 
434 See Senate Hearing 1985, supra note 258, at 394 (statement of Dr. Terry Yosie, Director, 
Science Advisory Board, EPA). 
435 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72. 
436 [d. at 4. 
437 [d. at 10. The most important commercial incinerators for very hazardous wastes are 
the Deer Park, Texas facility of Rollins Environmental Services and the El Dorado, Arkansas 
facility that is owned by Energy Systems Company (ENSCO). See First PCB Disposal 
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of waste reduction, recovery, and recycling.438 Nonetheless, the 
study recognized that ocean incineration could bridge the gap be-
tween the practices of the past and the preferred practices of the 
future which are still in the development stage. 439 
The findings of these three documents, particularly in light of 
EPA's refusal to issue final permitting regulations, call into question 
the leadership role of EPA. The process used to produce these 
documents depended essentially on a limited scientific base of the 
contractor reports produced after the various test burns.44o Thus, 
the limited data, which came primarily from one contractor, were 
extrapolated to form the major policy-determining documents on the 
subject.441 Moreover, the EPA studies were not released for com-
ment until after the proposed rule for ocean incineration were pro-
mulgated. When the ninety day comment period for the proposed 
regulation began running on February 28, 1985, time to respond to 
these documents was limited442 because the EPA Incineration As-
sessment was released on March 28, 1985 and the SAB Report was 
released on April 5, 1985. 
A recent report of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO)443 provides what appears to be the most objective and thor-
ough assessment of the current status of ocean incineration, from 
both a technological and environmental standpoint. 444 The Working 
Group of the Joint London Dumping Convention/Oslo Commission 
(LDC/OSCOM) Group of Experts on Incineration,445 concerned with 
incineration technology including combustion and destruction effi-
ciencies, formation of new compounds, and control mechanisms, met 
Facilities, 59 CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS 20 (Feb. 16, 1981); Rollins Wins PCB Disposal Okay?, 
CHEMICAL WEEK, Feb. 4, 1981, at 46. 
43B OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 4. 
439 [d. 
440 See id. at 180. 
441 [d. TRW Energy and Environmental Division was the major contractor for work on the 
EPA permitted burns. [d. 
442 But see 50 Fed. Reg. 8224 (1985). 
443 The IMO is the Secretariat under the LDC for ocean incineration activities. OTA, OCEAN 
INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 194. 
444 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, CONSIDERATION AND ADoPTION OF THE 
REPORT, REPORT OF THE JOINT LDC/OSCOM GROUP OF EXPERTS ON INCINERATION AT 
SEA, Agenda item 9, at 1-42, May 13, 1987 (LDC/OSCOMIIAS 2/9) [hereinafter IMO REPORT]. 
446 The Working Group met under the Chairmanship of Mr. L. Spaans (Netherlands), and 
included experts from the following countries and international non-governmental organiza-
tions which participated in the Working Group: Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, Greenpeace 
International, and the Association of Maritime Incinerators (AMI). IMO REPORT, supra note 
444, at 4. 
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in April, 1987, and reached several important conclusions. First, 
they noted that "many land-based incinerators cannot burn highly 
chlorinated wastes whereas at-sea incinerators can. "446 Second, they 
"found the performance of marine and land-based incinerators to be 
similar in terms of the ability to destroy organic compounds. "447 
Third, the Group found that, "in the absence of pollution control 
devices, there is no significant difference in organic emissions from 
at-sea or on-land incinerators when each is meeting the same per-
formance requirements for [combustion efficiency] CE, temperature 
and oxygen in the stack."448 Fourth, "[t]he ability to destroy organic 
materials in a waste mixture is the same for land and sea incinerators 
when the requirements of the London Dumping Convention are_ met, 
even though the means of achieving this objective are different, i.e., 
through using different residence times. "449 
Another Working Group devoted to the topic of "Effects on the 
environment of emissions from incineration at sea and on land"450 
provided the following conclusions in the 1987 IMO report. Hydro-
chloric acid (HCl) degrades rapidly following release, and in the case 
of the North Sea little HCl affects either land or water ecosystems.451 
For acute local effects where a plume impinges on a small area of 
the sea surface, a worst-case scenario452 noted that pH changes likely 
would be small. Also, acids emitted from land-based incinerators are 
largely eliminated (eighty to ninety-nine percent) by gas scrubbers; 
the remaining acid emissions might deposit and affect the area near 
446 [d. at 13. 
447 [d. at 14. 
m [d. 
449 [d. 
450 The Working Group met under the Chairmanship of Mr. M. Parker (United Kingdom), 
and included experts from the following countries and non-governmental organizations: Can-
ada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Nauru, the Netherlands, the United States, 
Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), Greenpeace International, and the Association of 
Maritime Incinerators (AMI). [d. at 17. 
451 [d. at 19. One estimate suggests that the acid from incineration at sea amounts to only 
1 x 10-9 of the HCl crossing the North Sea shoreline. [d. 
452 [d. at 20. The scenario considered a throughput of waste of 20 tons per hour at 60% 
chlorine content whereby 12 tons per hour of HCl are emitted. The Working Group found 
that: 
[d. 
If this were to settle and become mixed in only the surface 10 cm, the buffering 
capacity of sea water is such that the pH of sea water of [salinity] 30 would be 
reduced to 6 pH; in 25 cm of water, the reduction would not be more than one pH 
unit. Natural fluctuations in pH (day/night) can be of this order. Because of the 
conservative nature of the worst-case scenario, actual pH changes will likely be much 
smaller. 
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the incineration plant, which, depending on its location, may affect 
ocean or land ecosystems. 453 
Metals in wastes incinerated at sea are not combusted but are 
released in total to the atmosphere. 454 The behavior of metals cannot 
be predicted with the same accuracy achievable for gaseous HCl. 455 
U sing the same worst-case scenario, incineration at the same rate 
will lead to an increase in seawater concentrations of "grey list" 
(Annex II of the LDC) metals of less than 10 ug/l [= 10 ppb] and 
Hg, Cd, and As of less than 0.5 ug/l [= 0.5 ppb] in the top 10 cm, 
or less than 4 ug/l [= 4 ppb] and less than 0.2 ug/l [= 0.2 ppb] 
respectively in the top 25 cm.456 For the most toxic metals in each 
category (copper and mercury, respectively), these concentrations 
alone would be of the same order as "No Effect Concentration" levels 
used in United States water quality criteria for offshore incineration 
sites.457 If all the metals were to concentrate in the surface micro-
layer,458 it might be possible that toxic conditions would occur, but 
this situation is limited to the area concerned and for a short time 
frame. 459 However, as is discussed below, bioaccumulation of metals 
in the lipids of organisms living below the microlayer may be criti-
cal. 460 
Incinerator emissions to the North Sea were compared to emis-
sions from all other sources and demonstrated that incinerator emis-
sions account for 0.1-1 percent of total annual inputs at maximum, 
based on the conservative, low end of measured total emissions. 461 
Land-based incinerators are equipped with scrubbers that reduce 
the metal emissions per ton by eighty to ninety-nine percent, except 
for volatile mercury. In this respect, land-based incinerators are 
more effective at controlling metal inputs, although there remains a 
significant and added problem of treating and/or disposing of the 
scrubber wastes containing high metal concentrations.462 Some ex-
perts have suggested that, in addition to setting metal concentration 
limits in the emissions, limiting total input of individual metals prior 




456 [d. at 20-21. 
457 [d. 
458 See infra notes 68fHl6 and accomp~nying text. 
459 IMO REPORT, supra note 444, at 21. 
460 See infra notes 643, 653 and accompanying text. 
461 IMO REPORT, supra note 444, at 21. 
462 [d. 
463 [d. 
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The Working Group also addressed the question of the effects of 
organic emissions by establishing the likely release rates under nor-
mal operating conditions and failure modes, as well as determining 
acute exposure conditions.464 Most members, however, did not be-
lieve that upset conditions would contribute significantly to addi-
tional organic emissions. 465 
Total emissions from ocean incinerators were not analyzed and 
measured, but lists of major emissions from land-based hazardous 
waste incinerators were available. These lists indicated that ninety 
percent of emissions of organic substances were likely to be volatile 
or non-persistent and, thus, unlikely to affect the marine environ-
ment. 466 The main concern is for the ten percent of organic emissions, 
i.e., 0.001 percent of the original waste, that are persistent and non-
volatile467 and could adversely affect the marine environment. The 
general conclusion, in relation to acute effects, was that although 
the data suggest that the scale of impact is likely to be small, more 
information on the composition, persistence, toxicity, and levels of 
organic emissions is required and needs to be measured utilizing 
more sophisticated technology that is capable of lower detection 
limits. 468 
Total releases of organic substances at the North Sea site approx-
imate five tons per year, which is relatively small in comparison to 
464 [d. at 22. 
4115 [d. The Working Group determined that the incinerator system was overdesigned and 
combustion efficiency was not greatly affected by most failure modes: "Extreme failures whieh 
had so far been identified were generally of short duration (from less than 1 to 10 minutes), 
although the most extreme case might lead to a failure of one hour." [d. These events are 
expected to lower combustion efficiency by one to two orders of magnitude but were extremely 
rare (less than once per year). To remain on average within Convention limits of 99.9% 
destruction, the events would have to occur for between less than ten, percent to less than 
one percent of the time (i.e., once every few minutes to once every few hours). However, the 
upset events are much rarer than that. [d. 
466 [d. 
467 Such as chlorinated phenols, HCBs, polycyclic aromatics, etc. [d. 
468 [d. at 23. 
As an example of potential effects, the Working Group considered the case of 
dioxins and furans. These were undetectable in emissions during the second PCB 
bum in August, 1982, in the Gulf of Mexico at a detection limit of 1 ng/m3; subsequent 
analyses at lower detection hmits detected presence at 0.1 ng/m3 levels. By contrast, 
emission at 30 ng/m3 levels have been reported from one modern land-based incin-
erator. Both analyses were carried out by experienced analysts. Taking the 1 ng/m3 
as an upper limit and using the worst-case scenario described previously, concentra-
tions in the upper 25 cm of water might reach 0.5 ppt. 
[d. Much higher concentrations of dioxins and furans could be found in the surface mierolayer, 
perhaps even reaching levels high enough (in the ppb category) to be toxic. However, this 
category-the dioxins and furans-contains members of varying toxicity, and UV radiation 
may increase the rate of photodegradation of organic substances in the surface microlayer. 
[d. 
------------
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other inputs to the North Sea.469 Land-based systems, for example, 
currently incinerate most of the wastes generated in Europe and 
have both advantages and disadvantages in relation to emission of 
organic substances. 47o Out-dated systems operating without scrub-
bers and accepting solid wastes may give rise to higher releases per 
ton.471 More modern systems have furnaces which may improve 
destruction of POHCs but will increase the production of nitrogen 
oxides.472 Further, the longer cooling period in these systems may 
increase production of PICs. 473 General comparisons cannot be made 
between land and sea incineration because the emissions depend 
significantly on the nature of the wastes.474 Land-based incinerators 
expose local humans to emissions of organic substances, however, 
and these persistent substances that are deposited on land may not 
be subject to the same rapid processes of dilution and dispersion 
that occur at sea.475 Land and sea systems have similar problems 
concerning losses of wastes during transportation and with fugitive 
emissions. 
Finally, the Working Group considered the effects of spills, but 
stated that because the effects they found did not include a proba-
bility analysis the conclusions cannot form the basis of decision mak-
ing.476 The considerations included a discussion of the human health 
and ecological effects of a large spill into an enclosed bay or estuary 
and into the open sea at an incineration site.477 Large spills of high 
level PCB wastes would be expected to have major effects on the 
marine ecosystem, being most severe in a sheltered or enclosed bay 
region. Such effects would persist because of the character of PCBs, 
and long-term bioaccumulation effects on marine organisms would 
be of utmost concern. Open ocean effects would include chronic 
toxicity and bioaccumulation as well, but dispersion would reduce 
long-term effects in the spill zone. 478 The effects of EDC wastes 









477 [d. ''Two types of material were considered: wastes containing high levels of toxic and 
carcinogenic, bio-accumulative and persistent material such as PCBs, and alternatively, wastes 
composed largely of acutely toxic, volatile, non-persistent substances such as EDC tar wastes." 
[d. 
478 [d. at 24-25. 
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exhibit a rapid decrease in effect because EDC wastes are volatile 
and non-persistent. 479 The Working Group did caution that these 
statements are preliminary and the issue of spills requires further 
consideration both in relation to probability and to effects. 480 
D. The Legal Requirements for Ocean Incineration 
1. International Aspects 
The regulatory program for ocean incineration differs from that 
governing land-based incineration because the United States has 
agreed to subject itself to international agreements that require 
passage of additional domestic laws. The United States is a Con-
tracting Party to the "1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter," commonly 
known as the London Dumping Convention (LDC).481 The LDC con-
siders incineration at sea to be ocean dumping and, therefore, sub-
jects incineration to the controls specified in Annexes to the LDC. 
Incineration at sea is considered an interim disposal method to be 
permitted until new technologies and/or alternative land-based meth-
ods of treatment are available for hazardous waste management. 
Technical requirements of the LDC are set out in three Annexes. 
Annex I lists substances that may not be dumped unless they would 
be "rapidly rendered harmless. "482 This list includes organohalogens, 
such as DDT and PCBs, persistent plastics, and oil. Annex I com-
pletely bans dumping of high-level radioactive wastes, and chemical 
and biological warfare agents. Annex II lists substances requiring 
special care. These substances include heavy metals, cyanides that 
could present a serious obstacle to fishing or navigation, and medium-
and low-level radioactive wastes. Annex III sets forth technical 
requirements for disposal as well as the required characteristics of 
dumping sites. 483 
479Id. "In fact, mUltiple shiploads of EDC tars were dumped into the sea during the 1950s 
to 1970s and there is no evidence of persistent long-term ecological effects that can be 
attributed to EDC tar." Id. at 25. 
480 Id. 
481 London Dumping Convention, supra note 295. For review and analysis of this Conven-
tion, see Note, supra note 281, at 162-169. The LDC is an international agreement containing 
specific regulations governing ocean incineration. The LDC came into force on August 30, 
1975, following the necessary 15 ratifications. Fifty-three countries are now contracting par-
ties. 50 Fed. Reg. 8228 (1985). 
482 London Dumping Convention, supra note 295, Annex 6(B)(4). See Note, supra note 281, 
at 165. 
483 50 Fed. Reg. '8228 (1985). 
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Much of the hazardous waste incineration to date has taken place 
in the North Sea.484 The "Convention for the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft," commonly known 
as the Oslo Convention, in part regulates incineration activities in 
the North Sea. The Oslo Convention is a regional agreement of 
European nations that border the North Sea which governs dumping 
of wastes in the North Sea, the northeast Atlantic Ocean, and a 
portion of the Arctic Ocean. 485 In 1981, Rule 2.3 was adopted by the 
Oslo Commission, the governing body of the Oslo Convention, that 
defined ocean incineration as an interim technology and provides for 
a meeting of the Commission before January 1, 1990, to establish a 
final date for the termination of incineration at sea. 486 
European nations are currently rethinking their use of ocean in-
cineration. In November, 1987, the environmental ministers of eight 
North Sea nations agreed to reduce ocean incineration by sixty-five 
percent by 1991 and to end the practice by 1994.487 In June, 1988, 
the Oslo Commission agreed to terminate incineration in the North 
Sea. In October, 1988, the LDC countries, led by Denmark, passed 
a resolution that called for a gradual "phase out" of ocean incineration 
on a global basis. 488 
The Commission of the European Communities, under the aus-
pices of the European Economic Community (EEC), has also dealt 
with ocean incineration.489 The Commission considers incineration to 
be dumping at sea that should be terminated as soon as possible. 490 
Ocean incineration, therefore, is considered to be a temporary dis-
posal option by the EEC to be used only in the absence of practical 
alternatives of land-based methods of treatment, disposal or elimi-
nation. EEC member states are required to submit necessary infor-
mation to the Commission by January 1, 1990, in order to set a final 
date for the termination of incineration at sea. 491 
The United States is considering, but has not yet agreed to, an 
international ban on ocean incineration by the end of 1994.492 The 
484 See OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 17. 
4B5 See Oslo Dumping Convention, supra note 268. 
486 See generally OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 194. 
487 Total Ban on Incineration in North Sea by 1994 Among Steps Backed by Eight Nations, 
11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 13, 1988). 
488 D. Ditz, International Developments in Ocean Incineration Policy 3,' (Sixth Symposium 
on Coastal and Ocean Management, Charleston, S.C.) (July 11-14, 1989). 
489 OTA, OcEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 195. 
490 Id. 
491Id. 
492 Shifting Positions, U.S. Agrees to International Ban on Incineration at Sea, INSIDE 
EPA, Oct. 21, 1988, at 11. 
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interpretation of the 1988 LDC resolution calling for the gradual 
phasing out of ocean incineration remains controversial. The inter-
national trend is toward eliminating ocean incineration, but as of 
1987, ten nations were still incinerating at sea. 493 Additionally, be-



















no official position. 
no official position. 
plans to end ocean incineration by the end of 1994. The ban means 
that by 1994 Belgium will no longer be a port storage country for 
waste burned at sea. Eighty percent of the waste burned in the 
North Sea is stored in, and loaded from, Antwerp harbor. 
is "prepared to consider issuing a dumping permit for incineration 
at sea." 
no official position. 
favors a 1995 termination date. Germany has signed an agreement 
with Belgium which prohibits it from shipping its waste through 
Antwerp harbor for incineration at sea. The agreement will be ef-
fective as soon as Germany sites a portside storage facility. Emden 
and Bremen are proposed sites. 
supports ocean incineration in accordance with the U.K. position. 
opposes ocean incineration, no official date stated. 
opposes ocean incineration and would support a ban if it came to a 
vote at the LDC. 
opposes ocean incineration, no official date stated. 
will stop using ocean incineration by the end of 1990. 
no official position. 
(Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway & Iceland) favor a December 
31, 1991 termination date, as per the Nordic proposal. They also 
favor a prohibition on permitting of ocean incineration of any new 
substances (Le., PCBs) and oppose any increase in the amount of 
substances incinerated at sea after 1989. 
no official position, but the government is negotiating with OCS to 
establish a portside storage facility for hazardous waste near Lis-
bon. 
plans to conduct its first burn in October off the coast of Santan-
der. The government claims that the North Atlantic burnsite will 
be used for Spanish-generated waste only. Spain has signed an 
agreement with Belgium prohibiting the importation of Spanish 
waste to be burned at sea. Of course it will be nearly impossible to 
monitor and restrict the importation of waste from other countries. 
favors a 1995 termination date. 
supports ocean incineration. It submitted a proposal at the Oslo 
Commission meeting in Cardiff (May 4-6, 1987) to extend the 
range of substances permitted to be burned at sea and to continue 
the use of ocean incineration in the North Sea indefinitely. 
will release regulations governing ocean incineration for public 
comment in September. The U.S. has conducted several ''test'' 
burns, but no burns have taken place here since 1982. 
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cause the Oslo Commission decided to terminate ocean incineration 
by the end of 1994, the ocean incineration industry has been seeking 
new markets and burn sites including proposed sites located in the 
South Pacific, especially New Zealand and Australia, the Caribbean, 
and Southeast Asia. 494 
2. Domestic Aspects 
The federal regulatory framework for all domestic aspects of in-
cineration of hazardous wastes is provided primarily by the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) and EPA. 495 Ocean incineration would 
be the last phase in a series of hazardous waste management and 
disposal activities. The other phases require support facilities for 
transportation, storage, and transfer of wastes. Transportation of 
hazardous wastes is regulated by EPA under RCRA,496 and by DOT 
under authority of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (formerly 
the Port and Tanker Safety Act)497 and the Hazardous Material 







Note: Germany burns more than half of the total waste burned in the North Sea, although 
the governmental bureaucrats are pushing for a rapid phase-out. Greenpeace International 
(Sept. 1, 1987). 
494 Bunin, supra note 271, at 1. The 1983 Convention for the Protection and Development 
of the Marine Environment in the Wider Caribbean Region, known as the Cartagena Con-
vention, provides a legal framework for dealing with ocean dumping and pollution under the 
United Nations Environmental Program's Caribbean Action Plan. Id. at 6. Also, the Conven-
tion for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific, under 
the South Pacific Regional Environmental Program (SPREP), provides a legal basis for 
jurisdiction over ocean dumping in the South Pacific, although it does not specifically regulate 
incineration at sea. I d. 
496 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 3. 
496 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-699li (1982 & Supp. v 1987). "RCRA regulations cover both inter-
and intra-state land transportation, and contain standards concerning recordkeeping, report-
ing, labeling, and containers. RCRA tracks hazardous wastes from generator to ultimate 
disposal site through the manifest system, and [allows] transportation of hazardous wastes 
only to approved facilities." House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 68. 
The RCRA regulations apply to any waste storage facility on land, including those 
used to support land-based and ocean incineration. This includes storage facilities 
and any waterfront transfer facility that involves storage for more than ten days. A 
waste generator storing waste on-site for more than 90 days must apply for a RCRA 
storage permit. A waste transporter storing waste at a transfer facility for more 
than 10 days must also apply for a RCRA storage permit. If a transporter stores 
wastes for 10 days or less the facility is considered a transfer facility, not a storage 
facility. 
Id. at 70. Local building codes may impose additional safety and storage requirements. Id. 
491 Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
498 Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982). HMTA regulations 
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EPA and DOT, alone or in conjunction, may bring enforcement 
actions against transporters of hazardous wastes. Both agencies rou-
tinely coordinate investigations and enforcement actions in order to 
avoid duplication.499 In practice, EPA generally monitors activities 
at generator sites and waste management facilities, while DOT mon-
itors all shipping between them, whatever the transportation mode. 
Thus, the breakdown essentially is that DOT directs the land and 
water transportation, transfer, and handling of hazardous waste, 
while EPA focuses primarily on storage, disposal, and treatment. 500 
Within DOT, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has a par-
ticularly crucial role in the control of hazardous waste transportation 
via water, which can be a supporting link for incineration either on 
land or at sea. The USCG regulates numerous aspects of hazardous 
material transportation, including certification of vessel design and 
construction, annual inspections of vessels, certifications of crews, 
movements of vessels through ports, surveillance, and spill re-
sponse.501 EPA's Proposed Ocean Incineration Regulation, published 
in 1985,502 required that ocean incineration vessels meet USCG re-
quirements and have a contingency plan, approved by both the 
govern all modes of transportation-highway, railroad, land, and water-and apply to all 
commercial transportation of packaged products and bulk shipments, whether interstate or 
intrastate. Id. § 1802(1). The regulations require proper classification of materials, shipping 
papers, package markings, safety standards for containers or packages, and safety precautions 
for vehicles. Id. § 1804(a). Within DOT, various agencies regulate different aspects of trans-
portation, including the regulation of land transportation by the Federal Highways Adminis-
tration and water-borne transportation by the United States Coast Guard (USCG). House 
Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 70-71. 
"Transfer facilities or activities incidental to transportation activities are regulated under 
the [HMTA] and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act." Id. at 70. "Transfer facilities sup-
porting ships must comply with USCG requirements for all waterfront facilities, plus specific 
requirements for handling oil, chemicals, and other dangerous cargoes." Id. at 70-71. Water-
front hazardous waste facilities that comply with DOT packaging requirements are exempt 
from the RCRA storage permitting requirements unless the wastes are stored at the facility 
for more than 10 days. Id. at 71. 
499 There are some areas over which only EPA or DOT has jurisdiction. For example, EPA 
enforces the requirement that transporters clean up any accidental discharges of hazardous 
wastes, and DOT enforces the requirement of safety feature installations on all motor vehicles. 
House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 68-69. "To integrate the administration and enforce-
ment of RCRA and HMTA, DOT and EPA executed a Memorandum of Understanding in 
1980 that delineates areas of responsibility and coordination on the enforcement of standards 
applicable to shippers and transporters of hazardous waste." Id. at 69. 
500 Handling of Explosives or Other Dangerous Cargoes Within or Contiguous to Water 
Front Facilities, 33 C.F.R. § 126 (1988) (ports); Standards Applicable to Transporters of 
Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 263 (1988) (transport); Standards for Owners and Operators 
of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage and Disposal Facilities, 40 C.F.R. § 264.1(g)(9) (1988) 
(storage); Hazardous Materials Regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 171 (1988) (handling). 
501 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 69-70. 
502 50 Fed. Reg. 8222 (1985). 
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USCG and EPA, detailing the procedures to be followed in the event 
of a cargo spill. In accordance with these requirements, each vessel's 
contingency plan must establish response procedures from the point 
where the land-based transfer facility's contingency plan ends (when 
wastes enter the vessel) and must continue to the point when the 
wastes are incinerated. 503 
Both the USCG and EPA would be involved with the cleanup of 
a spill from an ocean incineration vessel. 504 If a spill did occur, 
however remote the possibility, then a 
cleanup action would be invoked under both the Clean Water 
Act (CWA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). The National Oil 
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (National 
Contingency Plan) assigns specific responsibilities to [fourteen] 
federal agencies and mandates Regional Contingency Plans for 
coordination and role identification at the state level. Under the 
National Contingency Plan, a [USCG] officer is the predesig-
nated on-scene coordinator for spills and potential spills in coastal 
and offshore areas, and the EPA is the on-scene coordinator for 
inland spills, [and NOAA provides scientific advice].505 
The actual incineration phase, as regulated by EPA, is compli-
cated. Three separate programs in EPA, under three different stat-
utes, deal with hazardous waste incineration.506 The Office of Solid 
Waste develops standards and permits for land-based incinerators 
under RCRA.507 The Office of Toxic Substances develops standards 
for, and approves the incineration of, PCBs on land under the Toxic 
503 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 69-70. 
504 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 173 (Table 25. Summary of Federal 
Regulatory Framework for Incineration). 
505 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 90 (statement of Captain Gordon G. Piche, Chief, 
Marine Technical and Hazardous Materials Division, Department of Transportation, United 
States Coast Guard); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 300, 300.23, 300.24 (1989); OTA, OCEAN INCIN-
ERATION, supra note 72, at 173. 
506 Numerous statutes administered by the Coast Guard and DOT also deal with incineration 
issues. See OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 173. 
507 See 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982). In 1976, Congress passed RCRA, to prevent damage to 
human health and the environment from the mismanagement of waste. EPA, INCINERATION 
ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 22. RCRA regulates all wastes, 
including liquid, sludge, and solid, hazardous and nonhazardous, and all methods of manage-
ment, including disposal, storage, treatment, and recycling. Id.; see also Buc & Haymore, 
Regulating Hazardous Waste Incinerators Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549 (1983). The basic regulatory program was promulgated in 
January, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 7666 (1981), and modified in June, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 27,516 
(1982). 
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Substances Control Act (TSCA).508 Finally, the Office of Water has 
issued permits for ocean incineration under the Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA).509 In 1985, the Office of 
Water published a Proposed Ocean Incineration Regulation that 
would provide more specific criteria to regulate ocean incineration 
under the MPRSA,51O but this regulation has not been finalized and, 
therefore, no permits for ocean incineration are currently avail-
able. 511 Thus, under these federal statutes all incineration facilities 
handling hazardous wastes must obtain permits by which the sta-
tutory requirements are applied. 512 The MPRSA implements the 
international environmental laws acceded to by the United States 
dealing with ocean incineration. 513 
The proposed regulation for ocean incineration is similar to the 
RCRA regulation governing land incineration,514 but generally is 
more stringent515 because of additional requirements imposed by 
international law. In general, the proposed ocean incineration reg-
ulation adopted the most stringent requirements of existing regu-
lations under the LDC and added these requirements to domestic 
law as expressed in RCRA, TSCA, and the MPRSA.516 The proposed 
regulation, exclusive of its interpretive Preamble, occupies sixteen 
pages of the Federal Register. 517 In contrast, the land-based incin-
erator requirements take up only three pages in the Federal Reg-
ister. 518 
508 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e) (1988). TSCA was enacted by Congress in 1976 partly in response 
to concern about potential health hazards from PCB contamination. EPA, INCINERATION 
ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 23. TSCA imposed a ban on 
PCB manufacture, and in 1978-1979 EPA issued regulations for proper PCB disposal under 
high-temperature incineration. Id. Because TSCA does not require compliance with the Clean 
Air Act, it was claimed that the Rollins Deer Park, Texas facility could emit air pollutants 
without regulation by the state under the CAA. Sweeney, This Town's Not For Burning, 
ENVTL. ACTION, Feb. 1982, at 12. 
509 33 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1414 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
510 50 Fed. Reg. 8222 (1985). 
511 See supra notes 402-07 and accompanying text. 
512 "Because it is covered under RCRA, hazardous waste incineration on land is effectively 
exempted from coverage under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Municipal waste incinerators, 
however, are subject to the CAA." OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 174. 
513 See supra notes 113, 481-83 and accompanying text. 
514 See supra notes 183-210 and accompanying text. 
515 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 11. (''[In particular], [t]echnicallimitations 
and performance standards, as well as strict requirements for obtaining permits, monitoring, 
and reporting, tend to be more involved and leave less to the judgment of those issuing 
permits for ocean incineration. ") 
516 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 31. 
517 See 50 Fed. Reg. 8222 (1985). 
518 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 265.340-265.352 (1989). 
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Examples of the more stringent requirements imposed on ocean 
incineration by the proposed regulation which do not have counter-
parts in the RCRA regulations governing land-based incineration 
include the following: 
(1) more exacting financial responsibility requirements;519 
(2) a requirement that an applicant prepare an endangered spe-
cies assessment;520 
(3) stringent limitations on metal content of wastes including 
aluminum, iron, and tin which are not generally regarded as 
hazardous;521 
(4) stricter requirements concerning trial burns;522 
(5) the requirement that a full-time EPA observer be present at 
the burn;523 
(6) certification of consistency with approved state CZMA pro-
grams;524 
(7) more demanding monitoring, recording, and reporting re-
quirements, including EPA rules on the qualifications of em-
ployees;525 and 
(8) yearly inspections of facilities and records by the USCG and 
on request by EPA. 526 
Significantly, the MPRSA requires a determination of the need 
for ocean incineration and ocean dumping in evaluating permit ap-
plications. 527 This determination involves a comparison between the 
human health and environmental risks associated with ocean incin-
eration to those associated with practicable land-based alterna-
tives. 528 Need presumptively is demonstrated if ocean incineration 
poses risks less than or equal to practicable land-based alterna-
tives. 529 
519 See 50 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8233 (1985). 
520 I d. at 8237. 
521 Id. at 8243-44. 
522 See id. at 8236, 8249. 
523 Id. at 8252. The USCG could require an additional shiprider. OTA, OCEAN INCINERA-
TION, supra note 72, at 129. 
524 50 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8238 (1985). 
525 Id. at 8251-52. "The requirements would specify, for example, the frequency of recording 
and the use of tamper-resistant devices." OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 129. 
"[Also,] EPA would have to renew and approve the qualifications of ocean incineration com-
pany personnel involved in monitoring and analyzing waste." Id. at 41. "All data from waste 
analyses and operational monitoring would have to be submitted to EPA." Id. at 129. 
526 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 129. 
527 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 31; 
see also MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(A) (1982). 
526 OTA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT, supra note 72, at 129. 
529 See 50 Fed. Reg. 8222 (1985). 
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The two incineration technologies most commonly utilized for liq-
uid organic hazardous wastes in Europe and in the United States 
involve liquid injection and rotary kiln incinerators. 53o There are 
some differences in design, however, between those used on land 
and those used at sea. Ocean incineration uses liquid injection incin-
erators without air pollution control systems. 531 The rationale for 
this distinction is that there are no proximal human populations at 
risk and the expectation that hydrogen chloride (HCI) emissions at 
sea will be rendered harmless by the ocean.532 Monitoring from 
previous burns, as well as simulation modeling, indicate that acid 
gases are neutralized by the ocean, and the particulates can be kept 
at safe levels by placing limits on the metal content of the wastes to 
be incinerated. 533 
Thus, ocean incineration has an economic advantage in that it can 
be performed without using air pollution controls, because seawater 
can neutralize hydrogen chloride gas emissions. 534 Moreover, fifty-
five percent of the land-based incinerators do not have scrubbers 
and, thus, release metals and other contaminants similar to ocean 
incinerators much closer to human populations. 535 The absence of 
pollution control devices on ocean incineration systems also elimi-
nates the production of scrubber water that would have to be man-
aged as a RCRA hazardous waste. 536 Without air pollution controls, 
the costs of ocean incineration are reduced to less than half that of 
land-based incineration. 537 
If the proposed regulation was adopted, ocean incinerator opera-
tors would have to perform waste analyses to ensure compliance 
530 See generally OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72. 
531 Id. at 11. 
532 Id. Conversely, land incinerators typically have air pollution control equipment in order 
to meet air emissions standards for HCI and particulates. Id. 
533 Id. at 41. Wastes containing chlorine present a problem when incinerated because they 
produce HCI, a highly corrosive and toxic gas that is difficult to control with air pollution 
equipment on land-based incinerators. Id. at 40-41. When burned, liquid wastes produce 
emissions of such small size and low particle density that air pollution controls are inefficient 
at capturing them. Id. at 160. 
534 See 50 Fed. Reg. 8222 (1985). 
535 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 160. 
536 Id. at 41. Scrubber waters from land-based incinerators contain hazardous materials and 
must be disposed of in an environmentally acceptable manner. SAB REPORT, supra note 376, 
at 21. The SAB study noted that some scrubber water was discharged to local sewer systems. 
Ultimately some of the materials could enter local waterways. Id. 
537 See Ocean Combustion Service, Inc. (promotional literature for the Vulcanus) (available 
at OCS, BV, Noordsingel185, 3035 ER Rotterdam, The Netherlands, P.O. Box 171, 3000 AD 
Rotterdam) [hereinafter OCS Promotional Literature] (land-based incineration costs $181-212 
per metric ton (MT) and at-sea incineration costs $80-91 per MT). 
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with permit conditions. 538 The Hel emission rate for ocean inciner-
ation was set at a level that allows a change of ten percent or less 
in seawater alkalinity in the release zone after initial mixing.539 The 
practical effect is that wastes with a high chlorine content even at a 
rapid feed rate still will not exceed the environmental performance 
standard, while wastes with greater than a thirty-five percent chlor-
ine content in land-based incinerators cannot be burned and meet 
current regulatory emission limits. 540 
The absence of air pollution controls on ocean incinerators would 
allow nearly all metals in the wastes to become air pollutants. Thus, 
ocean incineration would be limited to wastes that have concentra-
tions of fourteen listed metals541 that are less than 500 parts per 
million (ppm) per metal before burning. 542 EPA also put additional 
limits of 500 ppm for mercury, silver, and copper in the final blended 
wastes that could be incinerated. 543 
Other considerations further complicate the issue of whether the 
incineration of wastes with a high chlorine content is desirable. High 
chlorine liquid wastes burned at sea usually have a high BTU value 
whose heat value could be used to incinerate other wastes. This 
approach is used at some land-based incinerators, although many of 
the older land-based facilities are thermally inefficient. For inciner-
ation at sea, it is not feasible to combine waste streams to use high-
BTU wastes to burn low-BTU wastes, and consequently heat value 
is wasted. If high-chlorine wastes are directed to ocean incineration, 
other sources of energy such as petroleum must be used to incinerate 
538 50 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8238 (1985). 
539Id. 
54°OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 124. On land, if Hel production exceeds 
1.8 kglhr (approx. 4 Ibslhr), scrubbers must be used to remove 99% or limit emissions to 
approximately 4 Ibslhr., whichever results in the larger emission. An incinerator with a 
medium capacity of 1250 Ibslhr with a 99% efficient scrubber could only incinerate waste with 
up to a 30% chlorine content before exceeding the regulatory limit. I d. 
541 The restricted metals are aluminum, arsenic, cadmium, chromium, copper, iron, lead, 
mercury, nickel, selenium, silver, thallium, tin, and zinc. OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra 
note 72, at 122; see also House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 53. 
5420TA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 122-23. Environmental groups raised 
objections to the proposed metal limit because metals in the waste stream are .not incinerated 
but are emitted from the stacks and deposited in the ocean or wherever transported via air 
currents. In response to the criticisms, EPA was considering proposing a generic environ-
mental performance standard for the amount of metals allowed in the final waste mixture so 
that the ambient marine concentration of a constituent of the emissions would not exceed its 
applicable water quality criterion or, where there is no applicable water quality criterion, an 
aquatic life/no effect level. House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 53. 
543 See 50 Fed. Reg. 51,362 (1985). 
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low-BTU wastes. 544 Also, pollution controls used on land-based in-
cinerators act as an additional emergency backup in case of combus-
tion malfunction545 and make it easier to obtain monitoring infor-
mation. 546 
EPA's regulatory program for both land-based and ocean incin-
eration is based on performance standards rather than incinerator 
design requirements. 547 The measure of incinerator performance 
used by EPA is combustion efficiency (CE).548 The term CE is really 
a misnomer, for it is a measure of the relationship between carbon 
dioxide (C02) and carbon monoxide (CO) concentrations.549 For ocean 
incineration, a CE of 99.95 +1- 0.05% is required to meet regulations 
developed under the London Dumping Convention.550 Land-based 
PCB incineration must meet a 99.9% requirement,551 while other 
RCRA w'astes have no specified CE.552 The CE is a useful measure, 
although it evolved for evaluation of boiler operation, not hazardous 
waste incineration. Incomplete destruction of wastes still can occur 
with a high CE. 553 
The Destruction Efficiency (DE), or Destruction and Removal 
Efficiency (DRE), is a measurement of the percentage of destruction 
of each monitored compound in the waste feed. 554 DE/DRE require-
ments are 99.99% for all compounds except PCBs, dioxins, and 
dibenzofurans that have a 99.9999% DE/DRE requirement. 555 DEI 
DRE is measured after air pollution controls have acted on emis-
sions, but because ocean incinerators normally do not have air pol-
544 House Hearing 1983, supra note 258, at 234 (statement of Robert Gregory, Vice Presi-
dent, Rollins Environmental Services, Inc.) 
545 On the other hand, ocean incinerator ships depend on an automatic feed shut-off if the 
wall temperature of the combustion chamber drops below 11000 C. CEFIC, INCINERATION 
AT SEA, supra note 266, at 5. 
546 Incinerators using air pollution controls emit gases at lower temperatures, thereby 
making it easier to monitor the emissions. 
5470TA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 123. 
548 50 Fed. Reg. 8266 (1985). 
549 The formula for calculating combustion efficiency (CE) is as follows: CE = CO2-CO/C02 
X 100. 
550 50 Fed. Reg. 8227 (1985). 
551 40 C.F.R. § 761. 70(a)(2) (1989). 
552 50 Fed. Reg. 8227 (1985). 
553 EWK, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 167, at 5-1. One critic of the validity of CE 
uses as an example a diesel engine which usually has a thermal efficiency in the range of 30-
38%. However, the CO:C02 volumetric ratio in the engine's exhaust is in the range of 1:320 
to 1:640. This gives a CE calculation of from 99.7-99.8%, almost as high as the 99.9% specified 
in the 1981-1982 permit for the Vulcanus. [d. at 5-2. 
554 50 Fed. Reg. 8266 (1985). 
555 TSCA PCB Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 761. 70 (1988). 
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lution controls, there is a slightly more stringent requirement on an 
ocean incinerator's burning efficiency compared with land-based in-
cinerators. 556 The DE/DRE concept is based on an input/output ratio, 
however, so the effects of newly created substances, such as the 
products of incomplete combustions (PICs), are not considered. 
Thus, DE/DRE measurement cannot evaluate accurately the total 
quantity of emissions. 
The DE/DRE has a general but not precise relationship to com-
bustion efficiency (CE). Generally, DE/DRE will exceed 99.99% if 
the CE value is at or above 99.95%.557 Land-based incinerator op-
erators claim to have a much higher DE/DRE than at-sea incinera-
tors. Land-based operators claim a DE/DRE of 99.99999% ("seven 
9s"), while they claim that ocean incinerators only have a DE of 
99.99% ("four 9S").558 The ocean incineration industry claims that 
their DE is comparable to land-based incinerators. 559 
As under the land regulation, DE is measured by using a small 
number of primary waste components as a base index to represent 
the overall hazardous waste. 560 The ocean incineration regulation also 
requires a trial burn to demonstrate conformity with the perfor-
mance standard and to identify the appropriate operating conditions 
to be included in the permit. 561 
Past EPA-promulgated test results claimed that properly designed 
and operated ocean incinerators are capable of meeting EPA's per-
formance standard.562 Critics have denounced the EPA data. 563 Ac-
556 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 124. 
557 International Maritime Organization, Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the Scientific 
Group on Dumping 3 (Apr. 29, 1988). 
558 Ocean-Based Incineration of Hazardous Wastes, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce, Transportation, and Tourism, of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1981), Ser. No. 97-47 (statement of Melvyn Bell, President of Energy 
Systems Co.). 
559 Ocean Combustion Service Inc., promotional literature: Ocean Incineration, the Solution 
to the Problem (available at OCS, BV, Noordsingel185, 3035 ER Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 
P.O. Box 171, 3000 AD, Rotterdam). 
560 Because many of the wastes to be incinerated are complex mixtures of several different 
compounds, EPA uses a system that selects principal organic hazardous constituents (PORCs), 
which serve as indicators for the destruction of all constituents. PORCs selected are those 
considered most difficult to incinerate, with incinerability based on a determination of heat of 
combustion. EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 
27, at 12. 
561 Id. at 10. Trial burn requirements for land-based incinerators are set forth at 40 C.F.R. 
§ 270. 19(b) (1989). 
562 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 12. 
568 Critics say the Vulcanus I cannot be properly tested for any of the variables affecting 
DRE. EWK, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 167, at 2-5. The 1981 permit issued to the 
Vulcanus I specified a 0.7 second minimum residence time. Earlier permits did not specify a 
residence time, but the calculated value for the 1977 burn was 0.67 seconds. The only way to 
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cording to some of those opposed to ocean incineration, a minimum 
engineering requirement for incinerator combustion chamber resi-
dence time is one second, assuming an adequate temperature and 
oxygen level. 564 Land-based incinerators often overdesign. For ex-
ample, the ENSCO incinerator at EI Dorado, Arkansas has a mean 
residence time of 4.5 seconds. 565 The Vulcanus I claims a calculated 
residence time of 0.9 seconds at 1200° C. 566 This conforms to the 
dominant scientific view that only a fraction of a second at 1200° C 
is required for 100% destruction of an organic molecule. 567 Organic 
substances detected in emissions, therefore, are created after frag-
ments from the original substances have recombined. 568 
Particulate emissions from land-based incinerators are limited by 
regulation. 569 This regulation not only acts as a control on particulate 
matter in general, but also limits important subsets such as heavy 
metals and PICs.570 This standard is the same as the municipal 
incinerator standard for New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) 
under the Clean Air Act. 571 The Proposed Ocean Incineration Reg-
ulation has no specific particulate standard, but instead limits con-
centrations in wastes to be incinerated. The resultant mixture of 
incinerator emissions and seawater would have to meet marine water 
quality criteria. 572 
A subject of concern has been the formation and emission of 
PICs.573 Concern arose in the late 1970s when researchers discovered 
compensate for the Vulcanus I residency time, which is two to three times below the minimum 
required for land incinerators, is to reduce feed rate, which, due to this incinerator's design, 
would further reduce combustion efficiency. Id. at 2-3. In addition, the Vulcanus I used a 
vortex/rotary burner that does not have a high combustion efficiency and is not a preferred 
technique for incinerating PCBs and other high halogen content wastes according to critics. 
Id. at 2-5. However, the at-sea incineration industry disagrees. CEFIC, INCINERATION AT 
SEA, supra note 266, at 5. Despite the questionable engineering of the Vulcanus incineration 
system, EPA concluded that the Vulcanus provided an environmentally compatible means of 
disposing of wastes only one day after completion of the burn on December 2-9, 1974. EWK, 
OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 167, at 2-3. 
564 EWK, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 167, at ii. 
565Id. 
566 OCS promotional literature, supra note 537. 
567 IMO REPORT, supra note 444, at 12 (citing L. SPAANS, INCINERATION OF CHLORINATED 
WASTE AT SEA, PROCESS AND EMISSIONS (Marien Eco Publication No.1) (1987». 
568 Id. 
569 The particulate emission limit for land-based incinerators is 180 mg/dscm after correction 
to seven percent excess air. Incinerator Performance Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 264.343(c) (1989). 
57°ld. § 264.343(aHb). 
571 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 125. 
572 Id. 
573 PICs are substances formed in the process of combustion that were not present in the 
original waste. EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 
27, at 12. 
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chlorinated dioxins and furans in the emissions of many municipal 
refuse and hazardous waste incinerators.574 EPA has not regulated 
PIC emissions because most studies suggest that the reported levels 
of PICs from well-operated incinerators pose little risk, but the 
information available is insufficient and warrants more research. For 
this reason, the Science Advisory Board report recommends a more 
comprehensive characterization of emissions to provide a more in-
formed and critical risk assessment for both land and ocean incin-
eration.575 EPA has proposed that emissions from ocean incineration 
be analyzed for PICs during research burns and, at EPA's discretion, 
during trial burns as well. 576 
The basic requirement for an incinerator is to assure that the 
temperature and time in the incinerator is sufficient to burn those 
wastes most difficult to combust, often termed principal organic 
hazardous constituents (POHCs). Several valid concerns surround 
the adequacy of this method. The value of the heat of combustion 
index has been criticized,577 in that it does not allow adequate deter-
mination of the incinerability of complex mixtures of chemical com-
pounds.578 Nevertheless, EPA-although continually assessing this 
system-believes that the heat of combustion measure is the best 
available method. 579 EPA notes that normal operating temperatures 
of incinerators greatly exceed the temperatures required to destroy 
compounds ranked at the top of all incinerability lists, so this issue 
is not crucial. 580 As with DRE, however, EPA's position on the heat 
of combustion measure is challenged by those opposed to ocean 
incineration, and specifically by those opposed to the use of the 
Vulcanus ships. 581 
Another area of concern, the ability of the incinerators to maintain 
performance, was addressed in the EPA reports. EPA scientists 
believe the test burn results582 indicate that destruction efficiencies 
574Id. 
575 SAB REPORT, supra note 376, at 7. 
576 EPA INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 32. 
577Id. at 42-43. Heat of combustion is a "theoretical calculation of energy released when 
waste molecules are combusted. Compounds with a lower heat of combustion are presumed 
to be more difficult to burn than those with a higher heat of combustion." Id. 
578 I d. at 13. 
579 Id. 
5BO Id. 
581 See supra note 563 and accompanying text. 
582 Since 1974, the Vulcanus I was involved in four series of test burns, and in 1983, the 
Vulcanus II was involved in an additional series of test burns in the North Sea. EPA, 
INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 44. 
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(DE) of greater than 99.99% are attainable. 583 In these burns, how-
ever, EPA measured performance only for a short time and under 
optimal operating conditions.584 With this in mind, the Science Ad-
visory Board recommended that EPA conduct more specific tests, 
particularly focusing on the frequency and effects of "upset condi-
tions."585 The Board concluded that EPA should conduct several 
research burns under less than optimal conditions to provide emis-
sions information resulting from waste composition anomalies or 
mechanical malfunctions. 586 
Critics also have questioned both stack emissions monitoring and 
ambient air environmental monitoring. 587 The criticisms suggest that 
sampling practices have not been consistent and that analytical tech-
niques have not been proven adequate for ocean systems.588 For 
example, staying within the plume during field sampling is difficult, 
and samples taken at the air-water interface represent only a crude 
approximation of actual emissions. Monitoring on ocean vessels in-
volves special problems because the absence of air pollution control 
equipment causes the stack gases to be emitted at extremely high 
temperatures, which adversely affects sampling equipment. 589 Thus, 
additional analytical studies should be conducted during research 
burns. These studies should entail longer sampling times, better 
quantification of particulates, and more complete characterization of 
emissions and potential chemical changes as the hot effluent gases 
enter the cooler air. 590 
Once released into the air, stack gases and particles are transmit-
ted varying distances through the atmosphere until they either are 
broken down through such mechanisms as photo-decomposition or 
are deposited at sea or on land. 591 Due to atmospheric transport, 
however, land incineration potentially can produce more fallout of 
emissions into the sea than ocean incineration because of the "much 
583 [d. 
584 [d. at 13. 
586 SAB REPORT, supra note 376, at 2. Upset condition refers to the operation of a hazardous 
waste incinerator under less than optimal conditions. [d. 
5B6 [d. 
587 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 13. 
Ocean incineration involves ambient monitoring. Land-based incinerators have no such re-
quirement under RCRA or TSCA, although some states may require ambient monitoring 
under the CAA. [d. at 48. 
588 [d. at 13. 
589 [d. 
590 [d. at 48. 
591 SAB REPORT, supra note 376, at 25. 
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larger quantities of combusted material emitted over land. "592 For 
example, underregulated on-site and municipal incineration emis-
sions eventually are carried to the sea as air and water pollutants. 593 
Thus, assessment of the environmental impact of ocean incinerator 
emissions needs to consider more fully the impact on oceans of 
atmospheric transport and fate of emissions from land-based 
sources. 594 
Another requirement proposed by EPA mandates that EPA ship-
riders (observers) be aboard the vessel for transport and incineration 
phases. 595 This requirement would eliminate some of the concern 
that the monitoring of ocean incineration is so difficult that illegal 
releases or incomplete burns by unscrupulous operators would go 
undetected. 596 With an EPA official accompanying every incineration 
voyage, the likelihood of illegal activity might be reduced signifi-
cantly. Because burns can occur twenty-four hours a day, more than 
one observer would be needed on each vessel. A weakness of land-
based incineration regulation is that observers are· not required un-
der RCRA regulations. 
In EPA's Proposed Ocean Incineration Regulation of 1985, the 
agency limited incinerator emissions so that they "would not unrea-
sonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare, or amenities, 
or the marine environment, ecological systems or economic poten-
tialities or recreational or commercial shipping or boating or recre-
ational use of beaches or shorelines. "597 This requirement was to be 
met by an applicant using an EPA-approved model to show that 
receiving water would contain only trace contaminants that would 
rapidly be rendered harmless. 598 "Trace contaminants" are defined 
under technical guidelines to the LDC to prevent ocean incineration 
if the emissions "could cause undesirable effects, especially the pos-
sibility of chronic or acute toxic effects on marine organisms or 
human health or wildlife whether or not arising from their bioaccu-
mulation in marine organisms and especially in food species. "599 Thus, 
592 [d. at 29. 
598 See id. at 34. 
594 [d. at 29--30. 
595 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 32; 
see also 50 Fed. Reg. 8269-70 (1985). 
596 Note, supra note 281, at 186 n.182. Some commentators feel that the observer require-
ment is critical regarding the liability question. Without an observer on board, any damage 
occurring at sea is unlikely to be discovered and, even if discovered, it will be very difficult 
to prove. Asmus & Johnston, supra note 265, at 7. 
597 50 Fed. Reg. 8246 (1985). 
598 [d. 
599 [d. at 8244. 
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the aim of EPA's regulation was to prevent even small adverse 
impacts on oceans from ocean-based incineration. 
E. Environmental Effects of the Research Burns 
The actual data on environmental effects obtained from the few 
research burns are sparse and inconclusive. The earliest report by 
EPA's Office of Water and Hazardous Materials in July, 1975600 
provided data derived from two research burns conducted by Shell 
under its research permit granted on December 12, 1974.601 During 
this burn, the waste plume from the stack was monitored for HCI 
levels six meters above the sea surface. 602 Although seawater is well 
buffered, HCI was important to monitor because it can increase the 
acidity (lower the pH) of seawater. Further at-sea incineration would 
be conditional on a showing that the pH level in the waters near the 
Vulcanus did not drop by more than a 0.5 pH unit and that there 
were no significant effects upon the marine environment. 603 The 
maximum HCI concentrations measured ranged from 0.01 to 7 ppm, 
with the highest levels occurring at 0.4 nautical miles from the 
ship. 604 
During the second burn in 1975, an EPA aircraft made passes 
through the plume during the first three days of incineration. The 
aircraft measured maximum HCI concentration in the Vulcanus 
plume at 3 ppm the first and third day, and 1.8 ppm the second 
day.605 Additional grab samples collected in the plume and later 
analyzed were low in pollutants. In tests for pH and chlorinity in 
seawater by the Oregon II, where the plume touched down, the 
maximum pH depression was 0.15 units (well within the limit), and 
the seawater chlorinity increased 500 ppm. The chlorinity of sea-
water is usually around 20,000 ppm. The research done on the vessel 
Orca found no differences between fallout and control areas. 606 Water 
samples collected were also analyzed for organochlorides, which 
600 Kamlet, supra note 292, at 304. 
601 See supra notes 298--309 and accompanying text. 
602 Kamlet, supra note 292, at 304. Monitoring was carried out on the Oregon II, a NOAA 
research vessel, "using a Geomet hydrogen chloride (HCl) monitor supplied and operated by 
NASA. Sampling was confined mainly to a 90-degree arc downwind of the Vulcanus, beginning 
a few hundred meters behind the ship and extending about three nautical miles." The HCl 
detector had a minimum detection lower limit of 10 ppb. [d. at 304-05. 
603 [d. at 301. 
604 [d. at 305. 
600 [d. 
606 [d. 
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were found to be below the limits of detection,607 and no significant 
levels of eight heavy metals were detected. 608 
In addition to monitoring the plume, EPA monitored an area 
downwind and downcurrent of the incineration site. 609 The results 
indicated that "no significant changes in pH, chlorinity, organochlor-
ides, trace metals, phytoplankton, chlorophyll-a or ATP could be 
detected, suggesting the absence of cumulative impacts from the 
burn. "610 EPA cautions that there was very little marine life in the 
incineration site, however, which leaves open the possibility that 
richer marine environments could be affected. 611 Nevertheless, the 
first use of at-sea incineration in the waters of the United States for 
the disposal of organochlorine wastes was rated by EPA as a success 
and an environmentally acceptable practice when closely monitored 
and regulated. 612 
During the 1977 research burn,613 when the herbicide Agent Or-
ange was burned, limited biological monitoring took place.614 Specif-
ically, biological monitoring was confined to the collection of plankton 
samples in the burn site before and after the initial burn. 615 No 
differences between pre-burn and post-burn plankton tows could be 
found. 616 Again, despite the limited environmental monitoring, the 
at-sea incineration operation was rated an overall success, and the 
research burn demonstrated that incineration was an environmen-
tally safe disposal method for organochlorines. 617 
More detailed biological monitoring took place during the second 
Shell operation, conducted in the Gulf of Mexico at the same site as 
607Id. 
608 Id. 
609 Id. at 306. This monitoring was conducted by laying out a sampling grid of 16 stations 




SI3Id. The Administrator of EPA issued a research permit on April 25, 1977, authorizing 
the incineration of up to one shipload (4300 metric tons) of the herbicide Agent Orange stocks 
located at Gulfport, Mississippi. Id. at 307. The U.S. Air Force subsequently incinerated 3520 
metric tons of Agent Orange in the Pacific Ocean at a site 120 miles west of Johnston Atoll. 
Id.; see also supra notes 319-27 and accompanying text. 
SI4 Kamlet, supra note 292, at 308. A final report on the Agent Orange incineration (prepared 
by TRW, Inc., under contract to the Air Force) was published by EPA in April, 1978. See 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AT-SEA INCINERATION OF HERBICIDE ORANGE ONBOARD 
THE MIT VULCANUS (1978) (EPA-600/2-78-086); see also Kamlet, supra note 292, at 307. 
SI5 Kamlet, supra note 292, at 308. 
SIS Id. 
SI7Id. 
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the first series of burns, during March-April, 1977.618 The results of 
this monitoring were reported by EPA.619 In addition, biological 
studies were carried out by the TerEco Corporation of Texas. 620 
Specifically, EPA transported numerous coastal fish, Fundulus 
grandis, to the Gulf incineration site and exposed them within "biotal 
ocean monitors" (BOMs) to the Vulcanus incineration plume while 
the Shell waste was being burned. 621 Following the burn, the fish 
livers were reportedly frozen and later assayed for the activities of 
specified enzymes; only one enzyme showed a significant response 
to the test. 622 
The TerEco report concluded that the Shell PVC-derived orga-
nochlorine waste "generates a definite stress within the organism 
(i.e., Fundulus) either at high concentrations for short periods or 
low concentrations for long periods. "623 Nevertheless, the report 
concluded that "incineration of organochlorine wastes has only tem-
porary effects on the marine environment," and that one would 
expect a potentially serious problem to exist only with "benthic 
animals that are exposed to toxicants in the sediments for prolonged 
periods or with pelagic animals that are exposed to repeated injec-
tions of toxicants into the water column or with pelagic animals that 
must drift with a polluted water mass that maintains its integrity 
for prolonged periods" -conditions not likely to be associated with 
sporadic, short-lived, at-sea incineration operations.624 The results, 
however, do highlight the need for caution and further research into 
potential impacts of ocean incineration on the marine ecosystem. 625 
618Id. 
619Id. at 308-09; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AT-SEA INCINERATION OF 
ORGANOCHLORINE WASTES ONBOARD THE MIT VULCANUS (1979) (EPA-600/2-77-196). 
620 Kamlet, supra note 292, at 309. According to Kamlet, the TerEco Corporation report is 
unpublished. Id. 
62IId. 
622 Id. The activities of three enzymes-Catalase, ATP-ase, and Cytochrome P-450-were 
assayed from the fish livers. Id. 
Of these, only the [Cytochrome] P-450 showed a significant response (showing a 
nearly 3-fold increase in activity relative to controls), although catalase did show 
some depression. The report noted, however, that exposed fish that were returned 
live and acclimated for a few days in the laboratory before being tested had depurated 
and showed control levels of all three enzymes. The report emphasized the importance 
of selected metabolic enzymes as early warning signals for untoward responses of 
animals to chemical pollutants in the water column. 
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In essence, the above monitoring results were the extent of the 
information available to EPA at the time decisions were made re-
garding moving ahead with ocean incineration. Clearly, the available 
information concerning the health and environmental risks was lack-
ing at the time of the test/research burns. Since that time, more 
data have become available. 
V. HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS 
A. Health Effects of Land-Based and Ocean-Based Incineration 
Exposures to PCB emissions from land-based and ocean-based 
incineration can have a significant impact on human health. A 1985 
report626 provided a comparative exposure assessment that focused 
on the potential differences in human exposure from land-
based627 versus ocean-based incineration.628 For this comparative 
assessment, the incineration scenarios were devised as follows. 629 
Identical liquid injection incinerator facilities ,630 burning PCB-
containing wastes,631 were assumed to be sited on land632 and at 
626 Holton, Travis & Etnier, A Comparison of Human Exposures to PCB Emissions from 
Oceanic and Terrestrial Incineration, 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 453 
(1985). 
627 Id. at 454. Exposure pathways considered for land-based incineration were inhalation, 
terrestrial food chain, and drinking water. Id. 
628 Id. 
629 I d. It was emphasized in the report that the exposure methods utilized were very 
generalized because it was not possible, nor necessarily desirable, to develop predictive 
methodologies that address all processes affecting the movement of contaminants through the 
environment. I d. at 458. Rather, the overall goal of the study was to make reasonably 
conservative assumptions regarding the environmental transport of materials released by 
land-based and ocean-based incineration. Id. Specifically, the study was provided to "represent 
a reasonable compromise between model complexity and the ability to obtain realistic data 
characterizing model parameters." Id. The details of the specific assumptions, models, and 
parameters used in the study are beyond the scope of this Article, but are extensively reported 
in the cited study. 
63°Id. at 454. Because engineering stack design criteria for land-based and ocean-based 
incinerators differ, however, the stack parameters used in the analysis varied accordingly. Id. 
Specifically, the parameters were, for land-based and ocean-based incinerators, respectively: 
stack height (27.43 m; 10.45 m), stack diameter (2.08 m; 3.40 m), gas exit temperature (366.5° 
K; 1429° K), and gas exit velocity (6.40 mls; 15.2 mls). Id. (Table 1). Average heat capacity 
for the incinerators was 135 x 106 BTUIh. Id. at 457. 
631Id. at 454. A PCB waste stream consisting of 18.5% Aroclor 1242 was assumed. Id. at 
453. 
632Id. at 454. The land location chosen for the assessment was a site near Kansas City, 
Missouri, at 38° 20' latitude and 94° 20' longitude. Id. at 457. The number of persons living 
within the vicinity of the land-based incinerator was obtained from 1980 Census data tapes. 
Id. 
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sea. 633 The ocean incineration was assumed to occur on a vessel 
similar to the Vulcanus. 634 The study did not consider the impact of 
PICs or fugitive PCB emissions on total exposure at either site, nor 
were accidental releases of PCBs considered. 635 Area-specific mete-
orological, climatological, and geological data were used to estimate 
PCB concentrations in air, food, and water.636 The principal pathways 
considered for land-based incineration were atmospheric637 and 
aquatic transport,638 and ingestion of PCBs that passed through the 
terrestrial food chain. 639 Ocean incineration would take place 
hundreds of miles from the nearest land mass,640 so inhalation and 
terrestrial food chain pathways were not considered in this analy-
sis.641 Thus, the only human exposure pathway considered for ocean 
incineration was the aquatic food chain exposure pathway (Le., the 
ingestion of PCB-contaminated finfish and shellfish). 642 The particular 
633 Id. at 454. "The at-sea incineration site was assumed to occur within the Gulf of Mexico 
Incineration Site designated by EPA for ocean incineration (26° 20' latitude and 93° 40' 
longitude)." Id. at 457. 
634 Id. at 454. The study also assumed, for comparison purposes, that both the land-based 
and the ocean-based incinerators operated at Vulcanus I test burn conditions. Id. at 456. 
636Id. at 454. Fugitive PCB emissions were not factored in because preliminary investiga-
tions indicated that they would be insignificant because of the low vapor pressure of PCBs 
(e.g., the vapor pressure of Aroclor 1242 is 4.06 x 10-4 mm Hg at 25° C). Id. 
636 I d. at 458. 
637Id. The study made human inhalation exposure estimates for land-based incineration 
using the Atmospheric Transport Model (ATM) , a Gaussian plume model developed by Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, and the Concentration Exposure Model (CEM). Id. 
638 Id. The drinking water ingestion dose for PCBs emitted during the land-based inciner-
ation was calculated using a multi-media, screening-level model (TOX-SCREEN). Id. at 461. 
This model commences with the atmospheric release of pollutants at the incinerator and 
estimates air, water, and soil concentrations through calculations of "media interaction[s] (e.g., 
air to ground and surface water deposition, runoff from ground to surface water, leaching 
from ground to groundwater, and surface water percolation to ground water)." Id. at 461-62. 
Models, however, do not always reflect environmental reality. 
639Id. at 458. The study estimated food chain ingestion doses resulting from PCB releases 
from the land-based incinerator by using a terrestrial food chain exposure model (TEREX). 
Id. at 459. The study derived the agricultural parameters from the 1974 U.S. Department of 
Commerce county agricultural census. I d. at 460. The parameters included inventory estimates 
for milk and beef cows, and productivity and yield data from seven vegetable and food crop 
categories. Id. Chemical-specific parameters for the PCBs were also calculated inputs for the 
TEREX model. Id. 
64°Id. at 457. Because the at-sea incineration site in the Gulf of Mexico (183,000 km2) is 
centered 196 miles south-southeast of Galveston, Texas and 217 miles southwest of Cameron, 
Louisiana, the report assumed that there would be little or no impact on nearby land masses. 
Id. This assumption was supported by atmospheric modeling under a range of conditions, 
including estimates of the long-range transport of PCBs incinerated at sea. Id. 
641 See id. 
642 Id. The study predicted PCB concentrations in the ocean water column based on a simple 
two-compartment model consisting of the ocean and the atmosphere. Id. at 463. The atmos-
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concern that human exposure to PCBs incinerated at sea could be 
higher than exposures to PCBs from land incineration stems from 
the fact that bioaccumulation factors for PCBs in fish and shellfish 
are high. 643 
For land-based incineration, the study determined that the highest 
uptake (human exposure) for inhalation644 was 0.32 micrograms per 
year (ug/y),645 the maximum value for uptake via ingestion646 of PCBs 
in the foodchain pathway was 0.062 ug/y,647 and the maximum uptake 
via consumption of drinking water548 was 0.0032 ug/y.649 For ocean 
incineration, the exposure would be much lower. The most-exposed 
individual would receive about 0.0026 ugly of PCBs from ingestion 
of fish and 0.00026 ugly of PCBs from shellfish. 650 
Thus, the report concluded that, for land-based incineration, "in-
halation exposure is at least two orders of magnitude higher; ter-
restrial food chain exposure is at least a factor of 20 higher; and 
drinking water ingestion exposure is about equal to that of consum-
ing fish and shellfish (2.9 x 10-9 g/y) from the incineration site 
area. "651 This assessment indicates that incineration on land leads to 
higher human exposure to PCBs than does ocean incineration. 652 The 
report also provides a caveat, however, that the conclusions might 
be modified if it is shown that the microlayer of organisms on the 
pheric concentrations were calculated based on assumptions of D stability, a 3 mls boat speed, 
and a wind speed of 4 mls. Id. at 463,465. The study calculated ocean concentrations of PCBs 
using a uniform mixing model with an assumed depth of 75 m. Id. at 465. Once PCB concen-
trations were determined, bioconcentration for fish and shellfish were based on bioaccumula-
tion factors of 4 x 104 and 3 x 10\ respectively. Id. The study assumed a dietary worst-case 
scenario based on the assumption that the most-exposed individual receives all of his or her 
seafood from the 300 km circular incineration site. Id. 
643 I d. at 453. 
644 The inhalation uptake calculations assumed a breathing rate of 8322 m3/y and a 0.65 
absorption factor. Id. at 465. 
645 Id. 
645 This maximum is a reasonable "worst-case" individual "who would obtain all of his dietary 
intakes from the most affected (highest concentration and deposition) region." Id. 
647 I d. at 466. 
648 "The drinking water ingestion for a maximally exposed individual . . . assumed that this 
individual drank all of his water from a 1.5 km section of a free-flowing river located directly 
below the maximum air concentration location. Surface run-off from the river watershed into 
the river within this 1.5 km section was also considered." Id. at 465. 
649Id. at 466 (data from Table 10). 
650 Id. (data from Table 10). Further, these data are conservative in that reasonable consid-
erations that would lower the figures, such as fish migration, sources of other fish, and 
productivity of the affected area, were not factored in. Id. 
651 Id. at 453. 
652Id. Further, the study did not consider the consumption of freshwater fish that would 
be contaminated with PCBs from land-based incineration that would lead to even higher 
estimates of exposure from land-based incinerators. Id. at 466. 
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ocean surface is a significant contributor to aquatic food chain bioac-
cumulation. 653 This concern also applies to the aquatic food chains in 
freshwater systems impacted by land-based incineration. N everthe-
less, this area certainly deserves more research and understanding. 
A 1985 profile prepared for Chern Waste by ICF Technology, Inc. 
also addressed the human health effects associated with PCBs. 654 
This study reported that PCBs655 have low acute mammalian toxicity, 
and that the primary concern is for the potential effects of long-term 
exposure. 656 Exposure of workers to high levels of PCBs on the job 
typically produced an occupational skin disease known as chlor-
acne.657 Other studies have reported some liver function abnormali-
ties, although none were associated with detectable adverse health 
effects.658 Additionally, noncarcinogenic mammalian (non-human) 
health effects have been demonstrated. The toxic effects of PCBs 
are more commonly observed after repeated exposures over a long 
time period. 659 Specifically, skin syndromes, reproductive effects 
(e.g., altered menstrual cycles, reduced breeding success, and low-
ered birth rates), and other problems similar to those observed in 
humans have been associated with PCB toxicity in rodents, mon-
keys, and other non-human mammals. 660 
663 [d. 
654 This profile summarizes the then existing information about the toxicity of PCBs to 
mammalian species, including humans and aquatic organisms. The profile is based mainly on 
secondary sources, particularly assessments conducted under the auspices of EPA. ICF Tech-
nology, Inc., Profile of the Human Health and Aquatic Toxicity of Polychlorinated Biphenyls 
(PCBs) (Dec. 13, 1985) (available at ICF Technology, 1850 K Street, N.W., Washington, DC 
20006) [hereinafter ICF report]. 
PCBs enter mammalian systems in several ways. PCBs are readily absorbed through the 
gut and respiratory system, and slightly less through the skin. For example, studies show 
that oral absorption in rats is greater than 90%, and dermal absorption of PCBs (those with 
42% chlorine) was 15--34% in monkeys. [d. at 1 (citing various other studies). 
665 PCBs are complex mixtures of chemicals composed of two connected benzene rings with 
1 to 10 attached chlorine (Cl) atoms. [d. at l. 
656 [d. at 5. Commercial PCBs were marketed for various uses according to the percentage 
of chlorine in the mixture, including: plasticizers, heat transfer fluids, hydraulic fluids, fluids 
in vacuum pumps and compressors, lubricants, and wax extenders. PCBs are characterized 
generally by low reactivity, persistence in the environment, and the tendency to be stored 
for long periods in animal tissues. Because of their widespread distribution, high chronic 
toxicity, and environmental persistence, PCBs were singled out for stringent regulation. 
Manufacture of PCBs is now prohibited in the United States, and the handling and disposal 
of products still in circulation are regulated by EPA. Of significance is the fact that assessment 
of the hazards of PCBs is complicated by the fact that several different mixtures having 
different toxicities were produced and utilized by industries. 
657 [d. at 2. 
658 [d. at 3. 
659 [d. 
660 [d. at 3--4. 
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Several researchers have studied the carcinogenicity of PCBs in 
animals. Commercial PCBs have been demonstrated to induce he-
patic tumors and to act as tumor promoters in rats and mice. 661 But, 
there is little data covering the potential carcinogenicity of PCBs in 
humans. 662 The International Agency for Research of Cancer (IARC) 
found that some studies suggested that PCBs may be human carcin-
ogens, but determined that the overall evidence is inadequate to 
conclude a carcinogenic role of PCBs in humans. 663 Nonetheless, the 
EPA ambient water quality criterion to protect human health is zero 
for PCBs because they are considered potential carcinogens. 664 
B. Ecosystem Effects of Incineration and Transport 
In addition to the human health problems associated with incin-
eration, the airborne emissions and the direct discharges can have a 
significant impact on aquatic ecosystems. 665 Generally, there are two 
sources of potential impacts on aquatic ecosystems. The first source 
is the incineration plume and ash released to the aquatic ecosystem 
at the burn site. These effects can occur in both freshwater and 
marine habitats. The second source of risks are those associated with 
potential spills of unburned hazardous wastes in harbors, while at 
port, en route to the burn site, or at the burn site itself. This source 
of risks generally would be associated with ocean incineration. 
1. Incineration Emission Effects on the Environment 
The risks to ocean ecosystems associated with pollutants derived 
from incineration have not been well documented. 666 A recent study 
by Sodergren and colleagues attempted to elucidate the role of the 
marine microlayer as a source for the transfer of chemical pollutants 
to the biota inhabiting this layer and to describe the movement of 
the chemicals up the food chain to organisms throughout the marine 
661Id. at 4-5. 
662 Two cases of malignant melanoma among 31 workers heavily exposed and one case among 




665 Id. at 5-6. 
666 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Proceedings ofthe Workshop on the Sea-Surface 
Microlayer in Relation to Ocean Disposal (Dec. 18-19, 1985) (Airlie, Virginia, BN-SA-2367) 
[hereinafter Microlayer Workshop]. 
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environment. 667 Several important results were presented in this 
study. First, the chemical substances introduced into the air follow-
ing incineration were transferred readily into the water and surface 
microlayer. 668 Second, the surface microlayer was shown to be con-
siderably contaminated with PCBs following incineration. 669 Third, 
the results demonstrated that, after one day, an equilibrium between 
the concentration of PCBs in the air and water was established. 670 
Fourth, a rapid uptake of the added compounds (organochlorine 
residues) by the zebrafish, Brachydanio rerio Hamilton-Buchanan, 
was observed in all experiments. 671 However, it is significant that 
all fish survived the experimental exposure regimes. 672 
The study provides the first, albeit inconclusive, laboratory dem-
onstration that an airborne emission is directly related to contami-
nation of the microlayer and provides calculations of the quantitative 
relationship between the source and the degree of contamination. 673 
Importantly, the authors suggest that the results may be used to 
predict the levels of substances in the surface microlayer of the water 
based on the known concentration in the air.674 In summary, this 
study demonstrates that organochlorine residues emitted following 
incineration over a water surface are rapidly settled, transferred, 
and enriched in the microlayer. 675 From the micro layer, the pollu-
tants diffuse into the subsurface water and are made available for 
667 Sodergren, Larson & Knulst, Transport Mechanisms of Organochlorine Residues After 
Incineration to Air, Water, Microlayer, and Organisms; Final Report to Greenpeace Int'l 1, 
2 (1989). 
668 I d. at 9. Specifically, the rate of detection varied with the degree of chlorination of the 
PCBs burned; various PCB congeners were detected in the water within one day. I d. 
669Id. Specifically, during an exposure time of one week, a mean concentration of 47.7 pg/l 
[= 0.0000477 ppb] was obtained in the air, while the corresponding values in water and the 
microlayer were 13.4 ng/l [= 0.0134 ppb] and 7170 ng/l [= 7.17 ppb]. Thus, PCBs emitted to 
the air were distributed between the water and microlayer of the system, resulting in a mean 
enrichment of approximately 500 in the surface microlayer. Id. at 10. 
67°Id. With an atmospheric concentration of PCBs of 42 pgll [= 0.000042 ppb], the level in 
the water was 3.3 x 105 pgll [= 0.33 ppb] after 24 hours. During the next 14 days, the water 
PCB concentration remained between 3.1 x 105 and 5.4 x 105 pg/l [= 0.31-0.54 ppb]. The 
mean concentration in the surface microlayer was 17.8 x 106 pgll [= 1. 78 ppb], with a sample 
size of seven. However, due to the small sample size, the deviation from the mean was large. 
Id. at 12. 
671 Id. Significant amounts of PCBs and PICs from trichloroethylene were accumulated by 
the fish within 48 hours of exposure, and concentration increased with time. The bioaccumu-
lation factors at the end of the experiments were, for PCBs, 7000, and for PIC 1, 2, and 3, 
75, 1000, and 10,000 respectively. Id. 
672Id. 
673 I d. at 19. 
674 I d. at 21. 
675Id. 
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organisms, and, rather than being diluted, are concentrated in the 
lipids of the organisms.676 Nevertheless, the direct applicability of 
this laboratory study to aquatic ecosystems still remains unknown. 
In fact, the authors conclude with the warning that "[d]espite the 
fact that no biological effects in the field have been connected with 
PIes, their proven connection with the aquatic food web is of con-
cern, given what is known about chlorinated compounds with similar 
properties. "677 
The Sodergren study and the TerEco fish enzyme study conducted 
during test burns are the major sources cited by environmentalists 
as indicative of the hazards of ocean incineration as it affects the 
marine environment. Environmentalists have pushed the TerEco fish 
study far beyond its significance.678 Fundulis grandis, the fish spe-
cies utilized by TerEco to monitor ocean incineration effects, is a 
small fish from the coastal lagoons and salt marshes of Texas and 
Louisiana. 679 The fish were transferred to a new and different habitat 
as part of the experiment. This experimental design may have been 
the basis for the observed differences between the control and test 
individuals. 680 Indeed, the fish would have had even greater enzyme 
problems if they had been placed at a land-based incinerator site! 
676 Id. 
677 Id. 
678 Specifically, one commentator has written that "[i]n sum, there is evidence of adverse 
impact on at least one fish species, but otherwise virtually no definitive data exists on impacts 
upon marine organisms from incinerator emissions." Lentz, supra note 351, at 122; see also 
House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 156 (statement of Sally Ann Lentz, The Oceanic 
Society, on behalf of eight environmental organizations). 
679 Lentz, supra note 351, at 132. 
6BO The scientific validity of the fish experiment is difficult to assess. All efforts to obtain a 
copy of the TerEco Report were futile (including repeated requests to EPA, industry, and 
the environmentalists who stress its significance including the Oceanic Society and others). 
Although the specific organism selected for the study was a standard bioassay test species, it 
was not indigenous to the habitats characterized by the burn sites. While we recognize that 
organisms such as these are often utilized because their responses to toxic substances may 
have been previously established in other studies, it is not known if the TerEco researchers 
established a scientifically valid control in the fish study. A valid control would consist of 
dragging similarly aged fish to those used in the exposure analysis in BOMs behind another 
vessel without exposure to an incineration plume. Such a control would allow for a comparison 
of affected and control fish enzyme systems, and would enable the separation of stress effects 
caused by experimental design (Le., dragging) from actual effects caused by the incineration 
emissions. It is unlikely that this was done. However, it is important to note that, while direct 
effects are not realistically tested for by the fish study, indirect effects via the food web (i.e., 
ingestion of phytoneuston) could occur and would need to be considered. Additionally, direct 
effects from spills of liquid hazardous wastes could also affect the fish. However, the fish study 
did not do either of these; rather, it was only attempting to look at direct effects of incineration 
emissions on three fish enzyme systems. 
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Further, the use of this "hardy, coastal fish" for determining biolog-
ical effects in the open ocean was criticized in the discussion of 
Lentz's Oceanic Society paper.681 Even if the experimental protocol 
was valid, the open ocean TerEco data for estuarine fish would be 
largely irrelevant if the parameters of the experiment are never 
realized in nature. 682 Additionally, it has been noted that "most fish 
larvae are not normally directly exposed to the microlayer."683 De-
spite the weaknesses of the fish study, it is repeatedly cited by some 
environmentalist groups as indicative of the harmful effects from 
incineration. 684 Obviously, with the clear absence of viable data con-
cerning the environmental effects of ocean incineration, more re-
search is warranted and needed. 
Questions still surround the role of the surface microlayer685 in 
concentrating chemicals deposited on the ocean surface. 686 It has 
been postulated that chemical pollutants enter the aquatic food chain 
through the micro layer organisms that typically occupy the lower 
trophic levels in marine food chains. As noted above in the human 
health effects section, knowledge of the biology of the microlayer 
regarding bioaccumulation is necessary for a more complete under-
standing of PCB transport and fate as it relates to ecosystem effects. 
It should be emphasized that some fresh water habitats, particu-
larly free-standing bodies of water such as lakes and ponds, would 
be similarly affected by chemicals transported through the air. Thus, 
681 Comments of Mr. Compaan in discussion following paper presentation, reported at Lentz, 
supra note 351, at 132. 
682 This would be similar to showing in a laboratory that, at cold temperatures, polar bears 
eat penguins. Yet, in nature, polar bears and penguins do not co-exist; rather, they live at 
polar extremes. 
683 Sodergren, Larson & Knulst, supra note 667, at 2. However, near-shore studies provide 
information that some fish and shellfish, including cod, sole, flounder, hake, anchovy, crab, 
and lobster, have egg or larval stages that develop in the sea-surface microlayer. George C. 
Grant, Zooneuston: Animals of the Sea Surface, in Microlayer Workshop, supra note 666, at 
48. 
684 E.g., Lentz, supra note 351, at 122; House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 156 (state-
ment of Sally A. Lentz, The Oceanic Society, on behalf of eight environmental organizations). 
685 According to current theory, the microlayer is a thin (approximately 20 Angstroms) layer 
of lipids lying above a 0.1 to 1 urn layer of polysaccharides and proteins beneath which bacteria 
and neuston congregate. The micro layer is a dynamic structure, repeatedly broken and re-
formed by exposure of new water surface and accumulation of materials at the surface. 
Transport processes between the atmosphere and water occur at the microlayer. IMO REPORT, 
supra note 444, at 19. 
686 The surface micro layer is composed predominantly of bacteria, protozoa, phytoplankton, 
and zooplankton. Studies have shown that the microlayer is enriched in dissolved and parti-
culate organic chemicals by factors of from two to six orders of magnitude in relation to the 
subsurface water. Holton, Travis & Etnier, supra note 626, at 465; see also Lentz, supra note 
351, at 122. 
772 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:687 
the effects of pollutants from land-based incinerators on the surface 
layers of fresh water bodies would, in many respects, parallel those 
described above for the ocean environment. Land-based incinerators 
operating in coastally situated areas are also likely to affect signifi-
cantly estuarine and coastal ecosystems as well as terrestrial aquatic 
ecosystems. This is of particular significance when considering that 
these coastal wetlands are among the most productive ecosystems 
in the world , 687 as well as being home to abundant wildfowl and 
major spawning grounds for finfish and shellfish. Their importance 
is underscored by the fact that some regional catches of commercial 
fish, such as those from the South Atlantic and Gulf Coast fisheries, 
were estimated to be more than ninety percent estuarine-depen-
dent. 688 This is a subject that needs further attention. 
Emissions effects from incineration also could affect both migra-
tory and pelagic (open ocean) birds, although no data are available. 689 
Both land-based and ocean-based incinerators could harm birds. 
Nevertheless, the welfare of marine birdlife must be considered 
because emissions into the atmosphere may produce avian physio-
logical responses, or otherwise adversely affect migratory pat-
terns. 690 
2. Waste Spill Effects on the Environment 
Environmental impact following a spill of industrial wastes con-
taining organochlorine and other organohalogen compounds would 
be most troublesome in terms of acute effects.691 The 1985 ICF report 
concluded that "available data indicate that acute toxicity to fresh-
water aquatic life probably will occur at concentrations of PCBs 
above 2.0 ug/l [=2 ppb]," and that "[a]cute toxicity to saltwater 
687 ENV'T AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIV., CONGR. RES. SERV., REPORT ON WET-
LANDS MANAGEMENT, CRS-45 (1982) (Ser. No. 97-11) (prepared for the Senate Committee 
on Environment and Public Works by J. Zinnand & C. Copeland). 
688 [d. at CRS-46 to 47. 
689 OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS) FOR NORTH ATLANTIC INCINERATION SITE 
DESIGNATION (1981) (EPA 440/5-82-025, 4-28) [hereinafter EPA ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT]. 
690 [d. at 4-27 to -29. The birds could be directly affected by short-term atmospheric con-
tamination (primarily HC!) or be indirectly affected by consumption of organisms that have 
assimilated waste residues. [d. 
691 Kamlet, supra note 292, at 313; see also ICF Technology, Inc., Potential Effects to the 
Delaware River and Estuary Resulting from a Hypothetical PCB Spill from the Vulcanus II, 
at 24 (Dec. 13, 1985) (available at ICF Technology, 1850 K Street, N.W., Washington, DC 
20006). 
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aquatic life will probably occur at concentrations above 10 ug/l [= 10 
ppb]."692 
Various studies have assessed the effects of spilled PCBs on sev-
eral different components of freshwater and marine ecosystems. 
According to such studies, phytoplankton are critical organisms with 
respect to aquatic contamination with PCBs. For example, a marine 
diatom absorbed and concentrated PCBs (Aroclor 1242) to levels 900 
to 1100 times above the initial marine concentration. 693 In addition, 
PCB concentrations ranging from 0.1 to 100 ug/l [= 0.1 to 100 ppb] 
reduced growth of both marine and freshwater phytoplankton, al-
tered dominance relationships among algal species, and reduced spe-
cies diversity. 694 
Invertebrates, which occupy the lower trophic levels in marine 
and freshwater ecosystems, were also shown to be vulnerable to 
PCBs. For example, the acute toxicity for freshwater invertebrates 
ranged from an LC50695 of 10 ug/l [= 10 ppb] (Aroclor 1241) for scud, 
Gammarus fasciatus, to 400 ug/l [= 400 ppb] for the damselfly, 
I schnura verticalis. 696 Additionally, chronic lethal concentrations for 
freshwater invertebrates were 0.8 ug/l [= 0.8 ppb] (Aroclor 1254) 
for scud, Gammarus pseudolimnaeus. 697 For marine invertebrates, 
the LC50 of PCB (Aroclor 1016) values included 10.2 ug/l [ = 10.2 ppb] 
for the eastern oyster, Crassostrea virginica, and 10.5-12.5 ug/l [= 
10.5-12.5 ppb] for the brown shrimp, Penaeus aztecus. 698 In a lab-
oratory experiment consisting of seawater flowing through small 
aquaria for four months, concentrations of PCBs (Aroclor 1254) at 
levels of 1 ug/l [= 1 ppb] affected the species composition of com-
munities that developed from planktonic larvae. 699 
Available data for freshwater fish suggest that the "early life-
stages are particularly vulnerable to the acute toxic effects of 
PCBs."7°O For example, newly hatched rainbow trout, Salmo gaird-
692 ICF report, supra note 654, at 7 (citing U.S. EPA 1980, Ambient Water Quality Criteria 
for Polychlorinated Biphenyls, Criteria and Standards Division, EPA 440/5-80-068, NTIS PB 
81-117798). It is noted that "studies have shown that effects on species composition of inver-
tebrate communities can occur at concentrations as low as 1 ugll [= 1 ppb]." Id. 
693Id. at 6. 
694 Id. 
695 LCso refers to the median lethal concentration, or concentration at which 50% of the test 
species individuals die. 
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neri, were found to be "the most sensitive freshwater species 
tested," with a 96-hour LC50 of 2.0 ug/l [= 2 ppb] (Capacitor 21 (21% 
chlorine».701 In a similar study, the juvenile fathead minnow, Pi-
mephales promelas, had an LC50 of 7.7 ug/l [= 7.7 ppb] (Aroclor 
1254).702 Acute toxicity of PCBs on saltwater fish species has not 
been adequately demonstrated. 703 
Chronic test data for fish are also available. In fresh water, the 
most toxic PCB to fathead minnows (Aroclor 1248) gave a threshold 
value of 0.2 ug/l [= 0.2 ppb].704 Additionally, a chronic value of 1.0 
ug/l [= 1 ppb] (Aroclor 1254) was derived for the brook trout, 
Salvelinus jontinalis. 705 In a marine environment chronic test, pin-
fish exposed to 5 ug/l [= 5 ppb] PCB (Aroclor 1254) developed ragged 
fins, fungus-like lesions, hemorrhagic areas around the mouth, and 
forty-one to sixty-six percent mortality. 706 Additionally, as described 
previously, a spill could also indirectly affect marine birds through 
their consumption of organisms contaminated by the spill wastes. 707 
Thus, both land and ocean transportation of PCBs pose severe 
acute threats to associated aquatic ecosystems in the event of a spill. 
The ICF report also concluded that chronic exposures at lower levels 
would "probably induce effects," but relatively limited data are avail-
able. 708 Currently, the EPA ambient water quality criterion as 
twenty-four-hour averages for PCBs to protect freshwater life is 
0.014 ug/l [= 0.014 ppb], and 0.030 ug/l [= 0.030 ppb] to protect 
saltwater organisms. 709 Nevertheless, potential damages to the en-
vironment and aquatic life resulting from a release of a hazardous 
substance are highly variable. As one commentator has stated, 
"[d]amages are dependent on the substance that is released, the 
amount released, chemical and physical characteristics of the sub-
stance, environmental conditions at the time of release, the season 
701Id. 
702Id. 
708 Id. at 7. Specifically, acute exposure of saltwater fish to PCB mixtures have not produced 
data that can be used to obtain 96-hour LC50 values because concentrations tested were not 
sufficiently high. Id. For example, 48 hours by PCB levels of 100 ug/l (Aroc1or 1254) did not 
affect pinfish (after 90 hours in water to which 100 ug/l (Aroc1or 1016) PCB was added, 18% 




707 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 689, at 4-27 to -29. 
708 ICF report, supra note 654, at 7. 
709 Id. 
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in which the release occurred, and biological and physical character-
istics of the location of the release. "710 
VI. THE ASSESSMENT OF OCEAN INCINERATION 
Ocean-based incineration systems have four components. Like 
land incineration, ocean incineration systems include land transpor-
tation, transfer and storage operations, and incineration.711 Ocean 
incineration also includes two additional steps: (1) loading onto the 
ship;712 and (2) ocean transportation.713 Releases on land from acci-
dents during land transport or at storage facilities are equally prob-
able for land and ocean incineration systems.714 However, the two 
additional steps for ocean incineration increase the likelihood of spil-
lage.715 
Simply described, there are three ways to get wastes onto a ship. 
Usually wastes are delivered to the dock and pumped to containers 
on the ships. For example, Waste Management planned to blend its 
hazardous wastes at Emelle, Alabama and then truck them to the 
Gulf of Mexico where the wastes would be pumped to the Vulcanus 
1.716 SeaBurn, Inc. and Environmental Oceanic Services Corporation 
proposed a second approach using 5000-gallon stainless steel con-
tainers that would be filled where generated to avoid dockside han· 
dling of the wastes. Wastes from different storage containers can 
then be mixed and burned after adjustments to obtain the most 
complete combustion.717 Any necessary blending would take place at 
sea.718 Such standardized intermodal containers are used worldwide 
to ship diverse liquids and can be transported by rail, truck, barge, 
and ship.719 The third approach is based on an integrated system of 
specialized port facilities designed for ocean incinerator operations. 
710 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 35 (statement of Larry Jensen, Assistant 
Administrator, Office of Water, Environmental Protection Agency). 
711 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 15. 
712 Ocean-based incineration requires an additional loading step-pumping wastes from an 
onshore storage facility or from tank trucks through a piping system into the incinerator ship. 
Id. at 71. 
713 Ocean transportation refers to the transport of the wastes by the ship from the pier 
facility to the burn site. Id. at 70. 
714Id. at 16. 
715 Note, supra note 281, at 185. 
716 OTA, OcEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 109. 
717Id. 
718Id. at 110. 
719Id. 
776 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:687 
The port facility would be capable of testing, blending, and storing 
both containerized and tanked wastes. 72O At-Sea Incineration, Inc. 
and Waste Management, Inc. proposed integrated port systems,721 
but such proposals were never realized as the private sector with-
drew from the ocean incineration business in the United States as a 
result of EPA inaction. 
The amount of waste that would be involved in a viable hazardous 
waste incineration program is dwarfed by the volume of hazardous 
substances already entering and leaving United States portS. 722 It is 
estimated that an ocean incineration program would increase the 
total volume of traffic in hazardous substances by only about 
0.03%.723 According to the United States Coast Guard (USCG), in 
fiscal year 1983 the total volume of hazardous substances passing 
through domestic ports was 8701.6 million barrels compared to the 
estimated 2.18 million barrels of waste that would be carried in a 
year by six incinerator ships.724 Even if all the ships operated in the 
Gulf of Mexico, the hazardous waste transport in the Gulf would 
increase by only 0.05%. Further, even if petroleum was not consid-
ered a hazardous substance, the increase in volume would still only 
be 0.11%.725 
Under these circumstances, the risks associated with transferring 
wastes to a vessel and transporting them to a burn site become very 
small risks and are no greater than risks routinely accepted by our 
chemically dependent society. The already low probability of an 
720 Id. at 109. 
721Id. 
722 See House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 99 (answers to Representative Lowry's 
ocean incineration questions presented by USCG Captain R. T. Rufe). For example, the Anny 
Corps of Engineers' Waterborne Commerce of the United States statistics indicate that over 
130 million short tons of bulk liquid hazardous materials were moved in and out of the Port 
of Philadelphia on ocean-going vessels in 1985. The hazardous materials included gasoline, 
crude oil, benzene, toluene, sodium hydroxide, sulphuric acid, and other chemicals. These 
cargoes have such hazards as flammability, corrosivity, toxicity (including aquatic toxicity), 
and carcinogenicity. Assuming an incinerator ship has a carrying capacity of 3500 short tons 
(the capacity of the Vulcanus II assuming a cargo specific gravity of 1.0) and makes 15 trips 
per year, the ship would move approximately 52,500 short tons of waste per year. This 
represents about 0.04% of the total amount of liquid hazardous material moved through the 
Port of Philadelphia in 1985. Id. It is important to point out that the economics of transporting 
hazardous wastes can differ from that of useful, marketable hazardous chemicals. In the 
former instance, there is no direct monetary incentive not to spill, whereas in the latter 
instance, if you lose the marketable cargo, you lose money. However, proper liability require-
ments could eliminate some of this concern. 
723 50 Fed. Reg. 8226 (1985). 
724 Id. 
72Ii Id. 
1990] OCEAN INCINERATION 777 
accident could be further reduced by USCG escort and safety pro-
cedures that isolate incinerator ships from other port traffic. 726 Ad-
ditional measures to ensure safe transit could include: limiting transit 
to daylight hours and specified weather conditions; establishing a 
moving safety zone around the vessel; and requiring the vessel to 
broadcast a "Notice to Mariners" to avoid its route. 727 
To minimize transportation-related risks, the responsible federal 
agencies developed a regulatory system that has worked relatively 
effectively. As described previously, shipment to the port is con-
trolled by DOT under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act728 
and its implementing regulations. 729 Transport is also subject to 
RCRA regulations,730 which include requirements that transporters 
clean up any discharge and protect against any hazards to human 
health and the environment. If wastes are kept at a waste transfer 
facility for ten days or more, a RCRA permit is required. 731 If wastes 
are stored at a waterfront transfer facility, they are subject to 
comprehensive regulation by the USCG.732 Coast Guard regulations 
cover the storage, handling, and loading or unloading of hazardous 
wastes for incineration at sea. 733 In addition to these regulations, 
the USCG may recommend specific requirements to be included in 
an EPA-granted incineration permit. 734 
Regulations concerning ship design provide for further protection. 
Under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act,735 incinerator vessels 
must be at least "type II" bulk chemical carriers. 736 Type II chemical 
carriers have a double hull and store the wastes in several indepen-
dent compartments. In 1986 and 1987, there were no spills recorded 
that resulted from a leak or rupture in a type II ship.737 If standard-
ized 5000-gallon steel containers were used there would be even less 
risk. Such containers would minimize chemical handling during 
transfer to the ship. Moreover, these containers would probably 
726 Connor, supra note 317, at 72. 
727 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 38. 
m Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1802-1813 (Supp. v 1987); see 
also supra note 498 and accompanying text. 
729 Hazardous Materials Regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-179 (1988). 
730 40 C.F.R. § 263 (1989). 
731 [d. § 264.1(g)(9). 
732 33 C.F.R. § 126 (1989). 
733 See id. Oil and oil containing hazardous waste is regulated at 33 U.S.C. § 156 (1989). 
734 50 Fed. Reg. 8225 (1985). 
736 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
736 See House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 96. Ship type is indicative of a ship's ability 
to survive damage from a collision or grounding. [d. 
737 [d. 
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survive and remain sealed even if there was a collision. Finally, 
USCG Captains of the Port have extensive powers to impose addi-
tional safety requirements as deemed necessary. 738 
EPA conducted a risk assessment case study that compares the 
environmental and human impact of land-based versus ocean-based 
incineration. 739 Accidents involving fire or explosion at storage facil-
ities were ignored because the probability of occurrence is low and 
the risk is similar for both disposal methods. It was expected that 
eighty-five percent of the releases would be from the incinerator 
stacks and fifteen percent would come from transportation and hand-
ling. The analysis of land transportation used DOT data on tank 
trucks carrying hazardous waste. The data were applied to the "miles 
traveled" assumptions for an incineration program. The data project 
a release of cargo once every four to five years and a container 
failure every three to four years.740 Transfer and storage operations 
could lead to: (1) spills from unloading tank trucks; (2) spills from 
equipment at waste transfer and storage facilities; and (3) fugitive 
emissions. Spills of both types were considered to occur infrequently 
and would be expected to be contained at the facility. Fugitive 
emissions would be in the range of 1.1 to 1.2 metric tons per year. 741 
The most serious environmental impact associated with ocean in-
cineration would be a spill in port or at sea. Under most circum-
stances there would be no way to clean up a spill. The acute effects 
would include the loss of most organisms in and around the spill. 
Chronic effects would be more widespread and long-lasting, but 
would depend upon the types of hazardous wastes spilled. The impact 
of a spill also would vary with the density of the hazardous wastes. 
Heavy wastes would sink, affecting bottom dwelling organisms, but 
if a spill occurred in deep water the benthic impact would be mini-
mized. 742 A floating spill would affect a larger area than a sinking 
spill. The greatest damage would be in the surface microlayer and 
the organisms using that layer. A spill in a shallow water area 
probably would be more severe. Volatilization from a surface slick 
might pose an inhalation risk to humans. 743 
738 See 50 Fed. Reg. 8225 (1985); House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 92--101 (Repre-
sentative Lowry's questions with Coast Guard Captain R. T. Rufe's answers). 
739 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 15TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL 238 (1984) 
{hereinafter 15TH CEQ]. 
740 See id. at 239. 
741 [d. at 240. 
742 See OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 16l. 
743 [d. at 163-64. 
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In the 1985 EPA Incineration Assessment, EPA again developed 
a risk analysis case study that compared the human and environ-
mental exposure and effects likely to result from releases of land-
based versus ocean-based incinerators.744 The assessment allowed 
comparative evaluation of the different technologies used for land 
and sea incineration and considered the additional risks that incin-
eration at sea creates from the loading of the ships and the water 
transport to the incineration site. EPA claimed that because ocean 
and land-based incineration systems have different physical charac-
teristics and affect different locations and ecosystems,745 structuring 
a consistent comparison was difficult and the results of the study 
were not sufficient to determine the advisability of any specific land-
based or ocean incineration proposal. 746 
It is difficult to compare the impacts of emissions from land-based 
and ocean-based incineration because they affect different organisms 
and environments. It should be no~ed that the exhaust of an incin-
erator burning liquid organic wastes contains little ash content. 747 
Plankton can be affected by emissions, however, though no effect 
has been directly observed from ocean incineration. Incineration can 
affect fish, but only one burn has been shown to do so. There, the 
impact was a transient one and probably was due to weaknesses in 
the design of the study-the experiment may have induced the 
stress. 748 Benthic organisms could be affected, but given the depth 
at open ocean burn sites, the effects would be minimal, difficult to 
detect, and long-term. Birds might be affected by the incinerator 
plumes, but no evidence of such a problem exists. 749 
In the comparative EPA Incineration Assessment, EPA looked at 
the possible effects on human health from incinerator releases and 
fugitive releases from transfer and storage equipment.750 The anal-
744 EPA, INCINERATION AssESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 15. 
This study comprised an integration of existing information with new analyses developed from 
existing methods and data. EPA noted that since no new research was undertaken, the 
conclusions are limited particularly by the availability and quality of information on emissions, 
transport, fate, and effects. Additionally, EPA noting the complex, cross-program nature of 
the study, had the work extensively reviewed by experts throughout EPA's various offices 
(e.g., the Offices of Research and Development, Water, Solid Waste, Toxic Substances, Air, 
Noise, and Radiation, and EPA Regions II, III, IV, V, and VI). ld. at 68. 
745 See id. at 15. 
748ld. 
747 HUUBe Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 96. 
7~ See supra notes 621-24, 67~1 and accompanying text. 
749 OTA, OcEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 162. See also supra notes 689-90 and 
accompanying text. 
7IiO See EPA, INCINERATION AssESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 
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ysis of human health risks estimated the incremental risk of devel-
oping cancer for a hypothetical "most exposed individual" (MEl) who 
resides at the location of the highest overall risk due to air concen-
trations resulting from incinerator stack, transfer, and storage re-
leases. 751 These risk estimates assumed continuous exposure for sev-
enty years.752 The study found that the incremental risks from land-
based incineration releases were about three in 100,000 whereas the 
incremental risks from ocean-based incineration ranged from one in 
one million to six in ten million.753 The study also notes that the data 
and methods used to generate the incremental risk estimates were 
"highly uncertain" and tended to overestimate projected human 
health risks. 754 
However, while the absolute risk levels should be considered with 
caution, using the data for relative risk assessment indicates that 
land-based emissions of PCBs create forty times more incremental 
risk to the MEl than do ocean-based emissions, and about thirty 
times more risk from ethylene dichloride (EDC) waste incinera-
tion. 755 In other words, due to the greater distance from populated 
areas, human health risks from ocean incinerator stack emissions 
range from thirty to forty times less than risks from land-based 
stack emissions. The evaluation of the possible environmental effects 
of stack releases indicated that there would be no measurable effect 
on the marine ecosystem.756 Thus, EPA determined that overall 
human health and environmental risks from ocean incineration are 
very low. While land-based incineration facilities also generally pose 
small risks, ocean incineration would provide added safety to both 
humans and the environment. 
The comparative EPA Incineration Assessment looked as well at 
the effects from ocean transportation releases. 757 Here, increased 
15. Fugitive emissions encompass instances of uncontrolled releases from valves, inadvertent 
minor ruptures in containers or pipes, and small spills that occur during waste storage or 
transfer operations. SAB REPORT, supra note 376, at 1. This term does not apply to major 
accidents, collisions, explosions, or spills. [d. 
761 EPA, INCINERATION AsSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 17. 
For the land-based system, the location of the MEl was based on census data; whereas for 
the ocean-based system, the MEl was assumed to reside at the point on the coast where 
modeled concentrations are highest averaged over a year. [d. 
762 [d. 
763 [d. at 18. 
764 [d. 
766 [d. 
766 [d. In fact, EPA determined that background atmospheric flux of PCBs into the Gulf of 
Mexico was two to three orders of magnitude greater than deposition from incineration of 
PCBs. [d. 
767 Ocean transportation characteristics are unique to the ocean-based system. [d. at 71. 
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caution is warranted owing to the potential risks of spills during the 
ocean transportation phase of the operation. These risks are unique 
to ocean incineration but have a low estimated probability of occur-
rence. 758 The total estimated probability for casualties involving 
spills of any size was one per /1200 operating years. 759 Note that 
these estimates were conservative for they assumed that a spill 
released the vessel's entire contents and that no remedial efforts to 
clean up the spill from the marine environment were undertaken. 760 
Additionally, the tonnage carried by an ocean incineration vessel is 
small in comparison to commercial shipments of petroleum and other 
hazardous substances;761 thus, the increase in risk from an inciner-
ation program would be small. However, the low risk found in EPA's 
study flows from the fact that the transportation risks were esti-
mated using the data concerning the 320 voyages in the North Sea 
by incineration ships that resulted in no spills. Results were adjusted 
to show less risk because of restrictions imposed by the USCG and 
the soft bottom conditions of the Gulf of Mexico-the presumed burn 
site. 762 While EPA seems sanguine about the risk of spills, the public 
seems to feel differently. The fear of spill was the major reason for 
opposition by New Jersey and Delaware to the Chem Waste permit 
application in 1985. 763 
The EPA Incineration Assessment also characterized possible hu-
man effects resulting from spills in the marine environment. EPA 
found that volatilization of a spill could expose human popUlations to 
The study characterized possible human health and environmental effects from spills at three 
sites: Mobile Harbor, Alabama; over the continental shelf in the path to the burn zone; and in 
the burn zone itself in the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 19. Spill rates were developed for different 
impact and non-impact type accidents, for four different locations of interest, as well as for 
different vessel designs, operating restrictions and other parameters. See id. at 78-79. 
758Id. at 5, 79. 
769Id. The frequency of spills estimated for any particular location was much less. For 
instance, the overall spill rate for the pier and harbor area is about one per 3,000 operating 
years; for Mobile Bay about one per 10,000 operating years; for the coastal zone about one 
per 4,000 operating years; and for the burn zone about one per 6,000 operating years. Id. at 
79. 
760 Id. 
791Id. For example, the waste cargo carried by the Vulcanus would be only about 0.01% 
of petroleum and hazardous substances transported annually in the Gulf of Mexico area. Id. 
The three working ships today are small. The Vulcanus ships, for example, carry only about 
one-tenth of the cargo of a typical chemical tanker. The Vesta is even smaller. House Hearing 
1987, supra note 293, at 197 (statement of Dr. William Y. Brown on behalf of the Association 
of Maritime Incinerators (AMI». 
792 15TH CEQ, supra note 739, at 238. 
793 Letter to Henry Longest, Acting Asst. Administrator for Water, U.S. EPA, from gov-
ernment officials of Delaware and New Jersey (June 20, 1985) (copy on file with the Boston 
College Environmental Affairs Law Review). 
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high concentrations of hazardous constituents for short periods of 
time. 764 Owing to the acute nature of such an exposure, they com-
pared the estimated dosage received by human populations within 
the first twenty-four hours after a spill to the Threshold Limit Value 
(TL V) for the chemicals assumed to be released. 765 The results in-
dicate that spills of an entire cargo of PCBs or ethylene dichloride 
(EDC) one kilometer from a port could cause human health prob-
lems.766 Spills at other locations, such as the continental shelf or the 
burn site, would not be expected to cause acute human health prob-
lems.767 
The EPA Incineration Assessment also characterized the potential 
effects of a spill on a marine ecosystem. The severity of the effects 
of a spill would vary. For example, spills of PCBs would potentially 
have much greater effects on a marine ecosystem than spills of 
EDC.768 The absence of precise data on this subject warrants the 
development of a research program. In its study, the Science Ad-
visory Board (SAB) recommended that an evaluation of exposure 
durations and concentrations be based on both a detailed assessment 
of environmental transport processes and the habits of the exposed 
organisms in both aquatic and terrestrial environments. 769 Particular 
attention should be focused on the role of food webs in evaluating 
exposure effects.77o The SAB report also concluded that because the 
toxicities of emissions and effluents from ocean-based, as well as 
land-based, incinerators are largely unknown, at a minimum they 
should be tested on sensitive life stages of representative aquatic 
vertebrates, invertebrates, and plants of ecological importance. 771 
7G4 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 87. 
7Mld. The TLV represents the dosage to which a worker can be exposed with no adverse 
health effects such as coughing, dizziness, and longer-tenn health damage. EPA adjusted the 
TLVs to account for continuous exposure rather than only eight hours per day, and assumed, 
in all calculations, that the human population was directly downwind from the spill site and 
that the entire waste cargo of the vessel was released. ld. 
766 See id. at 87, 88 (Table 7). 
7671d. at 87. 
768ld. at 90. Effects of PCB spills range from being severe in the bay region (e.g., substantial 
reduction in benthic species and large bioconcentration effects on fish and shrimp) to less 
severe at the burn site. PCBs are persistent compounds and linger in the environment. 
Additionally, bioconcentration effects on commercial and recreational marine life would be 
most severely felt in bay and continental shelf areas. By contrast, EDC .spills would have 
relatively small effects on the marine ecosystem due to a rapid diffusion rate and a relatively 
low toxicity to marine organisms. Additionally, bioconcentration of EDC is not a significant 
phenomenon. ld. at 89-90. 
769 SAB REPORT, supra note 376, at 4. 
77°ld. 
771 ld. at 5. Particular attention should be devoted to assessing the effects on the organisms 
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Both laboratory and field studies should be undertaken to ensure 
that long-term operation of incinerators does not produce significant 
adverse effects on the marine environment. 772 
The major technological difference between land-based and ocean 
incineration is the absence of scrubbers on the ocean incineration 
vessels. 773 The controversy over the need for scrubbers on ocean 
incineration vessels is clouded by two common misconceptions re-
garding scrubber technology. The first involves the issue of what 
particular waste products actually are removed by scrubbers. Scrub-
bers generally are effective at removing acid gases, but are not 
always effective at removing residual organic material, such as un-
burned wastes or PICs.774 
The second misunderstood issue is that a difference exists between 
the emissions of organic material that would be allowed under the 
regulations corresponding to land-based incineration and ocean in-
cineration. The proposed regulation called for the performance of 
ocean incinerators, like land-based incinerators without scrubbers, 
to be measured by calculating destruction efficiency (DE). For land-
based incinerators utilizing scrubbers, performance is measured by 
calculating destruction and removal efficiency (DRE), after emis-
sions pass through the scrubber. In the end, the DE standard pro-
posed for ocean incinerators was identical to the DRE standard for 
land-based incinerators with scrubbers. Emissions from ocean incin-
eration would not be any greater than those allowed for land-based 
incinerators, even after determining any incidental removal of or-
ganic material by the scrubbers. In other words, ocean incinerators 
would be held to the same overall performance standard. 775 
Thus, any evaluation of the need for scrubbers on ocean inciner-
ation vessels should be limited to HCI and appropriate particulate 
emissions. EPA determined that HCI gases would be rapidly neu-
tralized by seawater, and particulate emissions would be minimal 
because of the limited types of wastes (e.g., liquid wastes with low 
metal contents) that would be allowed for ocean incineration. 776 
Another criticism of at-sea incineration concerns the approaches 
used to clean the ships. When the Matthias III was sold, the cleaning 
inhabiting the ocean surface waters that are most proximal to emissions and spill wastes. See, 
e.g., id. at 42-43. 
mId. 
773 OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, 8Upra note 72, at 11. As of 1986, scrubbers were only used 
on about 37% of existing land-based incinerators. Id. at 10l. 
Tl4 I d. at 12. 
Tl5Id. 
mId. 
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required by the government produced fifteen cubic meters of solids 
(scales and rusts) that were to be disposed in a landfill in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and about 290 tons of liquids with small solid 
particles that were to be incinerated on the Vulcanus 1.777 In June, 
1981, the Netherlands authorities revoked the Certificate of Ap-
proval for the Vulcanus I because of leaking cargo tanks. The ship's 
owners, Ocean Combustion Services, then took the ship to sea and 
cleaned the tanks en route to a Spanish shipyard for repairs because 
no harbor authority would allow such cleaning.778 This happened 
again in January, 1983, after the Vulcanus I had been operating in 
Australian waters and needed cleaning before entry to a shipyard in 
Singapore for repairs. 779 To eliminate this concern, USCG personnel 
would ensure that any wastes that are not burned at sea are either 
retained on board for burning during a subsequent burn or are 
brought ashore for disposal. This process could include supervision 
of tank cleaning operations to ensure that tanks are washed properly 
and that leftover wastes are transferred ashore to adequate disposal 
facilities. 780 
Also of concern regarding the ocean incineration option are the 
issues of liability limits and financial responsibility requirements. 781 
The MPRSA establishes no liability limits for any of the activities it 
covers, including ocean incineration. 782 Further, the MPRSA does 
not explicitly authorize EPA to impose a financial responsibility 
requirement through regulation. 783 Recognizing the need to impose 
such a requirement, EPA's Proposed Ocean Incineration Regulation, 
while noncommittal on the issue, sought public comment on a pro-
posed liability range of $50-500 million for ocean incineration per-
mittees. 784 Because the regulation was never finalized, the issue of 
liability was never resolved. 
777 International Maritime Organization, supra note 272, at 1. 
778 Vallette, supra note 342, at 11. 
779 International Maritime Organization, supra note 272, at 2. 
780 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 98 (statement of USCG Captain R. T. Rufe, in 
response to Representative Lowry's questions). 
7810TA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 46. Liability requirements are distin-
guishable from financial responsibility requirements. Liability limits, which are commonly set 
by statutes, represent specified maximum amounts of money that a party can be legally 
required to pay for damages. Financial responsibility requirements, which can be set by 
statutes or regulations, are designed to assure that parties undertaking certain activities have 
sufficient financial resources to meet liabilities the parties might incur. Thus, the liability limit 
and the required level of financial responsibility are typically the same. Id. 
782 Id. 
783 Id. 
784 50 Fed. Reg. 8233 (1985); see also OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 46-
47. 
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In 1986, however, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act (SARA) specifically addressed the issues of liability limits 
and financial responsibility requirements of owners and operators of 
incinerator vessels. 785 Section 127 of SARA amended sections 107 
and 108 of CERCLA in two ways. First, section 127 equated incin-
erator vessel liability with liability of CERCLA facilities so that an 
owner or operator of an ocean incineration vessel would be liable for 
the total costs of cleanup in the event of a spill and up to $50 million 
for natural resources damages. Second, SARA authorized EPA to 
require additional evidence of financial responsibility for incinerator 
vessels commensurate with the risks posed by ocean incineration, 
transportation, and other pertinent factors, starting with a minimum 
of $5 million. 786 Further, section 127(g) of SARA added a savings 
clause to section 106 of the MPRSA, which would allow private 
citizens to recover damages resulting from noncompliance with the 
MPRSA or the relevant ocean incineration permit. 787 
In addition, EPA considered establishing a new financial respon-
sibility requirement to be set at a determined amount to ensure that 
ocean incineration companies have funds available to respond to a 
spill and any third-party claims and to pay for any natural resources 
damages. The type of financial responsibility mechanism EPA con-
sidered allowing an applicant to use would include any of the mech-
anisms allowed under CERCLA section 108, including insurance, 
guarantee, surety bond, or qualification as a self-insurer. 788 
As with most aspects of the ocean incineration option, environ-
mental groups considered these liability provisions inadequate to 
cover the costs associated with a spill of hazardous substances, in-
cluding costs to third parties, and suggested a substantial increase 
in required coverage. 789 Indeed, they cite the 1983 Chern Waste 
785 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 54 (memorandum from the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, to the Subcommittee on 
Oceanography). 
786 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(c)(1)(D), 9608(a)(I) (1982 & Supp. V 1986). 
787 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 54 (memorandum from the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to the Subcommittee on 
Oceanography). 
788 42 U.S.C. § 9608(a)(1) (1982). 
789 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 167-70 (statement of Sally Ann Lentz, the 
Oceanic Society, on behalf of eight other environmental groups). The environmentalists crit-
icized EPA for relying on an insurance study (Clark, Oppenheimer, and Engineering Computer 
Opteconomics, Inc., Environmental Insurance Coverage for Ocean Incineration Vessels (1985) 
(prepared for the Office of Policy, Planning, and Assessment» that they believed flawed, to 
determine the cost of cleanup. Specifically, they believe the assumption that any "spilled 
substances would be oil-like in nature, denser than water and likely to float on the surface" 
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applications for "special" permits, which proposed coverage of $350 
million in liability insurance as a more realistic benchmark indication 
of a minimum standard than EPA's proposal of $50 million. 790 
A potential problem with these insurance requirements is that 
marine insurance policies are subject to legal defenses. The issue of 
exemption from liability for damages resulting from "acts of God," 
for example, needs to be addressed. 791 The fact that no legal regime 
exists to cover the cost of damages to marine resources and human 
health associated with the normal permitted operation of an ocean 
incinerator also has been criticized. 792 In other words, coverage ap-
plies to damage arising from "sudden and accidental events" such as 
spills, but not to damages from "gradual pollution," such as incin-
erator emissions. 793 It is argued that, due to the possibility that 
damages to the environment or human health could arise from ocean 
incineration apart from a spill, legal provisions should be established 
to protect potential victims from such risks. 794 However, land-based 
incinerators also are exempt from mandatory insurance for liability 
for damages from "gradual pollution. "795 Liability for damages from 
federally permitted releases should be no different, at least in scope, 
for land-based incinerators than would be required of ocean incin-
erators. 
If the ocean incineration option is revived, EPA should further 
investigate the sufficiency of the liability provisions and ensure ad-
equate coverage during the permitting process. Where appropriate, 
the coverage and requirements should be similar to those placed on 
land-based incinerators. Further, it is important to note that many 
of the problems regarding liability that apply to ocean incineration 
actually reflect the much broader crisis in environmental liability in 
general. 796 
does not adequately cover the range of potential chemicals spilled and led to an underestimate 
of the costs of mitigating or cleaning up a sinking spill. [d. at 168-69. 
790 [d. at 169. 
791 Marine insurance policies are subject to several legal defenses. For example, such policies 
usually do not cover damages resulting from acts of God, and most policies provide no coverage 
unless negligence by the vessel's owner or operator can be proved. OTA, OCEAN INCINERA-
TION, supra note 72, at 47. 
792 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 170; see also Vallette, supra note 342, at 47. 
793 Thus, damages arising from "federally pennitted releases" do not trigger liability re-
quirements, thereby raising the problem of distinguishing damage caused by permitted re-
leases from damage caused by non-pennitted releases. OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra 
note 72, at 47. 
794 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 170. 
7950TA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 46. 
796 The ever-increasing difficulty in obtaining affordable commercial pollution insurance 
threatens all waste handlers. [d. 
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tJ nquestionably, limitations and uncertainties surround the ocean 
incineration option. For example, the studies did not consider a 
number of effects that might result from releases from the ocean 
and land-based system, particularly the potential effects from either 
system on terrestrial systems,797 or the impact on oceans from ter-
restrial emissions. Additionally, the analysis of the quantity of and 
effects from stack releases is based on a number of assumptions 
about incinerator performance and scrubber technology derived from 
limited trial burns. For instance, the data on PIC generation is 
extremely uncertain and subject to debate. 798 Also, the destruction 
efficiency (DE) concept may not sufficiently account for the mass of 
partially destroyed wastes and the mass of compounds newly syn-
thesized during the combustion process. 799 But most of these con-
cerns relate to incineration generally and not just to ocean inciner-
ation. Also, many of the assumptions used by EPA were 
conservative.8°O Thus, if these limitations and uncertainties are di-
minished in the future through further research and trial burns or 
if better data become available, then a more accurate assessment of 
ocean incineration could be achieved. 
VII. DISCUSSION 
In the 1970s, ocean incineration was heralded as a valuable means 
of disposing of some types of hazardous wastes. With available land-
fill capacity for disposing of hazardous wastes rapidly declining and 
the increase in associated tort and environmental clean-up liability, 
ocean incineration appeared to be a viable disposal option. For sev-
eral years, EPA's hazardous waste management policy not only had 
a pro-ocean incineration tilt, its policy operated in favor of one 
company, Waste Management; some even called this relationship 
''incestuous.''801 But this relationship was not surprising or even 
necessarily undesirable. Both EPA and Waste Management had an 
interest in seeing hazardous wastes managed, and strict regulation 
increased the power of EPA and concomitantly the profit potential 
of the waste management industry. 
In the short run, Waste Management benefitted from EPA's 
stance, although its competitors for ocean incineration business fared 
797 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 69. 
798 [d.; see also supra notes 573-76 and accompanying text. 
799 SAB REPORT, supra note 376, at 7; see supra notes 554-56 and accompanying text. 
800 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 69; 
see also supra note 760 and accompanying text. 
801 Bailey & Faupel, supra note 396, at 7. 
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poorly.802 For example, At-Sea Incineration, which could have pro-
duced the most modern incinerator ships, was "helped" into bank-
ruptcy by EPA. 803 SeaBurn, Inc., which may have had the best 
proposal, received short shrift from EPA's senior management. 804 
SeaBurn's plan involved total containerization from source to burn 
and included air pollution controls as well. 805 Even ocean incineration 
critics considered SeaBurn's approach to involve less risk. 806 
Much of the conflict surrounding the ocean incineration option was 
the result of intense competition between the ocean incineration 
industry, dominated by Waste Management and its subsidiaries, and 
the land-based incineration industry, led by Rollins Environmental 
Services, Inc. These organizations aggressively fought to advance 
their corporate interests and may be considered to have played very 
"hard ball" in the process. 807 They agreed on nothing, including the 
need for ocean incineration. Waste Management perceived a large 
market, with room for all viable disposal techniques,808 while Rollins 
and others disputed this claim. 809 
Waste Management participated actively in politicizing the early 
EPA decision making process and paid for much of the research 
supporting ocean incineration using the same contractor that EPA 
relied on to support their original favorable position toward ocean 
802 See Anderson, supra note 346, at C15; Anderson, Agencies Battle Over Disposal Rights, 
Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1975, at E23; see also supra notes 396-401, 408-16 and accompanying 
text. 
803 See supra notes 396-401 and accompanying text. 
804 Correspondence between Vincent G. Grey, President of SeaBurn, Inc., and William D. 
Ruckelshaus, Administrator of U.S. EPA, letters dated April 25, 1984; ~ay 24, 1984; June 
18, 1984; and July 6, 1984 (letters on file with the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law 
Review); see also Zurer, supra note 155, at 36-37. 
805 See DeGregorio & Grey, Seaburn: A New Concept of Chemical Waste Collection and 
Shipboard Incineration, 9 STOLTEN 12 (Aug. 1984). SeaBurn Inc.'s proposal involved trans-
porting wastes in standard intermodal tank containers that would have been carried on a 
specially designed container ship. Wastes would have moved directly from the shipping con-
tainers to the incinerator. No wastes would have been carried below deck, and in the event 
of a collision or sinking, the wastes would be unlikely to leak into the environment. The 
incinerators would have been horizontally oriented to minimize the air-borne plume and to 
facilitate monitoring and sampling. Scrubbers would have been used to direct gases to be 
assimilated in the sea and not become airborne. The ships would have been U.S. built and 
manned. Letter from Vincent Grey, President of SeaBurn Inc., to Dr. Tudor Davies, EPA 
(Feb. 18, 1987) (copy on file with the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review). 
806 See Zurer, supra note 155, at 30-32. 
807 To some, the ongoing encounter between Waste Management and Rollins was known as 
"The Shootout at the OK Dump." MacKay, supra note 359, at 43. 
808 See Nassos, supra note 275, at 211. 
809 House Hearing 1983, supra note 258, at 230 (1984) (testimony of Robert Gregory, Vice 
President, Rollins Environmental Services). 
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incineration.810 While this might be explained as the desire of Waste 
Management to hire the best people to do their work, the fact 
remains that much of the favorable scientific information generated 
by EPA, the industry, and even international organizations811 has a 
common source. TRW, Inc., in particular, was a major contractor to 
both EPA and Waste Management in developing the studies to sup-
port ocean incineration. 812 
This potential conflict of interest seems improper.813 Credibility of 
at least some of this data is compromised by the apparent discrep-
ancy between the conclusions and the data gathering. For example, 
in the 1981-1982 Vulcanus trip report,814 it is stated that combustion 
efficiencies averaged 99.983 and 99.976% in the port and starboard 
incinerators, respectively. However, the body of the report states 
that the burn began on December 22, 1981 and continued to January 
2, 1982. On December 25, the combustion gas monitoring equipment 
on the port incinerator became plugged, and no combustion mea-
surements were made after December 27. There were three sam-
pling operations. The first was successful, the second only partially 
successful, and the third was a total loss. In essence, the conclusions 
were based on incineration of a single waste sample. These data 
seem a slender reed on which to support claims of a successful and 
environmentally sound burn. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated 
example of the questionable quality of EPA-sponsored research re-
lating to the ocean burns. 
During the 1970s, the research that EPA could have used to 
support an effective and believable regulatory program was not 
810 Compare, e.g., D.G. ACKERMAN, TRIP REPORT PCB RESEARCH BURN ONBOARD THE 
Mtr VULCANUS, DECEMBER 20, 1981-JANUARY 4, 1982 [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRIP RE-
PORT] with D.G. ACKERMAN, R.G. BEIMER & J.F. MCGAUGHNEY, INCINERATION OF VOLA-
TILE ORGANIC COMPOUNDS ON THE MIT VULCANUS II (1983). 
811 See D.G. ACKERMAN, OCEANIC INCINERATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: A STATE-OF-
THE-ART DISPOSAL TECHNOLOGY (1987). AMI is a Dutch association whose members own 
and operate the world's three incineration vessels: the Vulcanus I and II, and the Vesta. 
Waste Management, through its subsidiary, Waste Management International, owns and 
operates the Vulcanus I and II. The Vesta is owned by Lehnkering-Montan A.G. of Duisberg, 
West Germany, a member of AMI, and an independent company in competition with the 
Vulcanus vessels. House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 220 (response by William Y. Brown, 
Waste Management, to questions posed by Representative Lowry, Subcomm. on Oceanogra-
phy). 
812 OTA lists two reports done by Ackerman et al., of TRW in 1983; one for EPA, and the 
other for Chern Waste. OTA, OCEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 205. 
813 Senate Hearing 1985, supra note 258, at 108, 113 (testimony of Sue Ann Fruge on behalf 
of The Gulf Coast Coalition for Public Health, Harlingen, Texas). 
814 ACKERMAN, TRIP REPORT, supra note 810. 
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done. In the early 1980s, when the tide of public opinion changed, 
ocean incineration became particularly vulnerable to opposition-
mostly based on politics, not science. Because it had the potential to 
affect an entire region, the nearby port community, communities 
along the coast near the burn site, and the associated marine envi-
ronment,815 the public that feared the risks but anticipated little 
personal benefit from ocean incineration was aroused. 
The ocean incineration controversy that followed shows that the 
NIMBY syndrome is not limited to local siting issues. When a pop-
ulation, like that of the Rio Grande Valley in Texas, perceived no 
new jobs, no additional money flowing into a depressed local econ-
omy, and envisioned potential harm to the local environment, they 
were easily convinced to oppose ocean incineration. The potential 
threat to the Gulf of Mexico aroused the ire of those who made their 
living from the finfish and shellfish inhabiting the Gulf. With a fishing 
industry in Texas whose annual catch was valued in 1982 at over 
$613 million, this reaction is not surprising.816 Solutions to social 
problems such as hazardous waste disposal always seem to be op-
posed by those who will have the activity take place near their turf. 
When you add to these dynamics an out-of-state corporation like 
Waste Management which was perceived as an undesirable neighbor, 
and a well-orchestrated and presumably well-financed817 opposition 
by a land-based incineration industry that did not wish to lose busi-
ness to a low-cost rival,818 one can understand why more than 6000 
people would attend a public hearing to oppose ocean incineration. 
This opposition, once again, showed that the public can veto any 
815 EPA, INCINERATION ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, supra note 27, at 19. 
816 House HeaTing 1983, supra note 258, at 72 (statement of Deyaun Boudreaux, citing 
National Marine Fisheries statistics). In 1987, testimony stated that the Gulf of Mexico has 
40% of the commercial fisheries in the United States, as well as a large portion of the 
recreational fisheries. House HeaTing 1987, supra note 293, at 114 (statement of J oan Brotman, 
Gulf Coast Coalition for Public Health). 
817 See MacKay, supra note 359, at 42-43; see also supra notes 358-61 and accompanying 
text. 
818 Over 50% of all commercial waste disposal and treatment is handled by nine major waste 
management firms. They are: Browning-Ferns Industries, CECOS International, Chem-
Clear, Chemical Waste Management, Conversion Systems, IT Corporation, Rollins Environ-
mental Services, SCA Chemical Services, and U.S. Ecology. See CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING 
NEWS 321 (May 31, 1982). In 1981, these firms operated 27 of the nation's 46 hazardous waste 
facilities. Only a few of these firms have high-temperature incinerator facilities capable of 
handling chemicals such as PCBs. These companies compete to destroy hazardous chemicals 
with waste treatment companies that use chemical detoxifying processes to produce harmless 
products. Ocean incineration would add a low cost competitor to this industry and so the 
majority of the industry seeks to prevent it from being given government permits. [d. 
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proposed remedy to environmental problems but seems unable to 
achieve the consensus necessary to implement a viable solution. 
When the public rose up against ocean incineration, EPA failed to 
exercise a leadership role. In the famous environmental case of 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commis-
sion,819 the court set forth the standard for an administrative agency: 
A regulatory commission can insure continuing confidence in its 
decisions only when it has used its staff and its own expertise in 
[a] manner not possible for the uninformed and poorly financed 
public . . . . [T]he Commission has claimed to be the represen-
tative of the public interest. This role does not permit it to act 
as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries 
appearing before it; the right of the public must receive active 
and affirmative protection at the hands of the Commission. 820 
In the case of ocean incineration, EPA was not even an honest 
umpire but made the calls for and against ocean incineration without 
the use of good science or even a long-term view of the public 
interest. As public opinion pressured EPA to change its pro-incin-
eration attitude, the public perception of the integrity of EPA and 
Waste Management became at least as important as the facts. This 
mood shifted the focus from the technological feasibility of the ocean 
incineration option to an attack on the credibility of many of the 
players. A strident distrust of Waste Management was demonstrated 
by both those who supported and those who opposed ocean inciner-
ation.821 
The focus on Waste Management's overall environmental compli-
ance record prohibited an objective evaluation of the ocean inciner-
ation option. The irony is that, following the termination of the 
United States' ocean incineration program, Waste Management con-
tinued to profit from its ocean incineration ships by incinerating 
overseas. Additionally, because Waste Management is an integrated 
waste management business, it still can offer customers in the 
United States its other waste disposal services without fear of ocean 
incineration competitors offering its customers a lower-cost option. 
Moreover, Rollins Environmental Services, Inc., one of the big win-
ners in obliterating its potential incineration rivals, has an environ-
mental compliance record that is far from exemplary. 822 
819 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). 
820 [d. at 620. 
821 Summary of Public Comments on the Proposed Research Pennit for Incineration at Sea 
to U.S. EPA by JT&A, Inc. (Contract No. 68-01-6986), April 24, 1986, at 2,7. 
822 See, e.g., Senate Hearing 1985, supra note 258, at 352-57 (disclosure statement of Rollins 
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The public outcry against Waste Management was not entirely the 
natural flow of outraged citizenry. The land-based incineration in-
dustry, including Rollins, publicly spoke out against ocean incinera-
tion, and financed local pseudo-environmental organizations to op-
pose ocean incineration,823 although their influence on the national 
environmental organizations is unknown. With the fight for the haz-
ardous waste market at stake, such corporate actions, on both sides, 
hardly are surprising. 
What is most disappointing is EPA's failure to protect the public 
interest. EPA failed to insist upon use of good science from the many 
test burns in the 1970s to provide information needed for public 
policy formulation. When public opinion changed in the 1980s, EPA 
remained silent despite the absence of significant negative data and 
the presence of favorable, although somewhat flawed, data concern-
ing ocean incineration that had accumulated world-wide. In the fa-
mous case of Calvert Cliffs' Coordination Committee, Inc. v. Atomic 
Energy Commission,824 Judge Wright criticized the Atomic Energy 
Commission for not taking "the initiative of considering environmen-
tal values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the pro-
cess. "825 In the case of ocean incineration, rather than taking initia-
tive or exercising a leadership role or acting to provide useful 
information on the relative risks of ocean incineration, EPA took the 
politically expedient position of doing nothing. EPA took a technol-
ogy deemed useful by their own in-house studies, as well as outside 
evaluation, and rejected it without expressed reasons. If such a 
response was based on data showing that ocean incineration was 
harmful, perhaps regulation through inaction could have been jus-
tified. Thus, EPA ended the use of ocean incineration by refusing to 
promulgate a regulation without finding fault with this hazardous 
waste disposal option. The uncertainty concerning the risks to the 
public from ocean incineration is no greater than the uncertainty 
surrounding other programs for which EPA has committed many 
resources (e.g., Superfund). In this case, EPA's inaction was, in 
essence, an admission that they could not credibly regulate. 
Environmental Services, Inc.). Exemplifying the politics and emotions pervading and confus-
ing the ocean incineration debate, in testimony against ocean incineration, a $2.6 billion suit 
against a land-based incinerator, Rollins, was cited as evidence of the problems associated 
with ocean incineration by a citizen opponent. House Hearing 1983, supra note 258, at 90-93 
(statement of Shirley Goldsmith, President, Calcasier League for Envtl. Action Now); see 
also Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 12, col. 3. 
823 See supra notes 358-61 and accompanying text. 
824 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
825 Id. at 1119. 
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Furthermore, the United States' use of the Ocean Dumping Ban 
Act to prevent ocean incineration is stretching a federal statute 
beyond its scope. Ocean incineration is not ocean dumping. The 
release of small quantities of air pollution from incinerator ships 
pales in comparison to the tremendous input of pollutants from land-
based air pollution sources, much of which is ultimately deposited 
directly into the ocean through air transport or indirectly from fresh 
water runoff. The stretched interpretation of ocean dumping seems 
even more absurd when the releases from incinerator ships are 
compared with land-based water discharges that eventually end up 
in the oceans. For example, PCB releases from one year's operation 
of the Vulcanus to incinerate PCB-containing wastes would result 
in a discharge of an estimated forty-three pounds of PCBs to the 
environment. 826 Yet, it has been estimated that 12,281 pounds of 
PCBs flow into the Chesapeake Bay each year, primarily from non-
point source, urban runoff. 827 
The Ocean Dumping Ban Act might only wind up banning ocean 
incineration. Today, most ocean dumping is of sewage sludge. A 
successful ban on sludge disposal in the ocean will require building 
land-based sludge incinerators. Land incinerator proponents will face 
the same NIMBY gridlock that other incineration proposals have 
faced. 828 Thus, the Ocean Dumping Ban Act may actually increase 
the pressure to dump in the sea. 
The international community also may be rethinking its opposition 
to ocean incineration. While the rhetoric of many European nations 
826 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 203 (statement of Dr. William Y. Brown, on 
behalf of the Association of Maritime Incinerators, Appendix I, Background Information on 
Incineration at Sea). 
827 [d. at 205 (citing Basta et al., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, paper 
presented at Coastal Zone 85, Baltimore, MD, July 30-August 2, 1985). Also, claims of 
catastrophic effects from a potential spill must be viewed in light of the petrochemical indus-
try's discharges during the 1960s and 1970s of millions of tons of liquid wastes (including 
chlorinated hydrocarbons), directly into coastal U.S. waters. For example, in 1973, approxi-
mately 1.408 million tons of industrial waste were dumped into the Gulf of Mexico. This is the 
equivalent of a full load of the Vulcanus dumped directly into the ocean each day for an entire 
year. [d. at 208 (statement of Dr. William Y. Brown, on behalf of the Association of Maritime 
Incinerators, Appendix I, Background Information on Incineration at Sea). 
828 For example, in New York City, all but two landfills have been closed, and the sole 
remaining dump, Fresh Kills on Staten Island, could grow as high as 50 stories by the year 
2000, unless the city constructs the five huge incinerators which have been stymied by political 
delays and lawsuits. The city will have to spend around $500 million to compost or incinerate 
sludge, which it presently dumps in the Atlantic Ocean. Although the Ocean Dumping Ban 
Act orders such dumping halted by 1991, municipal officials say they will be unable to meet 
the deadline. Finder, Finding Ways to Finish Job of Fixing New York, N. Y. Times, Dec. 28, 
1989, at B1, B6. 
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has been in favor of phasing out this practice,829 the actual use of 
ocean incineration in the North Sea has remained constant at about 
100,000 tons per year through the 1980s.830 Further, the number of 
companies using the Vulcanus ships has increased from two in 1974 
to 754 in 1986 as the demand for ocean incineration has shifted from 
large to smaller companies. 831 Because alternative disposal methods 
and sites are no easier to obtain in Europe than in the United 
States,832 there is reason to suspect that the use of the North Sea 
for incineration will continue. 
Additionally, the Germans and other Europeans have stated, in 
support of their decision to phase out ocean incineration, that the 
incineration of hazardous wastes removes the potential to extract 
and reuse valuable components within the waste. 833 Calling for the 
phasing out of ocean incineration and not, concomitantly, land-based 
incineration, is blatantly inconsistent, and demonstrates the political 
nature of the decision. Both land-based and ocean-based incinerators 
destroy wastes, removing the potential for reuse of valuable com-
ponents. Further, ocean incineration certainly can be utilized for 
those hazardous wastes from which no useful components can be 
extracted for reuse or recycling, such as highly chlorinated wastes 
and PCBs. 
Thus, the United States' position supporting those in the inter-
national community who seek to phase out ocean incineration does 
not further United States interests. 834 This nation should not nego-
tiate away an important option for our hazardous waste control based 
on the claim that ocean incineration is not compatible with ocean 
829 See House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 224--31 (citing PIASECKI & DAVIS, AMERICA'S 
FUTURE IN TOXIC WASTE MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM EUROPE (1987». 
830 IMO REPORT, supra note 444, at 29; see also Zurer, supra note 155, at 38. 
831 IMO REPORT, supra note 444, at 29. 
832 A 1985 survey of member states to the Oslo Convention was undertaken to detennine 
the feasibility of ending ocean incineration in the North Sea. The survey documented that: (1) 
there is a potential shortfall in the capacity of land-based incinerators and other land-based 
treatment methods to dispose of the wastes currently being incinerated at sea; (2) spare 
capacity on land is considered far from sufficient, with very little increase in such capacity 
expected in the near future; and (3) the major constraint blocking tennination of ocean 
incineration is the .lack of land-based capacity for chlorinated hydrocarbon wastes. OTA, 
OcEAN INCINERATION, supra note 72, at 17. 
833 House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 227-28 (citing PIASECKI & SUTTER, ALTERNA-
TIVES TO OCEAN INCINERATION IN EUROPE (1986». 
834 As in the United States, Europe has opponents of ocean incineration. Even if ocean 
incineration is phased out in Europe for political reasons, it would not be unwise for the 
United States to use ocean incineration to serve a specific hazardous waste disposal need. 
House Hearing 1987, supra note 293, at 222 (statement of Dr. William Y. Brown, Waste 
Management, Inc., in response to Representative Lowry's questions). 
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protection, for this argument is neither supported nor unsupported 
by the scientific data. 
Ocean incineration could be an important component of a hazard-
ous waste disposal program. The present inventory of just PCBs 
requiring disposal is about 750,000 metric tons. 835 If the concentra-
tion of PCBs that makes wastes legally hazardous is lowered by EPA 
regulatory change, then the amount of waste requiring disposal could 
triple. 836 Today in the United States there are three large and one 
small land-based commercial incinerators that can do this work. They 
have a combined annual capacity of 70,000 tons. The chemical indus-
try can dechlorinate another 40,000 tons per year. Ocean incineration 
could add 60,000 tons per year from just the Vulcanus II, and 90,000 
tons per year from the Apollo I, if it could be used. 837 The ban on 
liquid organics going to commercial landfills could add 125,000 tons 
per year to the demand for incineration. If liquid injection wells are 
banned, as has been proposed, the 6.5% of hazardous wastes that 
would be suitable for incineration could increase demand for incin-
eration by another two million tons per year.838 With this demand, 
there would be a need for increased incineration capacity even 
though the land-based incinerators presently may have excess ca-
pacity.839 
A crucial point to stress is that ocean incineration destroys haz-
ardous wastes rather than just relocating them in landfills, injection 
wells, and lagoons to perpetuate the danger that could potentially 
harm future generations. While the ocean incineration option has an 
additional transportation step that presents additional risks, so too 
does the long-term storage of toxic wastes. It is a matter of social 
choice to accept this risk element associated with transportation that 
is tied to the destruction of the wastes rather than allow the wastes 
to remain a long-term hazard for local populations. Destruction 
rather than dumping should be a leading consideration when balanc-
ing risks against benefits. 
Further, because destruction techniques encompass both land-
based and ocean-based incineration, it makes little sense to have 
them regulated by different offices within EPA. Thus, if ocean in-
cineration is given renewed legal viability, it should be regulated by 
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EPA's Office of Solid Waste, which currently regulates land-based 
incineration.840 Also, land-based incineration regulations should be 
made as stringent as the Proposed Ocean Incineration Regulation. 
Even if the ocean incineration program is not revived, there seems 
to be no reason not to protect the public with a degree of regulatory 
protection applied to land-based incinerators that already was con-
sidered feasible and economically acceptable by those companies 
desiring to incinerate at sea. 
Present-day society has accepted the benefits of useful chemicals, 
even though the production and use of these substances involves 
production of hazardous wastes and post-use disposal problems. In 
the past, industry could make its production decisions on the basis 
of seeking to maximize their profit while knowing that the costs of 
both production and disposal would include appreciable external 
costs that society, not the producer, would eventually pay. Now that 
these external costs are being paid by society in the form of envi-
ronmental degradation and adverse impacts on human health, society 
is attempting to shift them back to the manufacturer and force these 
costs to be internalized. To the extent that the regulatory process 
is successful, hazardous waste generators should absorb as much of 
the real cost as possible. Products will then reflect the costs of 
protecting our ecosystem. Hopefully, more environmentally benign 
products will then enjoy a marketplace advantage. 
However, zero risk is not achievable by any known waste treat-
ment or disposal option. Only the non-generation of wastes-possible 
only if society is willing to forego the benefits associated with the 
products from which the wastes are derived-will give us the desired 
zero risk. 841 Nearly all alternative types of hazardous waste man-
agement and disposal involve the storage and transport of the 
wastes; accidental spills and emissions can occur during any stage 
with any option. Issues relating to the incidence of leaks and spills 
during storage and transport operations are similar for land-based 
and ocean-based incineration. The unique problems associated with 
ocean incineration should be further identified, researched, and ad-
dressed. Comprehensive, repeated sampling and monitoring is nec-
essary to ensure that transportation and incineration procedures are 
840 46 Fed. Reg. 7666 (1981); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122, 264, 265 (1989). 
841 "Almost everyone would support reducing wastes at their source in principle, but in 
practice we're not going to arrive at total source reduction for a long time. Right now we 
have a backlog of PCBs and chlorinated pesticides. These must be contended with now." 
Zurer, supra note 155, at 31 (quoting Kenneth S. Kamlet, URS-Dalton and former director 
of NWF's Pollution and Toxic Substances Division). 
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adequate. Observers must be used to help ensure compliance with 
all phases. EPA needs to expand its research on the transport, fate, 
and effects of land-based and ocean-based incinerator emissions 
through both field and laboratory studies. 
Noone is claiming that ocean incineration is a panacea. It may be 
a viable choice, however. If there are shortcomings in destruction 
efficiencies, monitoring, or in the production of PICs, then we should 
be working to correct them. A program to develop and improve this 
technology is needed. We should not, however, blindly condemn 
ocean incineration when its dangers are similar to those carried out 
by land-based incinerators in much greater proximity to the public. 
Ocean incineration of hazardous wastes warrants careful reconsid-
eration as it may be a viable and useful disposal alternative,842 es-
pecially when human health and overall environmental impacts are 
considered. EPA's decision to forego continuing exploration of the 
viability of ocean incineration was made in the absence of objective, 
valid scientific data and in the face of emotional opponents. It is 
indeed sad that, twenty years after the start of ocean-based incin-
eration, the overriding question remains the same as when it first 
came into use: is ocean incineration a rational and scientifically valid 
option? No one-not EPA, not the waste management companies, 
not the environmental groups, and not society-really knows. Per-
haps no one ever will. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
United States regulatory requirements that pose increasingly 
tighter restrictions on hazardous waste management practices, and 
thus concomitantly limit options and increase costs, are driving the 
reconsideration of all hazardous waste management options. We are 
nowhere near a stage of total source reduction that would make 
incineration unneeded. Something must be done to manage existing 
wastes until hazardous waste minimization becomes a reality. 
With further research, and proper technology, monitoring, and 
enforcement, ocean incineration could be a valuable and environ-
mentally sound option for disposing of some liquid hazardous wastes, 
particularly when compared to land disposal alternatives currently 
available. This argument is bolstered by the fact that present land-
842 [d. at 42. The ocean incineration controversy actually reflects a wider problem: industry, 
government, and the public are unable to work with each other toward what should be the 
common goal of reducing hazards associated with toxic wastes. Mistrust creates an ongoing 
cycle of reports, hearings, lawsuits, and deluge; yet nothing progresses. [d. 
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based disposal techniques are facing political gridlock due to the 
ever-increasing NIMBY phenomenon. We need to work within the 
hierarchy of waste disposal options to reduce the inventory of haz-
ardous wastes. For the present, ocean incineration could give the 
United States another option. This does not imply that all concerns 
regarding ocean incineration are unwarranted or even resolved. But, 
for some of the large amount of liquid hazardous wastes that will 
nevertheless be produced, incineration in the ocean may be the least 
harmful option and should be objectively reconsidered. 
